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 Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a case study of the drink drive initiatives, including 
marketing communications, legislation and enforcement practices implemented in the 
state of Victoria (Australia) between 1989-2000. It has been argued that the 51% 
reduction in road toll was related to these initiatives. In order to explore the veracity 
of these claims, a holistic case study approach was adopted. In addition to an 
examination of the communications tactics and extant practices of enforcement 
agencies, the study involved interviews with two distinct groups: professionals in 
various fields pertaining to road safety, and members of the general Victorian driving 
community. The focus of this work was on the advertising and communications 
campaigns that were run by the Transport Accident Commission from 1989-2000; 
however the policy and enforcement initiatives were also examined in terms of their 
potential impact on the lowering of the road toll. Suggestions for the improvement of 
policy and communication strategies within a social marketing context are made. 
 
 
 
 vi
 Introduction 
Road safety is a serious problem that concerns motorised countries both rich 
and poor around the world. This thesis was undertaken in response to this problem 
and the need for improvements in jurisdictions around the world. This work is a case 
study of one jurisdiction that has achieved a significant reduction in its road toll over 
the past 15 years. More specifically, the study focused on one aspect of this 
jurisdiction’s road toll reduction efforts, the issue of drink driving. The jurisdiction, 
the Australian state of Victoria, was selected both for its uniqueness (of initiatives) 
and the potential insight it could provide as a case. This research examined the 
tripartite method that Victoria utilised which integrated legislation, enforcement, and 
advertising initiatives which resulted in both attitude and behaviour changes among 
the Victorian community. This case study examined data in the forms of 
documentation, interviews, and direct and participant-observation to draw its 
conclusions. All of the data are examined within the context of the relative 
component: legislation, enforcement, and finally advertising. The thesis culminates 
with two concluding chapters, one focusing on the Victorian initiatives and one 
addressing the future of anti-drink driving initiatives.  
In 2003, on average in Australia, road accidents resulted in one death each 
day, one severe brain injury every four days, a paraplegic or a quadriplegic was 
produced every 17 days, someone was admitted to hospital every three hours, and 
there was a person injured every 30 minutes (TAC, 2002). These statistics portray a 
very grim reality, especially considering that these statistics describe one of the safest 
jurisdictions in the world in this area. In 2003, 330 people died, 6,642 people were 
seriously injured, and 16,274 people suffered minor injuries on Victorian roads. 
Across the whole of Australia, road accidents cost the country $17 billion in 2003, 
which is more than the annual defence budget (ibid). Yet in 2000, Australia was rated 
the eleventh safest nation out of all OECD nations1 in regards to the road toll per 
                                                 
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a group of 30 countries whose work covers economic and 
social issues. The OECD is a measure often used by Australia for international comparisons covering a range of issues. The OECD is comprised of 
the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
 1
 100,000 population and the eighth safest for the number of deaths per 10,000 
registered vehicles (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2002). Thus statistics like 
those mentioned above, which come from one of the safest nations in the world 
regarding road safety, provide an explanation as to why the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) recently reported their prediction that road traffic injuries will be 
‘the third leading contributor to the global burden of disease and injury’ by 2020 if 
appropriate action is not taken (World Health Organisation, 2004b). According to 
WHO, an estimated 1.2 million people are killed worldwide every year in road 
crashes, while an additional 50 million are injured (ibid).  
Thesis structure 
This chapter gave an overview of the research that was conducted, its 
background, and the significance of the study. Chapter Two reviews the 
methodological approach conducted throughout the research process, and the 
literature supporting its use. Chapter Three presents the legislation initiatives 
implemented in Victoria, through an examination of the literature regarding the issues 
of BAC and civil liberties, and comments from professionals in the road safety field 
and community members. Chapter Four examines the enforcement initiatives 
implemented, also by considering the literature, involving deterrence theory and 
random breath testing, and data obtained regarding these practices from the 
professional and community interviews. Chapter Five presents the advertising 
initiatives in regards to the literature on a multitude of advertising theories and 
debates. Information gathered from professionals and community members is also 
examined. Chapter Six discusses the answers to the research questions. Chapter Seven 
presents information that was discovered however was not directly related to the 
objectives of this work. Limitations to the case study and suggestions for future anti-
drink drive campaigns are presented. 
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 1: Background to the Study 
The study presented here is an exploration and assessment of the major drink 
drive initiatives that were implemented in Victoria, Australia between 1989 and 2000. 
The study encompasses initiatives from the legislative, enforcement, and advertising 
(public education) environments. In this case, initiatives from these three areas, 
henceforth known as ‘components’, were combined to form an integrated campaign. 
Integration of these components has been moulded into and classified as the ‘tripartite 
model for behavioural compliance in a social marketing campaign’. The tripartite 
model displayed prominently throughout this case; each component will be examined 
both individually and as a sum of the parts in three subsequent chapters. It has been 
observed that in this case, the use of a tripartite model appeared to have been a pivotal 
factor in the successful implementation of a drink drive road safety campaign.  
Road Safety in Australia and Worldwide 
Road safety is a field which concentrates on reducing the numbers of and 
consequences of vehicle crashes. Reductions and consequences of vehicle crashes are 
affected by creating and implementing management systems that integrate multiple 
arenas through a holistic approach. The facets that comprise road safety are: road user 
attitudes and behaviours, legislative policy, enforcement, engineering, road 
environment, and technology. Each of these factors affects the road toll, which is 
defined as the number of people who have died in road accidents. When evaluating a 
jurisdiction and its road toll, it is important to consider the size of the jurisdiction, the 
number and type (car, truck, motorcycle) of registered vehicles, the number of 
registered drivers, and the driving environment (eg metropolitan or rural area). This is 
necessary because these factors may each need to be addressed by different strategies 
(for example using police cars for random breath testing in rural areas compared to 
utilising large buses in metropolitan areas). 
In the 1970s, road safety became an issue that gained attention internationally. 
Since then different strategies have been implemented in a range of countries that led 
to varying results in the overall road toll (see Figure 1 on p4). Australia (and Victoria 
specifically) implemented a tripartite approach to road safety, integrating legislation, 
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 enforcement, and advertising to address road safety issues. In this time, Australia’s 
road toll since 1970 has been halved.  
In 1990 Sweden lowered its BAC limit to .02. As of 2000, Sweden was one of 
the three safest OECD countries based on number of fatalities per 100,000 population 
and per 10,000 registered vehicles (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2002). 
Conversely, the United States has reduced its road toll by only a third since 1970. 
While advocacy in the United States has been strong, legislation and enforcement 
efforts have been weak and have not gained much support (as evidenced by the 
United States having some of the highest blood alcohol concentration levels in the 
motorised world).  
Over the last twenty years, many countries have changed their approach to 
road safety. Previously there was a focus on isolated publicity and information efforts 
(Breen, 2004). However during the 1980s, many countries around the world have 
implemented a ‘systems’ approach to road safety. The systems approach addresses the 
traffic system as a whole unit, and looks at the interactions between road users, 
vehicles, and the road infrastructure in order to identify solutions (World Health 
Organisation, 2004a).  
 
Figure 1: Trends in fatalities per 100,00 population in selected OECD Regions (OECD, 2001)  
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 Road toll numbers have decreased over the past three decades while 
motorisation and population levels have increased. The following numbers illustrate 
this point: in 1970, with more than 4.5 million registered vehicles in Australia, there 
were 7.96 road fatalities per 10,000 registered vehicles. In 1997, the rate had 
decreased to 1.58 deaths per 10,000 registered vehicles, while there were over 11 
million registered vehicles (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 1997). In terms of 
population, in 1970 there were 30.4 fatalities per 100,000 population. In 1997, the rate 
of fatalities had dropped to 9.7 per 100,000 population. In 1970 Australia had a 
population of approximately 12.5 million, with an increase to a population of over 
18.5 million by 1997 (ibid). Figure 2 (below) and Figure 3 (p6) depict these patterns 
from 1925 through to 1997.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Road fatalities per 10,000 registered vehicles and 100,000 population, Australia 
1925-972  
 
                                                 
2 Source: (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 1997) 
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Figure 3: Number of road fatalities and registered vehicles, Australia 1925-19973  
 
Drink Drank Drunk? 
There are three levels of driving that involve alcohol which need to be defined 
for this thesis. These definitions are not universal, and are not strictly the definitions 
used within Victoria. It is for the purpose of meaningful discussion that these terms 
need to be defined. 
Drinking and driving relates to a driver who has consumed a small amount of 
alcohol (that would result in a BAC of under .02) and then drives a motor vehicle. 
Drink driving refers to a motorist who is driving after their consumption of 
alcohol would result in a BAC within the range of .02 to .10. 
Drunk driving refers to a driver who is operating a motor vehicle with a BAC 
at or above a level of .10. The BAC level of .10 was chosen because it is at this level 
that many of the visual behavioural impairments of alcohol occur. It is these visual 
impairments that many community members use to distinguish a ‘drunk driver’, so 
therefore it will be used as the classification in this work. This distinction is 
problematic however, and will be discussed in a following chapter. 
                                                 
3 Source: (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 1997)
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 Australians and Alcohol 
Alcohol plays a major role in the larger Australian social society and it is 
understood that beer consumption is an Australian pastime (Pettigrew, 2002). Its 
function is versatile, illustrated by the clichéd image of ‘mates having a few drinks 
‘round the barbie’, the prevalence of alcohol at sporting events, and the almost iconic 
status of the major beer brands. According to Pettigrew, “Alcohol plays a major 
symbolic role in Australian culture, with beer being closely associated with the 
Australian lifestyle [Fiske, et al, 1987; Kerr et al., 2000] (p113)”. Australians were the 
ninth largest per capita consumers of beer in the world as of 1999, which illustrates 
that the perceived link between beer and Australians is correct (Productschap Voor 
Gedistilleerde Dranken., 1999. as cited in Pettigrew, 2002, p113). Further, Australia’s 
per capita alcohol consumption was ranked 20th in the world in 1996 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). In a country in which alcohol is engrained to 
such a degree in the culture, some of the consequences of alcohol consumption (e.g. 
drink driving) are bound to occur.  
Alcohol is not only a significant component of Australian social lives, but it is 
considered by Australians to be ‘an integral part of Australian life and culture’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). This strong linkage between alcohol and the 
Australian community was an issue that would have warranted attention when a 
campaign to address drink driving was being developed. If this link had been ignored 
and a campaign was created that intended to sever the relationship between 
Australians and alcohol completely, it might be deduced that it would likely have 
been denied credibility and attention by the Australian community. Conversely, a 
campaign designed to alter attitudes and behaviours that allowed for the consumption 
of alcohol would have a higher chance of resonating with the community and 
therefore potentially gaining their acceptance. Ultimately this acceptance could result 
in a change of attitude and the adoption of desired behaviours and minimisation of 
undesirable behaviours. Furthermore, drink driving was an ingrained behaviour 
among Australians, evidenced by the high percentage of road deaths related to 
alcohol. For example, in 1981, 41% of Australian road fatalities of drivers and 
motorcycle riders had a BAC of .05 or above (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
1997). Thus the campaign strategy needed to provide specific and credible reasons as 
to why drink driving was an undesirable and unacceptable behaviour, as well as 
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 providing alternative behaviours to driving when drinking. While working to alter 
behaviours, an attitudinal change needed to be addressed as well, both at the 
community and individual level. These attitudinal shifts would support the change of 
behaviours by the individual by making the behaviours a socially immoral and 
therefore undesirable action.  
Road fatalities in the ‘70s and ‘80s 
Road fatalities became an increasingly serious issue in the 1970s and 1980s in 
Australia. According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), there were 
3,798 road fatalities in 1970, representing 30.4 deaths per 100,000 persons or 8 per 
10,000 registered vehicles. The number of deaths fluctuated within the 3,000-4,000 
range throughout the 1970s and mid 1980s. The number of fatalities was beginning to 
gain attention within the community and the road toll became a community issue. In 
Victoria, the newspaper the Sun News Pictorial began one of the first community 
campaigns against drink driving, launched in November 1970 entitled, ‘Declare war 
on 1034’. 1034 was the number of people killed on the roads in Victoria the previous 
year. The following quote from the article illustrated some of the facts used to try to 
engage and stimulate Victorians: 
Ten Thirty-Four isn’t just a road toll figure for 1969. It is a symbol of the dreadful 
carnage that makes this state statistically the most dangerous place on Earth for 
drivers…When a bridge collapses and 34 people die, we are rightly horrified. But we 
accept, almost without question, that four times that number will die between now 
and Christmas swiftly and shockingly (Sunday Herald Sun, 1995)4. 
However the Sunday Herald Sun’s call to action was not taken up by the 
community for almost twenty years, as the road toll remained in the 800s and 900s 
throughout the 1970s. While the organisation VicRoads launched smaller public 
education campaigns throughout the 1980s in Victoria, they had little or no effect on 
the community as the road toll fluctuated within the 600 and 700 range. It was in 1986 
that the first all-encompassing step was taken to combat the road toll. Under the 
Victorian Transport Accident Act 1986, the TAC, or Transport Accident Commission 
was established. The TAC is a third-party government insurance agency whose 
intention is to ‘ensure that road accident victims received adequate compensation and 
                                                 
4 In 1995 the Sunday Herald Sun published an article detailing the ‘Declare War on 1034’ campaign, and included quotations from articles written 
in 1970.
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 the cost of road accidents to the community was reduced’ (Transport Accident 
Commission, n-d). 
The TAC is responsible for paying the compensation and early rehabilitation 
costs for people injured in transport accidents, and also for minimising the cost and 
occurrence of transport accidents.  
With regard to the TAC’s responsibility of minimising the cost and occurrence 
of transport accidents, the TAC implemented a variety of initiatives, from a graphic 
advertising campaign to the execution of stationary random breath testing. These 
initiatives will be featured throughout this research. 
 In November 1989, the TAC launched its first advertising campaign on drink 
driving, which continued relatively unchanged through the year 2000. While the 
components of its success are an issue under debate, the road toll in Victoria dropped 
from 776 in 1989 to a low of 376 in 1994, fluctuating but settling on 383 at the 
conclusion of 1999. The campaign was comprised of a tripartite approach, 
encompassing legislative, enforcement, and advertising components.  
Victoria as a leader 
This study was set in Victoria, Australia and examined a case where there 
appears to have been success in reducing the drink driving road toll. In addition, an 
aim of this research was to identify the successful components of the campaign and 
present them as an example of a potential model for developing initiatives to combat 
drink driving behaviour in developed countries. Australia was primarily chosen due to 
the success it has achieved in lowering its road toll since the late 1980s. While not the 
only country to demonstrate this success, Australia as a nation was chosen due to 
similarities it shares with the United States of America. One major focus of 
commonality is the influence and importance of alcohol in the societies’ social 
structures. 
Victoria as a state was chosen for the successes it claimed to have achieved in 
minimising drink driving. Statistically Victoria also appeared to have lowered its 
overall road toll5 more successfully over the 1989-1999 timeframe of this research in 
                                                 
5 While comparisons amongst the states detailing alcohol fatalities would have been more applicable, this information was not publicly available. 
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 comparison with other Australian state and territories (see Figure 4 below)6. While 
New South Wales (NSW) and Victoria began with the highest levels of fatalities, and 
NSW also experienced a large reduction in their road toll, it appears that Victoria’s 
was more pronounced and resulted in an overall lower fatality rate. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Australian Fatalities by State from 1989-19997
 
Over the time frame of this case study Victoria consistently had one of the 
lowest percentages of fatal accidents due to drivers with an illegal BAC among 
Australian states and territories (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 1998). Victoria 
has both metropolitan areas and rural areas, and has a relatively heterogenous 
population. In addition, as the smallest state on the mainland Victoria is more 
comparable to a majority of US states (by area) than other Australian states or 
territories (Wikipediai:, 2000). This is important regarding enforcement initiatives and 
resources, such as mobile breath testing units. Thus, parallels are more easily drawn 
between the average US state and the Australian state of Victoria when it comes to the 
area of the jurisdiction and possible enforcement initiatives. These demographics, in 
                                                 
6 Statistics of alcohol fatalities by state were not accessible  
7 Source: (ATSB, 2004): Chart created at: http://tssu.atsb.gov.au/Query_DB.cfm
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 conjunction with its initiatives and supposed successes led to the choice of Victoria 
for this case study.  
Significance of the Study 
At the beginning of 1995, five years into its road safety program, Victoria was 
declared to have “the safest roads of anywhere in the world” (Black, 1995). From 
1989 to 1994, the road toll on Victoria’s roads was reduced by 51%, down from 776 
fatalities; making the 378 people killed on the roads in 1994 the lowest toll ever 
recorded. Between 1995 and 2000 the numbers fluctuated from a record low of 377 
deaths to a high of 418. There have been numerous studies undertaken to determine 
whether or not the TAC initiatives, most specifically the TAC’s advertising campaign 
were the cause of the reduction. It is claimed by the TAC that their advertising 
campaign, in conjunction with .05 legislation and the implementation of random 
breath testing (RBT) was largely responsible for the drastic reduction in the Victorian 
road toll. The TAC has used research from the Monash University Accident Research 
Centre (MUARC) and Brian Sweeney Research to base this claim. The Victorian 
initiatives are considered ‘world’s best practice’ by some international organisations 
(Breen, 2004). Several other countries, including the U.S. have sent representatives to 
Victoria to examine the initiatives in their context, to consider if any of the initiatives 
are applicable in their jurisdictions (Sinclair, 2004). New Zealand is one country that 
has adopted the TAC’s advertising style and created their own campaign based on the 
concepts of the TAC initiatives.  
Despite the TAC’s claims and the MUARC research, there is disagreement 
within the Australian road safety field as to whether or not the TAC campaign was the 
cause of the reduction in road toll. In addition there are claims that millions of dollars 
were unnecessarily wasted on the high-cost television advertisements. The most vocal 
of opponents is Dr. Michael White, a researcher at Transport South Australia. He has 
written multiple reports on the subject of the MUARC research, which he believes is 
incorrect [(White, 2000, 2001; White & Walker, 2002; White, Walker, Glonek, & 
Burns, 2000)]. There are others in the road safety field that concur with Dr. White, 
and agree with his argument that the MUARC research is faulty and the economy was 
the major factor in the road toll decline (pers comm., 2003). This argument over the 
success of the TAC campaign is based on quantitative methods and measurement 
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 issues relating to econometric models. This case study considered human attitudes and 
behaviours. 
It would appear that amongst the quantitative research there is little qualitative 
work on the subject of the Victorian, and more specifically, the TAC initiatives. 
Therefore qualitative research may provide more holistic and detailed information, 
which could ultimately result in a more robust understanding of the impact of these 
initiatives on the attitudes and behaviours of Victorians. Thus a case study 
methodology was adopted to focus on the initiatives in Victoria as a whole, and 
interviews were conducted to collect in-depth information directly from members of 
the Victorian community. This information may be helpful in planning future anti-
drink drive initiatives, both in Victoria, other Australian states and territories, and in 
other countries with comparable societies.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine and analyse the initiatives 
implemented in Victoria to minimise drink driving, and particularly those 
implemented by the Transport Accident Commission. Specifically, this study aimed to 
ascertain which initiatives were successful in affecting drink driving attitudes and 
behaviours in Victoria. By taking a qualitative ‘case’ approach this study intended to 
gain insight in to how the initiatives affected the Victorians that were exposed to 
them. In particular, this research sought to obtain and present information in a manner 
that may allow for cross-cultural adaptation for countries with similar societal aspects 
that have not achieved comparable reductions in their drink driving road behaviours. 
To obtain this information the following research questions were put forward: 
1. How have the attitudes toward drink driving changed among Victorians 
since 1989? 
2. What has changed in drink driving behaviour since 1989? 
3. What factors have led to a reduction in incidences of drink driving in 
Victoria? 
4. What types of advertising tactics are effective in changing people’s 
attitudes/behaviours regarding drink driving? 
5. What direction could future anti-drink driving campaigns take to improve 
upon the success of their predecessors? 
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 Scope of work 
While addressing the abovementioned questions, the thesis will be guided by 
the following boundaries and limitations: although a version of the Transport 
Accident Commission’s (TAC) ‘Bloody Idiot’ drink driving advertising campaign 
continues in 2004, this thesis will only evaluate advertisements and initiatives up to 
the commencement of the year 2000. While it is noted that the road toll has fluctuated 
since the end of 1999, the commencement of the year 2000 serves as a cutting off 
point for various reasons. Firstly, the time period of December 1989-December 1999 
spans an entire decade, and one that encompasses the majority of new initiatives 
implemented in Victoria’s first comprehensive attack on the road toll. Secondly, ten 
years in an extended time that allows for various reactions and responses to road 
safety initiatives from the target audience (e.g. advertising wear-out, compliance, trial 
and acceptance or trial and rejection). Thirdly, as this is a qualitative work it is 
dependent upon existing quantitative data, and it is necessary to leave a window after 
the timeframe so there is access to data spanning the entire ten years, not solely the 
earlier years. As the initiatives that led to a significant change in road toll were 
implemented in 1989 and the early 1990s, and a score of information has been 
contributed to the road safety arena since that time, 1989 became the starting date and 
for reasons explained above the conclusion of 1999 is the ending date. 
Although the ‘Bloody Idiot’ Campaign was a single stream of the TAC’s 
entire ‘Road Safety’ Campaign, there was neither the time nor space in this thesis to 
examine the other campaigns. It also has been posited that the ‘Bloody Idiot’ 
Campaign could have been run independently while attaining similar results. This will 
be discussed in a subsequent chapter. However the possible implications of the 
‘Bloody Idiot’ campaign being run in conjunction with other road safety messages 
will be addressed. In addition, highlight initiatives of other campaigns that could be 
linked with drink driving will be examined, such as the implementation of speed 
cameras, the mandatory seat-belt legislation, and bicycle helmet legislation.  
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Lastly, while Australia as a whole is one of the safest nations in the world 
regarding drink driving, the states within Australia vary greatly themselves 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2002). Victoria is the state that will be studied in 
this thesis, although comparisons will be drawn with other Australian states and 
territories.  
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 2: Methodology 
The Strategy of Inquiry 
The goal of this study was to gain an in-depth understanding of the initiatives 
implemented by the Transport Accident Commission in Victoria in an attempt to 
minimise drink driving, and to uncover the perceived successes and shortcomings 
from both road safety professionals and community members. Case study research, 
the ‘exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over time through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in 
context’(Creswell, 1998) was the methodology chosen to examine and analyse this 
research. According toYin (2003): 
…the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events—such as individual life cycles, organizational and 
managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, and the 
maturation of industries (p2). 
A case is, according to Stake (2000), simple or complex, one among others, 
but ‘the case is a specific One’—which is focused on in any given study. However not 
everything is a case. A case study ‘is both a process of inquiry about the case and the 
product of that inquiry’ (p 436). Case study research can examine either a single case 
or multiple cases (Yin, 2003) (Stake, 2000) (Grbich, 1999). 
Yin (2003) explained the importance and uniqueness of the case study 
methodology:  
In other words, the case study as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing 
method—covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific 
approaches to data analysis. In this sense, the case study is not either a datal 
collection tactic or merely a design feature alone (Stoecker, 1991) but a 
comprehensive research strategy (p14).  
Stake (2000) segments case studies into three categories: intrinsic, 
instrumental, and collective. Intrinsic case studies are categorised by the researcher’s 
attention to and understanding of the case itself. The case is not studied because of its 
representativeness of other cases or because of its illustration of a certain aspect—it is 
simply that the case itself is of interest to the researcher. 
Instrumental case studies are the opposite, selected not for the case itself but 
the information it will provide to an issue or to re-inform a generalisation. The role of 
the case itself is supportive; its importance is secondary compared to the greater 
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 knowledge that will come from examining the case. While the case is closely 
examined, it is as a means-to-an-end to pursue the general, outside interest. For 
instrumental case studies, the case may or may not be typical of other cases.  
Collective case studies are undertaken to understand a population, 
phenomenon, or general condition. Multiple cases are investigated; therefore a 
collective case study is simply an extended instrumental case study. The cases may be 
similar or dissimilar, and are chosen because it is hoped that a better understanding of 
a larger collection of cases will result from an understanding of the chosen few. 
This particular case study does not fit singularly into one of the 
abovementioned categories. However according to Stake, this is not abnormal or 
problematic. Stake says that ‘reports (and authors) often do not fit neatly into such 
categories. I see these three as heuristic more than determinative’ (p438). This study 
instead was a combination of two categories. Stake explains that there is no hard line 
drawn between intrinsic and instrumental case studies. Instead, ‘a zone of combined 
purpose separates them’, as a researcher will simultaneously have multiple interests 
that are both general and particular (p 437). The state of Victoria was chosen 
specifically for the high level of international interest in the TAC campaign, not 
because it was believed that Victoria was representative of other Australian states, or 
all successful attempts to minimise drink driving around the world. In addition, 
according to Stake the case is often already identified when intrinsic case work 
begins. Interest in the TAC campaign led to this research being undertaken. Therefore, 
this would lead the case to be classified as an intrinsic case study. However, it is an 
over-arching goal of the research to provide insight into a type of successful anti-drink 
driving campaign, and isolate aspects of the campaign that might be generalisable or 
applicable to other jurisdictions. That could lead to this study being classified as 
instrumental. Therefore, this case is being categorised as a blend of the two: the 
immediate interest in this case was intrinsic, the ultimate interest was instrumental.  
In the instance of this research, the subject was chosen prior to the research 
design. Various methodological strategies were considered, including grounded 
theory, discourse analysis, and ultimately case study research. The case study 
methodology was chosen for multiple reasons. It was initially considered as the 
subject being studied, the TAC anti-drink drive initiatives, fit the definition of a case. 
Secondly, the research questions were of the ‘how’ and ‘what’ (of an explanatory 
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 nature) type, as recommended by Yin for case study research. In addition, Yin (2003) 
describes case study research as: 
A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident (p 13).  
In the case of anti-drink drive initiatives, this has become clear as quantitative 
research has yet to come to an agreed conclusion on the successes of the initiatives. 
Although according to Yin, case study research is often discounted as being ‘a weak 
sibling among social science methods’ (p xiii), its function was applicable here: 
And, yes, case studies have a distinctive place in evaluation research…there are at 
least five different applications. The most important is to explain the presumed causal 
links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental 
strategies (p15). 
By speaking with individuals instead of relying on statistics, this work was 
able to illuminate possible yet established reasons behind attitude and behaviour 
changes that statistics have not. 
Of the six types of data collection recommended by Yin (2003), four were to 
be used in this research: documentation, direct observation, participant-observation 
and interviews. Triangulation, through the use of these multiple sources of 
information, ‘serves also to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen’, as cited in Stake (2000). 
Methods of Inquiry 
Four methods of qualitative data collection were used during this research: 
document review, direct observation, participant-observation and interviews.  
This thesis employed a case study methodology to examine the issues 
identified earlier. The case study method as suggested by Yin (2003), Stake (2000), 
and Grbich (1999) ensures that all relevant aspects of the 'case' are reviewed. The 
forms of data included in the case analysis can be seen in Table 1 below:  
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Table 1: Data used and contributions 
Source Contributions to case 
Extant literature from both scholarly and 
news sources relating to drink driving, public 
communication campaigns, and advertising  
Provided theory and research relevant to the case 
Advertising and consumer behaviour 
textbooks 
Provided background information on advertising 
campaigns in general and community behaviour in 
relation to advertising 
TAC advertising campaigns  Provided detailed, visual information on a focal area 
of the research 
Community attitude and value surveys Provided insight into changes in community attitudes 
towards road safe issues throughout the timeframe of 
the study 
Quantitative reports reviewing road safety 
initiatives 
Provided an alternate view of road safety issues, in 
addition to statistics related to various areas of road 
safety 
Australian and International Conference 
Proceedings 
Provided research and the focus of road safety 
professionals both in direct relation to this case and for 
other jurisdictions worldwide 
Interviews with experts from a variety of 
organisations with an interest in the field  
Provided the insights and opinions of road safety 
professionals directly involved with drink driving 
initiatives 
Interviews (dyad and individual) with 
members of the Victoria driving community  
Provided the views and opinions of those directly 
impacted by the Victorian drink driving initiatives 
who have resided in Victoria throughout the timeframe 
of the case study 
Participant observation in the field, including 
a short course on the responsible serving of 
alcohol  
Allowed for immersion in one of the areas of study 
Direct observation of stationary breath testing 
operations 
Insight into actions that occurred during the timeframe 
of the study without intrusion or dependence on 
others’ recollections or biases. 
 
Cases are necessarily bounded systems (Stake, 2000) and as such, much which 
could have been covered has been left out in the interests of creating a coherent 
understanding of the TACs drink driving campaigns as an exemplar for other 
communicators.  
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 Documentation 
A review of documents relevant to advertising, road safety and specifically 
drink driving was undertaken. Unlike other methodological paradigms, literature 
(documentation) is considered an important form of data in case study research (Yin, 
2003); (Marshall & Rossman, 1999); (Murphy, Dingwall, Greatbatch, Parker, & 
Watson, 1998). Due to this distinction, all literature is reviewed and examined with 
interview data in three subsequent chapters.  
Documents reviewed included newspaper and magazine articles, articles from 
peer-reviewed scholarly journals, advertising and consumer behaviour textbooks, 
quantitative evaluation reports from various research Universities across Australia, 
reports from Australian state transport authorities, as well as from the ATSB 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau), reports from International road safety 
organisations, reports from Australian insurance agencies, submissions by Grey 
Advertising Melbourne to the Australian Federation of Advertising (AFA) 
Effectiveness Awards and papers from national and international road safety 
conferences. According to Grbich (1999), “impersonal documentation comprises the 
public records by which cultural patterns can be examined (p146)”. By reviewing 
these documents, elements of the Victorian society could be discerned that may not 
have been remembered or mentioned in interviews that took place after the fact. 
However according to Yin (2003), “For case studies, the most important use of 
documents is to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (p87), 
especially because case study researchers need to be conscious of the fact that all 
documents are written from a certain viewpoint to serve a specific need. Therefore, 
the documentation studied was also used to compare to information collected from 
observation and interviews.  
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 Direct observation: Night spent with three Victorian booze buses 
This research included a night of direct observation of the main enforcement 
initiative implemented in Victoria: random breath testing. Although the observation 
took place three years after the timeframe for the case study ended, the process had 
already been in place for ten years as of 2000. Thus, while the actual model of booze 
bus that was observed was new in 2003, the operations were the same and therefore it 
is believed that the observations made in 2003 are very similar to those that would 
have been observed in 2000. A booze bus is a mobile breath-testing unit, whose sole 
purpose is to travel around the jurisdiction and breath test vehicles at random. The 
booze buses are large, recreational-type vehicles which are specifically designed to be 
highly visible and draw attention. According to Victoria Police Inspector Ian Cairns,  
…they are designed to be unique, we spend a lot of resources making one-off vehicles 
that the public recognises not just for the paint work but because of their shape, their 
size, all that, to really push the drink driving message (pers comm., 2003).”[See 
Appendix 1: A for a picture of a Victorian booze bus] 
Each booze bus contains space for two motorists to be simultaneously and 
confidentially tested on evidentiary breath test machinery. The buses are set up on 
various types of roadways, from single lane service ways to four lane freeways. The 
only requirements are that the area is safe for the bus to be set up and that there is 
enough traffic to justify the resources needed to operate the booze buses. It was on 
one of the freeways that this researcher spent a night observing the booze buses in 
action. Results from this night will be examined in a subsequent chapter. 
An issue that was faced during the direct observation was one of ethics. While 
all of the police officers were aware of the presence of an observer, the motorists 
being breathalysed were not. Inspector Ian Cairns, head of the Traffic Alcohol Section 
(TAS) of the Victoria Police had recommended bringing along a video camera to 
record the night’s events. This was done, however special care had to be taken to 
ensure that no faces or number plates were caught on film, as there was no consent 
from the motorists to be included in the filming. In addition, while observation was 
allowed from the safety strip with the officers to watch the tests administered (see 
Appendix: 1 C for video footage from the observation night), observation inside the 
booze bus while drivers were being processed was not allowed, due to confidentially 
issues.  
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 Notes were taken throughout the observation, in the form of video recordings 
(including verbal commentary), audio recordings, hand-written notes, and drawings. 
This was done to ensure the accuracy of events observed. 
Interviews  
Interviews were conducted as the major qualitative method of data collection 
from individuals. The interviews were focused, in-depth interviews, as described by 
Minichiello (1995). Researchers conducting focused interviews generally guide their 
interviews around a broad topic of interest. While a schedule or interview guide is 
prepared around a list of topics, it is done so without a fixed wording or ordering of 
questions. There is more flexibility allowed regarding the discussion and type of 
questioning in this method compared to survey-style interviewing, as the issues 
central to the research questions still comprise the content of the interview.  
Minichiello describes five situations in which in-depth interviewing is ideal. 
This research is described by the first situation;  
The in-depth interview is used to gain access to, and an understanding of, activities 
and events which cannot be observed directly by the researcher. Accounts of action 
and patterns of living are provided by those who have directly participated in or 
observed them… (p 70). 
As the timeframe of this case study was 1989-2000, and the research was 
undertaken between 2002-2004, observation of the attitude and behaviour changes 
occurring during this time was impossible. The exception was mobile random breath 
testing, as the operations of the booze buses have remained largely unchanged since 
their implementation in 1990. In-depth interviews were used for a number of reasons. 
Surveys would not have provided nearly enough detail for the information sought. 
The social unacceptability of the issue could have influenced focus groups; 
participants may not have been willing to be honest about socially condemned 
behaviours in front of strangers. In-depth interviews provided both the security and 
time frame to have honest, detailed conversations about individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, 
behaviours, and observations.  
Two types of interviews were undertaken; individual, one-on-one interviews 
and dyad interviews (two participants and the interviewer).  
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 Professional Interviews 
Of the many studies that have been conducted regarding drink drive initiatives 
in Victoria, or Australia, very few involved qualitative work. The beliefs of the 
professionals managing the initiatives are important as it is those ideas that help shape 
what initiatives are implemented when and why. The thoughts of the community 
members are equally as important, as they can be used as a guide to help explain why 
certain initiatives succeeded or failed, and those thoughts can also be used to gauge 
the community climate regarding the potential implementation of further initiatives. 
Human attitudes and behaviours are complex and multi-dimensional, and therefore 
need in-depth examination that is not possible through solely quantitative work.  
The professional interviews were conducted with members of the road safety 
community that work at organisations related to the Victorian drink drive initiatives. 
These individuals were selected to access their knowledge and opinions about the 
Victorian initiatives based on their personal involvement with them. The bias related 
to their positions was intentional and was collected for comparison to the unbiased 
thoughts of community members. This group of professionals includes employees of 
the Transport Accident Commission (the organisation that created the initiatives), 
Monash University Accident Research Centre (who monitor the initiatives through 
quantitative research), and the Victoria Police (who enforce the initiatives). 
Discussions were also held with members of the road safety community residing 
outside of Victoria, including Dr. Barry Elliott (a Consultant Psychologist in the road 
safety field), Dr. Michael White (the leading researcher at Transport SA who had 
headed the claims against the MUARC data and the success of the TAC program), 
and Dr. Soames Job (a behavioural scientist at the Roads Traffic Authority of New 
South Wales). A follow-up interview was also conducted with Job at his RTA office 
in Sydney. 
These interviews were all conducted on a one-to-one basis and all the 
Victorian interviews were held at the respective organisation’s offices. The 
discussions with the non-Victorians were held at the 2003 International Road Safety 
Conference in Sydney. Table 2 on the following page lists all the interviewees and 
their roles at their respective organisation. 
 
 22
 Table 2: Road Safety Professionals Interviewed 
Name Title Topic(s) 
Ms. De-Arnne Schmidt Communications Manager 
Transport Accident Commission 
Overall TAC Campaign 
Communications/PR aspect 
Mr. Ben Holgate Manager of Marketing & Innovation 
Transport Accident Commission 
Overall TAC Campaign 
Sponsorship component 
Ms. Samantha Cockfield Manager Road Safety 
Transport Accident Commission 
Overall TAC Campaign 
Road Safety Advertising 
Victorian Environment 
Mr. David Healy General Manager Road Safety Overall TAC Campaign 
Road Safety Advertising 
Victorian Environment 
Mr. Stewart Newstead Statistician- Road Safety Quantitative research on TAC 
advertising 
Prof. Max Cameron Statistician- Road Safety Quantitative debate over TAC 
advertising 
Inspector Ian Cairns Head of Traffic Alcohol Section  
Victoria Police 
Enforcement initiatives 
Random Breath Testing 
Dr. Soames Job General Manager Road Safety Strategy 
Roads and Traffic Authority NSW 
Threat appeals and advertising 
Initiatives in New South Wales 
 
Community Interviews 
Thirteen interviews were conducted with 16 members of the Victorian 
community. Interviewees had to be at least 18 years of age, and must have resided in 
Victoria since at least 1990 to be considered for participation. Interviewees were 
located through a convenience sample, however no one interviewed was directly 
connected to the interviewer (i.e. all were located through an acquaintance of the 
interviewer.) An attempt was made to secure random interviewees via an 
advertisement in local community papers, however no responses were received. This 
was likely due to the rewording of the advertisement by the paper, and the short time 
the advertisement was run. However while not random, a diverse group was sought 
for the interviews. Both men and women were interviewed, although the majority of 
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 interviewees were men. The age group of interviewees ranged from 19 to 53 and 
included both individuals who had grown up in rural or metropolitan Melbourne.  
 
Included in the sample were: 
• drivers who had been caught and charged with drink driving,  
• drivers who had been caught drinking and driving and had not been 
charged 
• drivers who had committed the offence of drink driving but not been 
caught 
• those who claim to never have driven while over the .05 BAC limit 
• drivers who had been in car accidents while under the influence of alcohol 
• two hotel (bar) employees 
• drive-through bottle shop attendant 
• two Probationary drivers (P-Plater); a new driver within their first three 
years of driving, so designated by the Victorian graduated licensing 
scheme 
In addition to the one-on-one style of interview, dyad interviews were also 
used. Dyad interviews include the researcher and two interviewees, all present at one 
time. Questions are asked to one interviewee, and then the other has the option of 
adding comments, disagreeing, or agreeing with the first interviewee. The interviewee 
first receiving the question fluctuates, so that both interviewees have equal 
opportunity to respond. The two interviewees are expected to be friends, and were 
told before they were selected that they must be close enough to divulge personal 
information in front of the other. This is in fact a main strategy of dyad interviews—
the interviewees are present at the same time to keep each other honest 
(Mariampolski, 2001). The theory is that as they are friends, if one person tries to tell 
a lie, their friend would ‘call them on it’, or verbally indicate that their comments 
were not the truth (either from them also being a participant in that event or from 
having heard the story when there was not an outsider present). Dyad interviews were 
considered particularly applicable for this research based on the subject matter. As 
drink driving is currently considered a socially ‘moral’ issue in Victoria, there is 
reason to believe that an interviewee would not want to admit to ‘immoral’ acts to a 
stranger. Additionally, an interviewee might try to respond a certain way so as to tell 
the interviewer what they think the interviewer wants to hear, regardless of whether or 
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 not it is the truth. Having a good friend in attendance was hoped to deter both the 
abovementioned situations. As it happened, not only did the former occur, but also the 
two interviewees were able to feed/recollect information off of the other as various 
stories that were told occurred when both interviewees were present.  
Participant-observation 
One instance of participant-observation was undertaken during this research. 
The Liquor Licensing department of Consumer Affairs Victoria offers a workshop 
entitled “Responsible Serving of Alcohol” (RSA) for employees working in licensed 
venues (venues licensed to sell alcohol). This workshop aims to educate servers of 
alcohol about the necessity of responsible serving, the benefits of it, and how to deal 
with difficult customers. RSA training is a requirement to manage a bottle shop, work 
in a venue with late night entertainment conditions and to become licensee of other 
licensed premises. While it is not a requirement by law to be an employee in a 
licensed premises, many licensed premises around Victoria require the certification 
for their employees who serve alcohol (pers comm., 20048).  
The session was attended at a University, and attendees were mostly university 
students currently in or planning on applying for a job in the hospitality industry. The 
workshop was a three-hour course which covered the following topics: problems 
associated with excessive consumption, alcohol and the law, who is responsible in 
various situations, facts about alcohol, strategies for responsible serving, and refusal 
of service. Results from this observation will be discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
                                                 
8 Information received from a member of the licensing services division of the Victorian Department of Justice
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 Data management and analysis 
A few different types of data maps were used to manage and analyse data. 
According to Hart (1998) two benefits are accrued from using a combination of maps: 
an organisation of ideas into some kind of arrangement (which results in declarative 
knowledge), and an acquisition of procedural knowledge about ‘the relationships 
between elements that comprise the knowledge on the topic’ (p145). Over the course 
of the literature review and the interview data analysis the following maps were used: 
relationship maps, linear relationship maps, subject relevance trees, and taxonomic 
maps. These maps aided in the organisation of ideas, the illustration of links between 
topics, and the highlighting information that was missing.  
Ethical Considerations 
As human participants were an element of the data collection of this research, 
certain steps were taken to ensure the ethicality of this work. The RMIT University 
Human Research Ethics Committee granted permission to conduct interviews for this 
thesis. All interview participants were presented a copy of the plain language 
statement prior to their interview, and signed a letter of consent before the interview 
commenced. Interviewees were sent a copy of their consent form after the interview. 
The consent form granted all community members confidentiality and the removal of 
all identifying factors from the published work. The professionals interviewed all 
agreed to the use of their names in the published work, providing they saw a draft 
prior to publication to confirm the true representation of their comments.  
All notes from the interviews were kept in a locked drawer, as were all 
recordings from the interviews. In addition, all mini discs were labelled with letters so 
the identities of those on the recordings were not discernable to outsiders.  
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 Methods to Enhance the Trustworthiness of Data 
Prolonged engagement 
This work took place over two years of full time research. Initial time was 
spent adjusting to the Australian social scene, and understanding the initiatives in the 
context of the Australian culture (social/drinking culture, legislation culture). This 
time was also spent reviewing literature and developing a proper understanding of the 
issue of road safety in Australia, and specifically Victoria.  
Accuracy checks 
Copies of the comments made during the professional interviews that were to 
be used in the finished work were sent to each interviewee for verification. This was a 
condition agreed upon in exchange for the use of the professionals’ names to appear 
with their quotes in the document.  
Triangulation 
The process of triangulation was used for various reasons. According to Stake 
(2000): 
Triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple perception 
to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. 
But, acknowledging that no observations or interpretations are perfectly repeatable, 
triangulation serves also to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen (pp443-444). 
As described above, the data collection methods of documentation, direct 
observation, interviews, and participant-observation were all used to compile facts 
and information. The use of both professional and community opinions was intended 
to crosscheck facts and opinions from both viewpoints to see what aligned and what 
differed. Observations were compared against documented facts and interview 
comments for validity.  
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 Peer debriefing 
Feedback on the work and the testing of ideas while the research was in 
progress was undertaken in a few ways. Frequent meetings were held with the 
primary research supervisor, and additional meetings were undertaken with other 
research mentors holding various areas of expertise. In addition, fortnightly meetings 
with other postgraduates in the school were attended to gather comments, critiques, 
and suggestions on various aspects of the research throughout the process.  
Synopsis of methodologies applied in this case study 
This chapter examined the methods used throughout the research. It explained 
the use of the case study as the strategy of inquiry, and the importance of such a 
strategy in relation to this particular case. Next, the four methods of qualitative 
research were described: documentation, direct observation, participant-observation 
an interviews. The importance of triangulation of the work was also identified. 
Methods used to enhance the trustworthiness of the data as well as ethical 
considerations that were undertaken were explained.  
The next chapter describes and explores the first of the three components 
necessary for a successful drink drive campaign: legislation. Following the legislation 
chapter will be the enforcement and advertising chapters. Each of these three chapters 
will explore the results of the data collection from this research; initially through 
examination of data from the literature, and subsequently through professional and 
community member interview comments.  
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 3: The Written Word:  
Drink driving legislation in Victoria and its counterparts 
The present chapter identifies and discusses Victorian legislation, regulations, 
and road rules that have directly and indirectly impacted the drink drinking road toll. 
This was done so readers outside the jurisdiction can become familiarised with the 
Victorian system. Furthermore, the legislative framework of a jurisdiction appears to 
be a crucial component of a program’s success, as it dictates practices and parameters 
for the enforcement component of the campaign. In the particular case of Victoria, the 
jurisdiction has certain legislation that is crucial to its enforcement efforts; this 
legislation is unique and therefore its positives and negatives need to be presented. 
Two of the most important Acts related to Victorian road safety are examined first, 
followed by a discussion about legal blood alcohol concentration limits. As both of 
these topics appear to have played an integral part in Victoria’s drink driving 
successes, it was necessary to address them. Next, some of Victoria’s controversial 
legislation is discussed, followed by a look at civil liberty issues pertaining to 
legislation that allows random breath testing. Following is a section highlighting road 
safety legislation that does not directly address drink driving behaviours but examines 
behaviours that impact on the drink driving road toll. Concurrent legislation was 
important to note as its ramifications would have influenced the drink driving road 
toll. The next section discusses various alcohol and driving-related regulations, and 
includes a comparison to other international jurisdictions. The legislation regarding 
drink driving penalties is described, and lastly a discussion about Victorian 
community members’ knowledge and feelings regarding the abovementioned 
penalties is presented. As this is a case study, the literature is treated as data and as 
such is examined in this chapter alongside more traditional forms of data, such as 
responses from interviewees and results from observations.  
Legislation as a component of the tripartite model is one that appears to need 
the most support from its counter-components (enforcement and advertising). Without 
promotion of the laws, motorists could be left unaware of them. Without enforcement 
of the laws, motorists could potentially flout the laws and continue performing the 
undesirable behaviours. The legislation is important in itself however: a lack of 
specific legislation could result in confusion in enforcement and difficulty in making 
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 community members adhere to it. An understanding of this successful legislation is 
important for any jurisdiction considering implementing a large-scale anti-drink 
driving campaign. Legislation, when supported by enforcement and advertising, can 
lay the groundwork for a reduction in drink driving. If the legislation is accepted by, 
and supported by the community it is being applied to, evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that success will occur. 
By the late 1980s, road safety had become an issue that the Victorian 
community felt warranted its attention9. Although no full-scale campaign had been 
launched against the road toll up to this point, the community was concerned about 
the huge number of people dying on the roads each year. Over the course of the ten 
years of this case study, and the few years bracketing either side, the Victorian 
government introduced a plethora of legislation aimed at drink driving and other road 
safety behaviours (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 1998); (Road Traffic 
Authority, 1987); ("Road Safety Act," 1986). The chapter examines the most 
important and relevant of that legislation and demonstrate how the community not 
only accepted the laws but also expected them. It is argued that it was the 
community’s expectations and acceptance of the road safety legislation that was 
largely responsible for the success of the legislation in getting community members’ 
to obey the laws by changing their behaviours. 
Road Safety Legislation in Victoria 
The legislative framework has been an integral part of Victoria's efforts to 
improve road safety since the 1960s. There exists not only legislation in the form of 
Acts of Parliament but also subordinate legislation such as regulations. 
The legislative framework that has been established has impacted drink 
driving, not only that which is directly related to drink driving but also that which is 
aimed at related road safety actions. In addition to the provisions found in the relevant 
Acts of Parliament, the achievement of the aims and purposes of those Acts may be 
supplemented or complemented by the making of relevant regulations. The power to 
make regulations is typically given by the relevant Act. 
                                                 
9 As reported in a historical overview article regarding drink driving in Victoria, (Sunday Herald Sun, 1995) 
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 For example, in the Road Safety Act 1986, in addition to the provisions of that 
Act, section 95 of the Act gives the Governor in Council the power to make 
regulations ‘[for or with respect to any matter or thing required or permitted by this 
Act to be prescribed or necessary to be prescribed to give effect to this Act including, 
but not limited to, the matters and things specified in Schedule 2’. Schedule 2 lists 
numerous subject matters including amongst other matters licensing of drivers, traffic 
regulation and alcohol. The coverage of road safety laws was further enhanced when 
the road rules became law in Victoria as a result of the Road Safety (Road Rules) 
Regulations 1999. The road rules provide laws touching on a wide range of matters in 
relation to use of the road, from obligations on drivers to matters in relation to 
parking. 
An illustration of how each aspect of the legislative framework may work 
together can again be found in the Road Safety Act 1986 and its corresponding 
regulations and road rules. For example, laws in relation to drink driving matters are 
provided for in the Road Safety Act. The law requiring probationary drivers to display 
'P' plates is covered in the regulations while the law in relation to obeying speed limits 
is provided by the road rules. 
Due to Victoria’s unique and successful approach to drink driving, it is 
imperative to understand the legislation that was implemented and therefore the 
freedoms and restrictions that were guiding the enforcement and advertising 
initiatives. Though occurring just outside the parameters of this case study, The Road 
Safety Act 1986 and the Transport Accident Act 1986 were important steps in 
Victoria’s road safety legislation and their effects were apparent throughout the case 
study’s timeframe. Therefore they shall be addressed. Both will be summarised 
below.  
One of the most singly comprehensive legislative efforts was the Road Safety 
Act 1986. The purposes of this Act were:  
(a) to provide for safe, efficient and equitable road use; and  
(b) to improve and simplify procedures for the registration of motor vehicles 
and the licensing of drivers; and  
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 (c) to ensure the equitable distribution within the community of the costs of 
road use10
 
The Road Safety Act 198611 contains eight sections, covering definitions, 
registration, licensing of drivers, recreational vehicles, offences involving alcohol or 
other drugs, offences and legal proceedings, infringements, private parking areas and 
general information. The fifth section is devoted to ‘offences involving alcohol or 
other drugs’. The purposes of this section of the Act are to: 
(a) reduce the number of motor vehicle collisions of which alcohol or other 
drugs are a cause; and  
(b) reduce the number of drivers whose driving is impaired by alcohol or other 
drugs; and  
(c) provide a simple and effective means of establishing that there is present in 
the blood of a driver more than the legal limit of alcohol. 
 
It was within this Act that older laws and regulations were updated and new 
laws and regulations were implemented regarding: provisions about the cancellation 
and disqualification of licenses, previous convictions, drink driver education 
programs, zero blood alcohol level for certain categories of drivers, preliminary 
testing, evidentiary testing provisions, and offences related to drugs and driving. 
In conjunction with the Road Safety Act 1986, the Transport Accident Act 
1986 was also implemented in December 1986. The Transport Accident Act brought 
major changes to Victoria’s personal injury insurance system. This was done by the 
creation of a new compensation scheme and a new body, the Transport Accident 
Commission. The aims of the Transport Accident Act were to: 
                                                 
10 Version No. 054, Road Safety Act 1986, Act No. 127/1986, Parliament of Victoria, accessed at: 
http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/l2d/R/ACT01149/5_4.html on 22/03/04. For the most recent version, no78, go to: 
http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubLawToday.nsf?OpenDatabase
11 http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/Domino/Web_Notes/LDMS/PubLawToday.nsf?OpenDatabase
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• Provide medical treatment and rehabilitation for people injured in transport 
accidents 
• Provide compensation to those injured—or to the dependents of those 
killed 
• Reduce the incidence and cost of transport accidents 
 
These aims were carried out through the new body that was created, the 
Transport Accident Commission. The Transport Accident Act, through the creation of 
the Transport Accident Commission, directly addressed the community’s expectations 
by giving them an organisation they could interact with, and one that constantly 
produced efforts and results with which the community could gauge the progress 
against the road toll. 
As a unique organisation in Australia, and a major player in Victorian road 
safety policy, it is important to understand not only the aims and objectives of the 
organisation, but how the TAC works. Why it works so well, and that the TAC’s 
establishment was a primary factor in the success of Victoria’s road safety initiatives 
will be argued in a later chapter. As it is believed that this is one of the overarching 
reasons for success and a recommendation for other jurisdictions, it will be best 
discussed with other recommendations in Chapter 7: A Perspective on Drink Drive 
Campaigns in the Future. 
The Transport Accident Commission (TAC) is a monopolistic third-party no-
fault government insurance agency. A portion of Victorian motorists’ registration 
costs include an annual premium to the TAC. In return, the TAC will cover anyone 
(passenger, driver, cyclists, pedestrians) injured in a transport accident in Victoria, 
and Victorian residents injured in other states in a Victorian registered vehicle. The 
TAC operates under a no-fault scheme; regardless of who is to blame for an accident, 
anyone injured in the accident is entitled to benefits. The no-faults benefits cover, ‘all 
reasonable costs of rehabilitation, hospital, medical, nursing, dental, home help, child 
care and funeral expenses incurred as a result of a transport accident’ (Transport 
Accident Commission, n-d). These benefits are available throughout the life of the 
injured person. The TAC also works under a common law scheme, which dictates that 
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 if a person that is seriously injured in a transport accident can prove another was at 
fault, they may be able to receive additional compensation through the courts.  
In addition to providing compensation to injured motorists, the TAC also has a 
statutory responsibility for minimising the frequency and expense of accidents. 
Therefore, since its inception the TAC has been the leading body in the 
implementation of road safety initiatives in Victoria. This involves supplying funding 
and concepts for enforcement and advertising initiatives, which will be discussed in 
detail in subsequent chapters. Both before and after the Road Safety Act 1986 and the 
Transport Accident Act 1986 were enacted, laws and regulations regarding various 
aspects of drink driving were implemented in Victoria. These laws dictated the 
various legal blood alcohol levels and which category of driver was able to drive at 
which level, the penalties associated with being caught at various blood alcohol 
levels, and the legalisation and breadth of (random) breath testing. The legislation is 
listed in Table 312 below. 
While all of these laws played a role in minimising drink driving in Victoria, 
some were more directly influential then others. The BAC laws and random breath 
testing legislation are of primary importance to anti-drink drive campaigns (public 
policy makers), as they are the major laws that dictate the desirable (and legal) 
behaviours of community members. They will be examined in detail below. 
                                                 
12 Road Traffic Authority Report no GR/87/7, March 1987, page 18 
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Table 3: Legislation and regulation in Australia  
Year Legislation 
1966 
 
The legal Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC), or milligrams of alcohol per litre 
of blood permitted in a motorist in Victoria is .05 
1971 Increased drink drive penalties. Licence disqualification for a period dependent on 
blood alcohol reading. 
1974 Compulsory blood alcohol testing of road accident victims attending hospitals 
1976 Random breath testing legislation implemented 
1978 Increased penalties for drink driving offences. Approximate doubling of penalties, 
plus a reduction in magistrates’ discretion to adjourn cases. 
1984 Zero blood alcohol level for first year, learner, and unlicensed/disqualified 
13drivers 
1986 Zero blood alcohol level requirement extended for full probationary period. 
1986 Police can immediately suspend a licence where the BAC is .15g/100ml or more, 
or if the person refuses a breath test. 
1986 The circumstances under which police may require a breath test have been 
broadened. 
 
1992 Zero blood alcohol level for heavy vehicles 
2001 Blood alcohol level is officially enforced at .050.  
 
 
Blood Alcohol Concentration 
The International literature in relation to BACs  
Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) is defined as the number of grams of 
alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (VicRoads, 2002). For example, a BAC of .05 
constitutes .05 grams or 50 milligrams of alcohol in every 100 millilitres of blood. 
The legal BAC in Victoria has been .05 since 1966--well before drink driving became 
an issue within the community. Therefore the BAC level has not been an issue of 
vocal debate among Victorians—it is mostly accepted that the legislators who created 
that law did the research to ensure that .05 was an appropriate level. However the 
                                                 
13 Information sourced from: ATSB, 1998; RTA, 1987; Victorian Government, 1986 
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 decision of where to set the BAC is an issue of contention in countries around the 
world (Chamberlain & Solomon, 2002).  
The United States is a prime example: over the past five years 47 states and 
the District of Columbia have reduced their BACs from .10 to .08. Three states 
continue to support a BAC level of .10. However it was a financial threat that caused 
the majority of those states to lower their BAC. Under legislation introduced in 
October 2000, states were ordered to reduce their BAC to the lower threshold by 
October 2004. Those who did not faced the loss of millions of federal highway dollars 
each year in funding (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2001). As a 
result, a majority of the states have acquiesced and lowered their laws. Progressively, 
other countries (such as Canada and the UK) have debated in the last few years 
whether to drop their BACs from .08 to .05 (Chamberlain & Solomon, 2002). 
The BAC debate in centred around two issues. The first, most important, and 
most technically difficult question to answer is at what blood alcohol limit a 
motorist’s skills are impaired to the point of being a danger on the road. Secondly, 
there is a debate as to what blood alcohol level impinges on individual and 
community lifestyles, in regards to their social experiences and civil freedoms. The 
majority of research regarding BAC advocates a limit of .05 (ibid), and it can be 
assumed that in societies where this is not currently a realistic goal (eg the United 
States), a BAC of .08 as a maximum.  
In countries around the world where BAC limits have been reduced, positive 
effects have been identified through post-law change evaluations. A study completed 
by Johnson and Fell (1995) showed positive results from the lowering of the BAC 
limit from .10 to .08 in five states in the U.S.  This study took into account six 
measures of driver involvement in fatal crashes that were alcohol-related; amongst the 
five states, four achieved significant decreases in nine of the thirty measures. 
 Clayton (1997) discussed results that were achieved in Australia, Canada, the 
United States, Britain, Sweden, France and Germany.  Results included significant 
reductions in casualties, a significant overall reduction in the number of crash-
involved drivers with illegal BACs, and a drop in fatal accidents. It should be noted 
that some of these jurisdictions simultaneously instituted increased enforcement 
activities, and this and other factors may have contributed to the reductions.  
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 Additionally, not all of these jurisdictions had significant results across all drivers 
during all driving hours (day vs. night).   
An array of research studies have shown that impairment from alcohol can 
begin at levels as low as .02 (Preusser, 2002); (Moskowitz, 2001); (Burns & 
Fiorentino, 2001). Preusser (2002) presented results that found a statistically 
significant increase in risk at a .02% BAC in all age groups between 21 and 49. 16-20 
year olds showed a significant increase of risk at .03 BAC. For 50-64 year olds .06 
was their first BAC level to show an increase in risk and .08 was the first level for 
drivers 65 years of age and up. The study also showed that younger drivers are clearly 
at a greater risk at lower BACs than older drivers. These risks are apparent at zero 
BAC, moderate BAC and high BAC. Preusser concluded that both his results and 
laboratory findings indicated that increases in fatal crash risk occur as low as .02 
BAC. He also concluded that “the shape of the BAC by risk function is likely linear, 
not exponential as suggested by earlier case/control studies (p939)”. According to 
Preusser, if linear, comprehensive efforts to reduce alcohol related crashes must focus 
on low BACs. This research supports the debate that the lower the BAC, the less at 
risk a driver will be both to themselves and others on the road. It also indicates that 
there are dangers at very low level BACs, which is an issue that needs to be brought 
to the attention of the public. 
Moskowitz & Fiorentino (2002) compiled a literature review of experimental 
studies between 1981 and 1998 regarding the impairment effects of alcohol at various 
BAC levels. They found that 109 studies of 112 reported alcoholic impairment at one 
or more BAC levels. 94% of the studies reported impairment by .08, while a majority 
of the studies reported impairment by .05. With these results in mind, Moskowitz and 
Fiorentino highlighted another issue related to BAC; that different functions related to 
driving are affected at various levels of BAC. They concluded that their literature 
review confirmed results from previous literature reviews, that certain behavioural 
areas that are imperative to driving are impaired at any departure from zero BAC. 
Vigilance, drowsiness and divided attention were examples they cited (see Figure 5 on 
p39 for other examples). Again, this work highlights that a driver does not need to be 
exhibiting visual signs that they have lost control of themselves to be a danger on the 
road. Mental characteristics that are hard to visibly identify, such as vigilance and 
divided attention, are factors in accidents and therefore motorists may need to be 
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 made aware of these risks, as they would not be likely to consider them when making 
a decision on whether or not to drive. In addition, public policy makers need to be 
made aware of these dangers so they can establish laws that accurately reflect the 
threat.  
 
 
Figure 5: BAC levels and impairment14
 
Ralph Hingson has been one of the leading advocates in the United States for 
the lowering of BAC limits in American states from .10 to .08. Hingson, Heeren, & 
Winter (2000) addressed the effects alcohol has on motorists’ skills. Hingson et al. 
cited laboratory studies that showed effects at 0.08 BAC: drivers have, “reduced 
peripheral vision, poor recovery from glare, poorer performance on complex visual 
tracking, and reduced divided attention performance (p109)”. They also cited driver 
simulation and road course studies which indicated that parking performances were 
poor, driving at slow speed was impaired, and steering inaccuracies. In addition, they 
reported that with each .02 increase in BAC, the risk of fatal crash involvement is 
nearly doubled. At a BAC of 0.05-0.09, the fatal crash risk was at least nine times 
greater than at zero BAC across all sex and age groupings. Hingson et al. also 
promoted the combination of lower BAC and administrative license revocation laws, 
based on his study that the combination of the two resulted in a larger drop in deaths 
                                                 
14 source: NHTSA, as cited on MADD’s website: http://www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,1182,00.html (accessed on 07/06/04) 
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 than simply reducing the BAC. Their work addresses the issue that while BAC laws 
are not the only legislation necessary for a reduction in road toll, they are very 
important contributors that appear beneficial when used in conjunction with other 
legislation.  
Laboratory studies and results are not always enough to convince politicians 
and community members that it is necessary to alter public policy and legislation. 
Hingson et al’s work that was published in 2000 was supported by practical examples 
achieved internationally in the mid 1990s. Stewart (2000) illustrated the benefits of 
lowering a BAC to .05 through the examples of Belgium and France. In December 
1994 Belgium lowered its BAC to 0.05, and reported a 14% reduction in fatalities the 
following year. France (the country with the highest per capita alcohol consumption in 
the world), also lowered their limit to 0.05 in December of 1995, and fatal crashes 
were reduced by 4% in 1996. These studies all indicate that lower BACs are a 
contributing factor to lower road tolls. 
Additionally, two Australian states provide examples of actual results in a 
single jurisdiction (compared to a whole country), as both New South Wales and 
Queensland reduced their legal BAC from .08 to .05 in 1980 and 1982, respectively. 
In both cases lower BAC limits clearly demonstrated a reduction in the number of 
alcohol-related crashes as well as significant financial savings resulting from reduced 
accident costs. Queensland saved $32 million, while New South Wales saved $76 
million (Howat, Sleet, & Smith, 1991). 
The lifestyle debate is one that is often raised by those in the liquor industry 
(Anderson, 2000); (American Beverage Institute, n-d), who fear that lower BAC laws 
will result in a large loss of profit from lower amounts of consumption. Therefore, the 
argument is put forth that a lower BAC would keep community members from 
enjoying a glass of wine with dinner, or a beer at the pub. Nolan (1999) however 
discredits this argument, claiming that a significant amount of alcohol can be 
consumed before a person reaches the .08 limit. She contends that surveys showed 
that Americans would not generally drink after these significant amounts of 
consumption: “A .08 BAC is not typically reached with a couple of beers after work 
or a glass or two of wine with dinner” (p2). She goes on to cite the typical American 
consumption guides for reaching a .08 BAC: an average 170-pound male would have 
to drink four 12 oz cans of beer on an empty stomach within one hour to reach .08. An 
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 average 137-pound woman would need to drink three 12 oz cans of beer on an empty 
stomach within one hour to reach the limit. She concludes that when aware of the 
abovementioned limited, 66% of Americans believe the limit should be no higher than 
.08 BAC. This lifestyle debate is one that could be considered and ultimately 
dismissed in discussions with the community. If community members are shown that 
they can drink significant amounts of alcohol while still remaining under the legal 
limit and not compromising their social situation, they are more likely to be 
supportive of this legislation. 
The research presented in this chapter addresses two aspects of BAC levels. 
Firstly, a BAC of .05 is a relatively safe limit to place in jurisdictions, and that .08 is 
the highest that should be implemented in jurisdictions where .05 is not currently a 
feasible law. Secondly, motorists with BACs below these recommended legal limits 
are inhibited in cognitive ways and are more dangerous than sober drivers. This 
second issue, that BAC impairments begin below legalised limits and therefore may 
be an unknown danger to motorists, will be addressed in-depth below. 
Issues of drink v drunk driving 
Behaviours affected by alcohol can be placed in two categories, overt - 
visually identifiable behaviours such as slurring of speech, stumbling and difficulties 
in motor coordination, on the one hand, and less discernable behaviours, primarily 
cognitive, such as judgment, divided attention and perception.  
According to Dr. Moskowitz, the leading researcher in the United States on 
BAC levels and related impairments, the public is misinformed about which 
behaviours are the cause of most accidents:  
Unfortunately, the public is mistaken as to the nature of traffic injury causation. it is 
not the failure in the simple motor control activities that produce the overwhelming 
majority of accidents. The overwhelming majority of accidents under alcohol are due 
to errors in judgement, such as inappropriate speed selection, decision with regard 
to turning, etc., and most importantly, failures in attention, visual performance and 
information processing which affect the driver’s ability to perceive stop signs, other 
vehicles, pedestrians, etc. (pers comm., 2004). 
Dr. Moskowitz contends that this mistake is based on the belief that the 
observable evidence of intoxication are the reasons for traffic collisions An individual 
can easily see and identify the visible behaviours of another affected by alcohol, such 
as stumbling or slurring speech. However cognitive behaviours are hard to perceive in 
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 another individual through simple observation, as they occur inside the person’s brain. 
It is also difficult to evaluate these behaviours in one’s self introspectively, as an 
individual cannot be aware that their judgement is effected, because their judgement is 
affected. For example: an individual may not see something because they have a 
perceptual deficit. However because they have a perceptual deficit they have failed to 
see the object and so they do not realise there was something they did not see. 
Therefore, there is no mechanism for self-correction. 
This discrepancy in what individuals do and do not observe can result in an 
attitude that driving with alcohol levels that do not cause visual signs of impairment is 
not dangerous, and it is only those drivers exhibiting impairment that cause accidents. 
This attitude was reflected by a majority of the community members interviewed. 
However as explained in the BAC literature above, these alcohol caused 
deficits in cognitive behaviours can occur at BAC levels as low as .02. As community 
members are uneducated about these low-level effects, they are confidently driving 
without the knowledge that their cognitive behaviours are not at the same 
performance levels as they are when sober. 
Many of the community members interviewed commented on their belief that 
different people were affected to different degrees at the same BAC level. For 
example, they believe that a heavy drinker will not be as impaired at .05 as an 
occasional drinker would. This belief led many to question whether a set BAC was 
fair to all, even though they agreed one was necessary.  
Judging an individual’s impairment under alcohol is often a difficult task due 
to the simultaneous presence of several variables that influence the judgment of 
impairment. One factor that leads to the impression that people vary in their degree of 
impairment at a given BAC level is that there are differences in the degree to which 
compensating behaviours can offset alcohol affects. Dr. Moskowitz noted that he 
believes heavy drinkers get used to some effects of alcohol, such as those that produce 
a swaying gait. The difficulties in walking can be perceived by subjects in themselves, 
and therefore many can develop corrective techniques to modify their alcohol 
influenced gait. He used the analogy of experienced sailors adjusting their gait to the 
swaying of a boat. Moskowitz contends that when the community views these 
individuals appearing unimpaired, when they are aware that the person has consumed 
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 a large amount of alcohol, that perpetuates the idea that there is a wide range of 
differences in impairments at given BAC levels. Therefore, they believe that these 
drinkers who can control their observable behaviours under alcohol have developed 
tolerance to all the influences of alcohol. What community members fail to appreciate 
is that this perceived tolerance of motor activities does not generalise to the cognitive 
behaviours affected by alcohol, which are the primary determinants of alcohol related 
accidents. Decisions are made based on observations of behaviours irrelevant to 
driving.  
Moskowitz noted that two individuals who drink to a certain BAC limit in the 
same time frame will be equally impaired from their initial behavioural skill level. 
One individual may consume two drinks in an hour to reach .08. A much heavier 
individual may drink four in that hour to reach .08, however they will be equally 
impaired from their original level. The discrepancy in this situation is that each 
individual will be impaired to the same degree from their baseline, or sober level. 
However as every individual has different skill levels in their cognitive activity 
initially, they will differ greatly in their ability to perform under alcohol, not because 
the alcohol has differentially affected them, but because they were initially different in 
cognitive skill level. A further complication to a clear understanding of the issue of 
BAC levels and their effects is called acute tolerance. Moskowitz defines acute 
tolerance as ‘the adaptation to alcohol that occurs within a single drinking session’ 
(pers comm., 2004). Acute tolerance stipulates that drinking at a different rate will 
vary the behavioural effects of the same BAC. For example if two people of a similar 
weight drink to get to .08 but one reaches that level in one hour and the other person 
in three hours, their behaviours will be unequally affected. Moskowitz explains that 
the more slowly you drink the more time your body has to adapt to the alcohol. Thus, 
some variation in what people believe is an individual difference in response to 
alcohol is actually the result of the rate of drinking.  
Acute tolerance, individual cognitive behavioural differences, behavioural 
adaptive techniques, and observable versus non-observable impairments all result in 
the issue of BAC levels and related impairments to be a complex one, and one not 
easily presented to the general public. However it is important to note that due to all 
of these circumstances the general community appears to believe that driving at low-
level BACs where impairment is not evident is safe, and it is only at levels where 
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 impaired behaviours are observed that is dangerous. Yet research, both experimental 
and epidemiological, illustrates that the abovementioned alcohol impairment of 
cognitive behaviours can begin to occur at BACs even lower than .02, and that these 
behaviours affect the probability of involvement in traffic collisions. Therefore those 
involved with public education may want to consider the idea of educating the general 
public that when they are drinking and driving their cognitive behaviours are not 
performing to the same standard as they do when they are alcohol-free. 
The view of Victorian Road Safety Professionals in relation to BAC 
In Victoria the BAC legislation has remained largely unchanged since its .05 
inception in 1966. Only one major change took place in 2001; this legislation made 
the .05 law a reality instead of simply theoretical. Prior to 2001, motorists were not 
actually booked until they blew a reading of .07—making Victorian a .05 state in 
theory but not practice. This was due to insufficient technology at the time. This fact 
was not widely known however, so Victorians were under the impression they drove 
in a .05 state15.  
Therefore the issue of BAC was not one of contention here in Victoria, and 
there were not any other legislative attempts to change the BAC. This research 
enquired as to whether or not road safety professionals and community members 
supported the .05 legislation, and if not, why they believed it was flawed and at what 
level they would like to see it changed to. 
Members of the professional road safety community in Victoria at the 
Transport Accident Centre, Monash University Accident Research Centre, and the 
Victoria Police were asked their opinions on Victoria’s .05 BAC limit. All individuals 
are directly involved with Victorian drink driving initiatives, either through research, 
enforcement, or management. These individuals were approached to gather and then 
compare their thoughts with the literature, and also the community members’ 
opinions.  
                                                 
15 According to Inspector Ian Cairns, Head of the Traffic Alcohol Section of the Victoria Police (pers comm., 2003)
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 When asked his feelings on the .05 BAC and if he thought it was an 
appropriate level, TAC General Manager of Road Safety David Healy responded 
similarly to his colleagues at the TAC when he said,  
Certainly not higher, I think .05 doubles your risk of crash involvement at least at 
that level (pers comm., 2003). 
He then broached one of the most difficult aspects of having any BAC law 
above .00: 
 The real difficulty with the drink driving laws, it’s one of the few areas where you 
don’t know if you are committing an offence or not, when you think about it, and for 
everything else, you do (pers comm., 2003). 
Healy’s comments alluded to a problem that appeared absent in much of the 
literature regarding the BAC debate: how motorists are supposed to determine if they 
are above, below, or at the legal limit in their respective jurisdiction. Healy’s 
comments led to the formation of various questions that were put to the community 
members, which will be discussed shortly. In addition, Healy’s comments led to 
exploration of this issue throughout the undertaking of this research.  
Healy continued that due to the difficulties in accurately gauging one’s BAC, 
he believes that the answer is a BAC that leaves no room for doubt: 
In fact, a very courageous move by politicians would be to introduce .00 blood 
alcohol for driving. Which I’m pretty sure would reduce the level of drink drive relate 
trauma…But there would be community debate to be won, given the strong 
association in the Australian context of alcohol use with socialising (eg football, 
band barbeques). ( pers comm., 2003) 
Here Healy’s comments targeted a large issue facing the implementation of a 
.00 BAC: for a country like Australia, whose social origins are based on the inclusion 
of alcohol, this legislation would not be one that would be easily accepted, supported, 
or necessarily adhered to by the community. These ideas were also put to the 
community members, with results to be discussed shortly. 
Samantha Cockfield, TAC Manager of Road Safety echoed Healy’s 
comments, based on a slightly more cynical view of human decision making 
processes when alcohol is involved:  
I think it’s [.05] a reasonable level based on what we know from the literature about 
how effective it has been, and because of the processing abilities, etc…I certainly 
don’t think that it should be any higher…I think that while you have any level of BAC 
allowable, it means that you have to make choices, and when people have to make 
choices some people will make the wrong ones. (pers comm., 2003) 
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 Cockfield continued by explaining why she believes .00 BAC is the right 
answer: 
…the choices are much simpler. You’re not trying to make choices about ‘oh have I 
had 2 or 3, should I risk it? If you’ve had one drink you’re risking it and you know it 
and everybody knows it and you’re quite certain when you’ve had that one drink 
(pers comm., 2003). 
People making poor decisions when they have the correct information is one 
problem that needs to be dealt with. However another problem arises when 
individuals make decisions without all of the information they need. 
MUARC researcher Max Cameron, who has been researching drink driving 
initiatives and their results for ten years, spoke out about a different problem relating 
to having a BAC limit of .05. Cameron’s comments reflect the BAC literature that 
was presented earlier in the chapter regarding its effects, and the gap that resides 
between the community’s knowledge and the results of that research: 
There is a misconception in the public about the risk associated with consuming 
alcohol and driving. I think a lot of the people think there’s no risk below .05 and all 
the risk above .05 (pers comm., 2003). 
 Although there is research discussing the risks associated with BAC’s as low 
as .02, as discussed above, the general community is not aware of this information. 
Discussions in interviews with community members supported Cameron’s statement 
that driving while under .05 is not an issue that concerns those community members. 
This led to the discovery of a major issue of concern and confusion regarding alcohol 
and its effects, which will be examined shortly. 
The perceptions of Victorian Community members in relation to BACs 
Although there are a multitude of scientific studies in the literature regarding 
BAC levels, there seems to be an absence of studies that look at the community 
attitude towards the issue. Accordingly, the research presented here made attempts to 
incorporate community attitudes and opinions in such areas. Some studies did include 
interviews with leading professional road safety members (Sheehan, 1994), but again 
community viewpoints were neglected. Therefore, this research tried to bridge that 
gap by speaking with both groups and comparing their comments.  
The current Victorian BAC limit was a point of discussion in all of the 
community interviews. Community members’ answers were relatively uniform, with a 
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 majority of respondents replying that the .05 limit seemed ‘about right’. Most 
respondents commented that it could be a bit lower (.03) or a bit higher (.07), but that 
there had to be a set limit and .05 would accommodate most people. One respondent 
replied, “I think it’s right…it could be a bit low here, but if it was increased it could 
be abused.” Conversely, another respondent said, “Probably too low, but what’s the 
difference between .05 and .07? From a legal point of view, you have to put a fence 
up somewhere.” One respondent had difficulty with the question, “I don’t know, 
because I don’t know what I’m like at .05. It’s hard to say”. A few interviewees 
mentioned that .08 was too high, and all agreed that .1 was well above a limit they 
would support. It is interesting to note that while only half the respondents were 
confident about knowing how many drinks it took them to personally reach .05, 
almost all of them were in favour of a .05 limit. This shows a level of confidence in 
their legislators, as the community trusted that the government would make a law that 
was reflective of research and trustworthy. In addition, almost every respondent 
replied that s/he didn’t think others knew what it would take them to reach .05. This 
touches again upon the issue of guesswork involved with having any limit above .00. 
This will be discussed later in the chapter.  
 Not a single interviewee volunteered the idea of lowering the BAC in Victoria 
to .02 or .00; thus each one was asked their feelings on a .00 BAC in Victoria. They 
were informed how the law works in Sweden, a country with a .02 legal BAC; 
although you are not allowed to have any alcohol in your blood while driving, there is 
a .0.02 allowance for things such as mouth alcohol, or the alcohol in cough syrup. The 
questions were posed both what were their feelings on it, and also their thoughts on 
that law being implemented in Australia.  
None of the respondents replied that they felt the law would be accepted in the 
current Victorian community. One respondent, a father with young children, replied 
that if the law was implemented, kids that grew up with it would accept it: 
I don’t know if I would welcome it, to be honest, but if you introduce it and they grow 
up with it, they’ll accept it…00 BAC, why not? It just becomes a mindset, people just 
don’t like change.  
Every other respondent was quick to dismiss the idea being accepted in 
Australia. Comments ranged from, “…I think it could be damaging to the culture of 
Australia”, to “Theoretically I disagree with that, because it takes the onus off the 
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 individual and starts regulating it, and all of a sudden we’re living in a police state”, to 
“it’s good safety-wise, but if one can’t go out and have a glass of wine with lunch or 
dinner, then you’re really infringing upon society”. Two interviewees commented that 
they believed the government that brought in that law would lose the next election 
based on that one piece of legislation. However prior to all of their comments about 
how that rule would never be accepted in Australia, many replied that they thought it 
was a good idea as far as stopping people from drink driving. They implied that it 
would be safe not because they believe it is dangerous to drink up to .05, or just over 
.05, but if there was no leeway at all, then people most likely wouldn’t be driving at 
.08 or above either. The overarching conclusion was that while safety-wise it might be 
successful and a logical next step, pragmatically it was unacceptable and unrealistic 
legislation to consider for the current Victorian society. Road safety practitioners may 
want to make note of this finding and not attempt to usher in legislation to early, or 
the community will reject it, which could lead to damaging backlash, or a general 
mistrust of the government that would hamper future legislative efforts. 
Issues relating to the enforcement of drink driving (rules regulations and 
legislation)  
Draconian police state 
The Victorian jurisdiction is relatively unique in the amount of freedom it 
gives to its police force regarding random breath testing. The Victoria Police are 
allowed to breath test any driver in any vehicle anywhere in the state. That includes 
cars on public or private property, ranging from the highway to private driveways. 
Also, any motorist over the age of 15 who is taken to hospital after an accident must 
allow a blood sample to be taken and analysed16. According to Inspector Ian Carins, 
the head of the Traffic Alcohol Section (TAS) of the Victoria Police, this causes many 
other jurisdictions to consider Victoria a ‘draconian’ police state: 
Look, some jurisdictions are trying to do the best they can, but they don’t have the 
legislation behind them. A lot of jurisdictions see our legislation as draconian, 
because we have got the power to breath test anyone anywhere, even on private 
property. The offence takes place anywhere, let’s just say you’re on a farm, you have 
an accident, you’re over .05, we can charge you. We can set a booze bus on or near a 
                                                 
16 This rule does not apply if the first doctor responsible for the patient’s care or treatment believes the taking of a blood sample would be 
prejudicial to the individual’s proper treatment or care.  
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 highway anywhere, the only stipulation is that we have to do it in quick succession, 
we can’t hold up cars for any longer than it takes to perform a breath test.. That’s 
why it’s random. We pull some cars in. It’s quite easy (pers comm., 2003). 
Although Victoria can be viewed as having a ‘draconian’ attitude due to the 
freedoms of its police force, it needs to be understood that this is an attitude the 
Victorian community as a whole accepts. However there are always some dissenters, 
as was illustrated by one interviewee who voiced this concern: 
I think it [the current drink drive environment] is over the top. I suppose from the 
point of view laissez faire there should be less government intervention. I agree 
wholeheartedly that it’s intended to save human lives, but it’s very much a police 
state and that worries me. You travel to the US and other things, and there are far 
more relaxed type of environments in the States, and I think Victoria is probably 
worse than the other [Australian] states, I just think it’s oppressive.  
However as he was the only interviewee that expressed these types of 
concerns, it is proposed that although everyone is not comfortable with the 
‘draconian’ laws, a majority of the community may not have problems with them.  
Max Cameron, a researcher at MUARC explained that he believes Victorians 
are accepting of these measures because they put the community good before their 
individual freedoms:  
Particularly in Victoria, not generally the case all over Australia but here people 
have been very accepting of what others would see as fairly draconian and far-
reaching safety policy and intervention. The booze buses and speed cameras have 
been innovative. In other states, speed cameras are signed. People here accept that 
when they can see a proven benefit afterwards (pers comm., 2003). 
It is important to note this as a major reason that legislation was accepted by 
the community; that Victorians put the good of the group before the rights of the 
individual. However other jurisdictions need to evaluate whether this type of response  
is typical in their society, or otherwise such legislation would be a cause for 
contention and again could lead to a backlash or an attitude of mistrust of the 
government. It is important to identify this view of Victorian initiatives so that other 
jurisdictions realise that this is a unique approach and may not be suitable for their 
community.  
Issues relating to Civil liberties and drink driving  
One of the interesting issues concerning Victorian (and Australian in general) 
legislative initiatives is that of civil liberties. This is especially important when 
considering whether or not any of Victoria’s initiatives are transferable to other 
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 jurisdictions. Homel (1990b) addressed the civil rights debate that took place in New 
South Wales (NSW) around the inception of their random breath testing legislation in 
1982. Homel noted that there was considerable concern and debate before the 
legislation was enacted regarding the civil liberties aspects of random breath testing.  
Dr Soames Job, currently an employee at the Roads Traffic Authority (RTA) 
in New South Wales and formerly an associate professor of psychology at the 
University of Sydney commented on the civil liberty issue with the implementation of 
RBT in NSW. He explained how NSW took a two-fold approach to convince the civil 
libertarians that random breath testing was a justifiable compromise:  
We did a lot of work to identify that a lot of innocent people were being killed by 
drink drivers and they were losing all their rights, their lives, so compared with that, 
the infringement of your right by being stopped for 30 seconds to blow into a bag was 
pretty trivial…the second argument we ran was that driving on the road was not an 
automatic right, it’s a privilege. And there are limitation attached to that privilege, 
and that has inherently always been the case; there are speed limits, processes you 
have to go through to get your license, your have to have your vehicles registered, 
there are gazillions of laws, so this was simply another limitation to what was 
already a privilege. If you didn’t want to be random breath tested, then don’t drive. 
There was a privilege; if you accessed that privilege this was a consequence of that 
privilege (pers comm., 2004). 
These tactics led to the eventual position reached by the New South Wales 
Council for Civil liberties as noted by Homel (1990b): 
…a civil liberty might be set aside in the specific instance if it can be demonstrated 
that the practice of random breath testing achieves the aim of reduction road deaths 
[NSW Council for Civil Liberties 1982, p.1] (p71) . 
Therefore, the civil libertarians decided that the good of the community 
superseded the good of the individual in this particular case. In addition to the 
literature reviewed, the professionals interviewed commented that they believed that 
the Australian values that the community good supersedes an individual’s right was a 
strong force in overcoming civil liberty concerns. This example demonstrates that 
even when civil libertarians are providing obstacles to legislation it does not preclude 
them from being convinced otherwise; infringements on civil liberties can be justified 
by the beneficial and tangible results of that infringement. Hence while a jurisdiction 
should not be deterred by the threat of civil liberty condemnation, it needs to consider 
whether or not the individuals of its society will value others’ lives over their 
individual liberties.  
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 In addition to the New South Wales’ civil libertarian concerns, Homel (1990b) 
also addressed concerns made by H. Laurence Ross regarding random breath testing 
legislation. Homel first noted that Ross’ work played a significantly positive influence 
in New South Wales’ early considerations of RBT. Homel then reviews Ross’ 
concerns about deterrence-based approaches to reducing alcohol-related casualties. He 
quotes Ross as comparing RBT to:  
a mass stop and frisk, which cannot clearly be distinguished from, say, stopping all 
passing pedestrians to be sniffed by dogs for the possession of drugs or to be patted 
down to see whether they are carrying weapons (p75).  
Homel then lays out Ross’ alternative suggestions: diminishing the availability 
of and increasing the cost of alcohol consumption, designing better highways, and 
removing environmental hazards as trees. Homel notes that Ross’ arguments 
exemplify the exact difficulties that would be faced trying to introduce RBT to the 
United States, and some of the logical alternatives. However Homel disagrees with 
Ross’ analogy and instead makes his own. Homel associates random breath testing 
with the searches of passengers and luggage at airport. While intrusive, he believes 
both are a ‘necessary sacrifice’ (p 75) for security’s sake—one against terrorism, one 
against dangerous drivers. This author agrees with Homel’s arguments that Ross’ 
analogy is a bit dramatic, and that random breath testing is a ‘necessary sacrifice’ for 
security’s sake. However this author contends that in addition, it is also a privilege to 
drive, not a right. Therefore when people are driving, they are in moving weapons. 
Thus where it might be wrong to stop someone walking and search them as they do 
not pose a large threat, when an individual is placing others at risk with their actions, 
it is a fair claim to make sure they are operating at the best of their abilities. 
Comments made by the community members involved in this research 
suggested that all of them agreed with Homel. While opinions varied on how much 
overall success they felt the random breath testing achieved, all interviewees agreed 
they were comfortable with the process. One interviewee, who claims to have been 
breathalysed hundreds of times commented:  
Part of me says necessary evil, part of me says where else would you be able to 
justify an investment in those sorts of things with a strike rate that low. 
So although this interviewee does not favour the process, he appears willing to 
tolerate it. Another interviewee, who had just been breathalysed the previous weekend 
said, “I don’t have a problem, in fact I don’t mind at all’. Another interviewee, who 
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 admitted to driving short distances (a few blocks) when she assumed she was slightly 
over .05 said that RBT had “been a good deterrent. I don’t feel it interferes with your 
life”. While this may seem paradoxical, this interviewee used to drive longer distances 
when she was over the limit, but since the random breath testing began and she felt 
threatened in those situations, she minimised her driving to short distances on back 
roads. One interviewee, who almost lost his life while a passenger in a drink drive 
accident had a mixed view on random breath testing: 
I’ve been breathalysed, but people still do it [drink drive], It’s never going to fully 
stop. It’s like trying to eradicate thieves. They are also going to be there. It minimises 
the number of people though, definitely. 
This quote illustrates that even when community members do not believe an 
initiative will completely solve a problem, they can still support it with the knowledge 
it is helping to some degree. This highlights the importance of community support for 
legislation. As random breath testing was supported17 by 97% of the population in 
2000 (Mitchell-Taverner, 2000), it is no surprise that there is no longer vocal dissent 
regarding rights violations through random breath testing. When asked if they had 
ever been random breath tested, interviewees looked surprised, as if they had been 
asked if they had ever paid a toll before. The majority of them also disregarded their 
experiences of random breath testing without a second thought. In addition, over five 
hours of direct observation of three booze buses on a highway produced not a single 
complaint about the process. Not a single motorist even balked at the process or at 
what was expected of them. They all simply rolled down their window, took the test, 
and drove off. The high level of support of the legislation came from the community 
believing there was a problem that needed to be addressed. The civil liberties issue 
involving random breath testing legislation is a good example of the community 
accepting legislation because they expected it. By the time this legislation was 
enforced, the community had been stirred into outrage at the extent of the road toll in 
Victoria. Through the outrage they demanded that something be done to address the 
problem—when the answer came through the implementation of random breath 
testing, the community was willing to trade a piece of their civil liberty for peace of 
mind, knowing an effort was being made to minimise the road toll.  
                                                 
17 The 97% approval rate of RBT includes those who agree ‘somewhat’ with RBT. The rate is 86% when only those who are ‘strongly’ in favour 
of RBT are included. 
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 Road safety legislation and regulations (not related to drink driving but 
important to decreasing road deaths)  
In addition to the abovementioned drink driving legislation, a variety of laws 
were concurrently implemented related to other aspects of road safety. These laws 
would have had a direct impact on the drink driving road toll although they were 
indirectly related to drink driving. For example, as more people wore seat belts and 
bicycle helmets, fewer deaths would have resulted from drink drive crashes. These 
laws are listed below in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Related Victorian Road Safety Legislation and Corresponding Regulations 
Year Legislation18
1970 Compulsory seat belt wearing legislation, applicable to occupants of vehicles 8 years old 
and above, where a seat belt is available. 
1974 Retro-fitting seat belt legislation. Immediate requirement for vehicles first registered in the 
period October 1964-1968 to be fitted with front seat belts, and for earlier vehicles to be 
fitted on resale.  
1976 Child restraint legislation. Children under eight years of age were required to be suitably 
restrained when occupying a front seat (but not rear seat) 
1981 Child restraint legislation amendment. Requires children under the age of 8 years of age to 
be restrained in available restraints when occupying rear as well as front seats. 
1983 Red light cameras introduced. Automatic cameras installed at intersections with traffic 
signals to detect “running the red light” offence. 
 
1985 Drivers responsible for seat belt wearing by their passengers aged 8 to 17 years. Fine of 
$100 per person without a seatbelt. 
1986 Speed cameras introduced. 
1986 P-plates required for full period of probationary licence 
1990 Mandatory bicycle helmet regulation 
 
 
Importance of seat belt regulations in producing behavioural change 
The seat belt regulations (part of the Road Safety Act) were an important step 
that laid the groundwork for the success of future road safety initiatives in Victoria. 
For the legislators and members of the road safety field, the success of the seat belt 
regulations was evidence that the community’s behaviours could be altered if proper 
legislation and enforcement were implemented. ‘Proper’ legislation implying that the 
community felt there was a need for the laws and regulations (that a problem was 
significant enough to warrant attention) and therefore was in support of them, and also 
that the laws were enforceable. The seat belt regulations were important for 
community members as well. It demonstrated that a change in their behaviour would 
result in improvements in road safety. The success of these regulations is 
                                                 
18 Information sourced from: ATSB, 1998, RTA, 1987 
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 demonstrated through a 91% response in those who always wore a seat belt in the 
front and 73% who wore one in the rear seat according to a 1989 community survey 
(Reark Research Pty Ltd, 1989). By 1996, 95% of Australians claimed they always 
wore a seatbelt in the front, and 92% of Victorians (86% of Australians) always wore 
one in the back seat (Mitchell-Taverner, Adams, & Hejtmanek, 1996). It is important 
to note this success both for the importance of reassuring the community that 
legislation can have an impact on a problem, and also that it is important to consider 
all angles of a problem instead of simply the direct ones. In this case, addressing other 
behaviours that play a role in drink driving accidents (such as seat belt use) concluded 
in a positive result.  
International comparisons of legislation relating to driver licensing and alcohol 
consumption  
In addition to the laws related to drink driving, such as BAC and breath testing 
legislation, other areas are examined and addressed by legislation. This includes laws 
determining the ages involved in the purchase and consumption of alcohol, the 
obtaining of a drivers licence, penalties for first offences, multiple offences, 
rehabilitation and re-granting of licences. They are noted below in Table 519. 
                                                 
19 Information from (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2000) 
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Table 5: Licensing and alcohol consumption legislation and regulations in Australia 
Issue Legislation and regulations 
Minimum age for purchasing alcohol 
 
18 
 
Minimum age for consuming alcohol 
 
18 
 
Minimum licensing age for private vehicles 
 
18 
 
Graduated system of licensing? 
 
Yes. A learners permit must be held for at least 12 
months before progressing to the probationary stage. 
Probationary period lasts 3 years. Special plates must 
be displayed, the licencee is limited to a lower BAC 
and speed. 
Conditions on re-attaining license after found 
guilty of a drink driving offence (full license 
holders)? 
Yes, restricted to a zero BAC for three years after 
obtaining a court order (Z condition license) 
Rehabilitation requirements prior to re-
licensing?  
* this is after a license disqualification, not 
suspension. 
Yes. Requirements depend on age, license category 
and BAC range of the offender 
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (of the United States) 
compiled a report in 2000 comparing the United States’ drink driving legislation with 
comparable nations around the world. All of the countries included are part of the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), which is a 
measure Australia often uses for comparable purposes regarding road safety. The 
NHTSA report illustrated that Australia has similar legislation to a majority of its 
peers and in many areas is in fact leading the nations regarding ‘world’s best 
practice’. 
 Australia’s .05 BAC legislation is the same as a multitude of European 
jurisdictions (such as Germany and France), while a majority of those nations not 
enforcing at .05 do so at a level of .08. Australia is one of the few nations that also 
have lower BAC requirements for younger drivers. This initiative was proven to be 
effective in reducing alcohol-related crashes among young drivers in the United States 
(Hingson et al. 1994; Blomberg 1992, as cited in National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (2000)). Australia is also comparable with many European nations in 
having a driving age of 18 years of age. The age of new drivers is seen to be important 
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 as younger drivers are more vulnerable than older drivers. In addition to the driving 
age, the licensing system is important as well. Australia is one of several countries 
that has a graduated licensing system. A graduated system gives novice drivers new 
privileges over time, as they gain more experience before reaching the next step. 
Examples of this are driving with multiple passengers, or driving at night. In addition 
to privileges, these systems can penalise novice drivers separately from the general 
driving population. According to the NHTSA report (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 2000), graduated licensing systems have been shown to minimise 
crashes among novice drivers, according to research conducted by the National 
Transportation Safety Board in 1993. Australia is also similar to many other countries 
in not automatically re-granting licenses that have been cancelled, and placing some 
requirements on reinstated licenses (such as a zero BAC requirement for three years in 
Victoria). The suspension or cancellation of licensing is dependent upon the arrest 
BAC, both in Australia and various countries around the world. Overall, it is evident 
that Australia, and Victoria specifically are consistent with other countries regarding 
drink driving laws, and in some circumstances are regarded as a leader with the 
continual creation and implementation of successful drink drive related legislation. 
While it is not a law that employees who serve alcohol must take the RSA 
course, it is required by many licensed establishments. The serving of alcohol is 
somewhat related to the laws and regulations dictating the legal ages of alcohol 
purchase and consumption. 
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Legislation regarding drink driving penalties in Victoria 
Table 6 (below) presents the penalties for varying blood alcohol levels in 
Victoria. Similar to most countries in the European Union, and contrary to laws in the 
United States, the arrest BAC plays a large role in determining the severity of 
punishments for drink driving. Therefore less discretion is involved in assigning the 
punishments, and those that have acted grossly irresponsibly (driving with an 
extremely high BAC) will be penalised differently than those whose actions may not 
be viewed as equally irresponsible (driving with a BAC slightly over the legal limit). 
These penalties are the minimum requirements; these levels must be imposed if the 
case goes to court (however more severe penalties can be applied). An individual 
breathalysed on the road with a reading under .15 will be issued with a Traffic 
Infringement Notice, mandating the equivalent penalty noted below. Any individual 
with a reading over .15 must go to court, where they will be penalised with a 
monetary fine of not more than $1200, on a first offence.  
 57
  
Table 6: Victorian Penalties for varying BAC offences20
BAC 
 
License 
Suspension 
Monetary 
Penalty 
.050-.069 No suspension, but 
10 demerit points 
 
$300 
.07-.079 6 months $300 
.08-.089 6 months $300 
.09-.099 6 months $300 
.10-.109 10 months $300 
.11-.119 11 months $420 
.12-.129 12 months $420 
.13-.139 13 months $420 
.14-.149 14 months $420 
.15-.159 15 months $420 
.20-.209 20 months Court 
.24 or more 24 months Court 
 
The above penalties are for first offences. With multiple offences, both the 
fine and period of license suspension are increased; often they are doubled. 
Educational courses are required to regain a license if it has been disqualified (but not 
suspended), and new conditions may be placed on a license when it is reinstated.  
 Less information can be more in relation to drink driving and its penalties 
An interesting note is that while familiar with general penalties, the majority 
of the interviewees were not familiar with the exact penalties for being caught drink 
driving. They were all aware of license suspension and fines, and many also 
mentioned demerit points. However only interviewees who had recently looked the 
information up specifically had any ideas about exact penalties. This is interesting to 
note that while community members are not aware of specific penalties, they are 
knowledgeable enough to be threatened into refraining from or minimising the 
undesired behaviours.  
                                                 
20 Information complied from: Victoria Police, 2004, Victoria Legal Aid, 2001 
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 The community members were asked their opinions on the major sanction 
taken against drink drivers, a suspension of license. Responses varied from 100% 
agreement to qualms about the length of suspension, with concerns that 2 or 3 months 
would be sufficient instead of 6 or 12 months. One interviewee highlighted one of the 
major difficulties of enforcing license suspension: that it is difficult to enforce people 
who drive with a suspended or disqualified license. Another respondent explained his 
support of the penalties in terms of their consequences: 
Whether it’s a 6 months or a year I guess it would depend on the severity of the 
offence, but I think 6 months as a minimum is a very fair penalty…it would certainly 
cause inconvenience and would certainly make people stop and think.  
A few of the respondents mentioned the necessity of sanctions other than 
fines, due to the short-lasting effects a fine would have on them, “Any financial 
penalty to someone like myself isn’t a deterrent whatsoever. The things that would 
deter me, inability to drive and social aspect.” While this respondent was a middle-
class, middle-aged male, his comments were echoed by younger respondents as well 
who were not of the same financial means. However the factors this interviewee did 
mention that would deter him, inability to drive and social stigma, are both probable 
results of drink driving in Victoria. And this respondent was emphatic about his 
refusal to drive if felt he was anywhere near a BAC of .05. One interviewee, a 
Victorian who was convicted of drink driving in Queensland and lost his license for 8 
months commented:  
I think they’re reasonable, but what’s reasonable? If I had killed someone…Maybe 
penalties should go up, but where do you draw the line? 
One unusual response came from a single mother with young children who 
admitted to drink driving short distances when she considered herself slightly over the 
limit: 
Yes, I’d have to say it’s fair, I just wouldn’t want to be caught doing it. I couldn’t get 
to work, couldn’t transport the children. 
She was in agreement with the penalties and aware of their consequences, 
however she took chances because she felt she either had no other options or that over 
the short distances home (that usually involved back roads) the threat was minimised. 
This is interesting to note that while community members are not aware of specific 
penalties, they know enough to be threatened into refraining from or minimising the 
undesired behaviours.  
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 Synopsis of government policies and drink driving initiatives  
Throughout the period of this case study, Victoria has implemented multiple 
pieces of legislation directly and indirectly related to drink driving that have aided in a 
minimisation of the road toll. The legislation has been not only accepted by, but 
expected by the community and therefore has the community’s support behind it. 
With that support, the legislation has been adhered to by a majority of the population. 
Victoria is rather unique as a jurisdiction however as it is governed by a large amount 
of legislation which is viewed as quite strict and constricting by some outside 
jurisdictions. It is important to also note that many Victorian drivers were likely also 
influenced by concurrent road safety legislation governing areas such as speed and 
seat belts. Implications of receiving fines or other penalties for related road safety 
behaviours may have played a role in convincing Victorians to adhere more closely to 
drink driving legislation than if the drink drive legislation had been implemented in 
isolation. With the enforcement and advertising support that are to be examined in the 
following two chapters, legislation in Victoria has led to the minimisation of the 
undesirable behaviour of drink driving.  
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 4: The Stick: Enforcement efforts in the anti-drink driving fight 
This chapter examines the enforcement efforts in Victoria and the theoretical 
concepts underlying the initiatives implemented. Deterrence is a method of gaining 
control through the use of fear; deterrence theory will be examined in this chapter. 
Deterrence theory will be explored through literature on the topic and also through the 
inspection of its application via the random breath testing processes. Deterrence 
theory underpins Victoria’s enforcement initiatives, and thus is the focus of this 
chapter on enforcement efforts. Next, the four most important points, or ‘pillars’ of 
deterrence theory will be examined. These pillars guide Victoria’s enforcement 
initiatives, and each will be individually addressed to accentuate its role within the 
process. A section looks at other enforcement measures that are not based on 
deterrence theory, and through literature comments on their apparent effectiveness. 
This is noteworthy as the ineffectiveness of these techniques supports the contention 
that deterrence theory is a necessary step for effective enforcement initiatives. 
Comments from professional and community member interviews regarding random 
breath testing practices and experiences will be examined. The chapter concludes with 
a look at the differences and difficulties involved in enforcing legislation in the 
contrasting metropolitan and rural regions of a single jurisdiction. This distinction is 
important to note as the majority of initiatives and successes that are focused on in 
this case study occurred in the metropolitan areas of Victoria, not the rural areas. 
Following the case study paradigm, the literature involved in this chapter is treated as 
data and as such is examined alongside more traditional forms of data, including 
comments from interviewees and direct observations. 
With the legislative framework in place, it was important to find methods of 
enforcing the laws that would be heeded by the community. While Victoria’s first 
attempt at enforcement was unsuccessful and led at a temporary cessation of the 
random breath testing approach, successes in other jurisdictions prompted a revamped 
effort. The theoretical framework of New South Wales’ successful approach was 
adopted and deterrence theory became the pillar of Victorian enforcement initiatives. 
It will be argued that deterrence theory is a necessary step for successful anti-drink 
drive campaigns, as will be the importance of enforcement that is supported by the 
community.  
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 The second aspect of the tripartite model for successful drink drive initiatives 
is enforcement, or ‘the stick’. If there are laws but no threat of being caught, people 
will continue to break the laws if they do not believe what they are doing is wrong, or 
do not believe they are really committing a crime (for example, ‘I’m just a little bit 
over, it’s no big deal). Therefore, enforcement is necessary to support the laws.  
There is one prominent form of enforcement in Victoria; random breath 
testing. Random breath testing is composed of both stationary and mobile testing, 
both which will be explored in-depth in a following section. Random breath testing is 
based on deterrence theory, which will be presented in detail below.  
Deterrence Theory: The Literature 
As noted above, deterrence is a method of gaining control through the use of 
fear. Deterrence uses the threat of punishment to raise fear levels through some type 
of sanction. A strict definition of deterrence is:  
A person is deterred from offending by a sanction if, and only if, he refrains from that 
act because he fears the implementation of the sanctions, and, for no other reason. 
[Beyleveld 1979, p.207, in Elliott (2003a)] 
Deterrence theory consists of two segments, specific deterrence and general 
deterrence. According to Elliott (2003a), “General and specific deterrence are not 
different mechanisms, but the same mechanism applied to different populations (p1).” 
Specific deterrence affects the individual (when they themselves are caught); general 
deterrence affects the community (seeing police random breath testing activity) (see 
Figure 6 on p63).  
Therefore, general deterrence is aimed at potential offenders who have not 
previously endured the sanction. Specific deterrence targets individuals who have 
been caught in the hopes of persuading them not to commit the crime again since they 
have been impacted by the sanction. Elliott emphasises the fact that if motorists 
refrain from committing an offence for a reason other than the fear of consequences 
(for example social impact vs. loss of license), then they are not deterred. 
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Figure 6: General Deterrence Theory (from Cameron et al, 2004) 
 
Elliott continued by naming the three different types of effects deterrence has 
as a preventative measure: 
(1) The deterrent effect -intimidation; 
(2) The strengthening of moral inhibitions -education; and 
(3) The stimulation of habitual law abiding conduct-reinforcement. 
 
The overarching issue facing enforcement is getting community members to 
obey the laws by changing their behaviours. Elliot (2003a) identified three effects of 
deterrence that are directly related to this issue. The first effect, intimidation, works to 
change people’s behaviour by threatening them with unfavourable consequences (for 
example loss of license and fines). The education aspect of deterrence works to 
support a change in attitude, which will aid in changing behaviours, or supporting the 
behavioural changes if they occurred first. The reinforcement aspect continuously 
prompts motorists to obey the laws by making the new behaviours habitual.  
Ross (1984) was one of the original proponents of deterrence theory. Ross 
claimed that the theoretical propositions of deterrence assume that as long as the 
relevant public (motorists) perceive the threatened sanctions as severe, certain, and 
promptly imposed, the undesired behaviour will be minimised. These components 
(severity, certainty, and swiftness) became some of foundations of deterrence theory. 
Based on examples from countries that had implemented enforcement laws based on 
specific deterrence theory, Ross (1984) concluded: 
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 In sum, the existing experience with enforcement campaigns supports the hypothesis, 
which is based on the deterrence proposition, that perceived certainty of punishment 
is an important determinant of the efficacy of deterrence measures (p30).  
Ross also concluded that increasing the severity of punishment ‘produced no 
evidence in favour of the deterrence proposition’ (p32). This contention, that certainty 
of punishment is a much more effective tool than severity of punishment has been 
echoed in subsequent literature including Grosevnor, Toomey, & Wagennar (1999) 
and Benson, Mast & Rasmussed (2000). Furthermore, Ross deduced that efforts to 
deter drink driving through legal threats are successful in the short term when they are 
aimed at increasing motorists’ perception of certainty and punishment. Therefore, in 
addition to planning a long-term campaign, the campaign’s deterrence aspects could 
be focused more on the certainty of punishment then the severity of punishment. 
Yet Ross (1984) reported that where there was a deterrence effect in the short 
term, the impact did not last. Thus it should also be noted that according to Ross that 
the value of an enforcement crackdown is limited to its duration. However Ross did 
allude to the fact that if enforcement was maintained over time, it might secure long-
term deterrent effects. This is important because it advises against short-term 
solutions for drink driving problems. Ross’ claim means that simply setting up 
deterrence-related enforcement behaviours for a short amount of time will not have 
any long-lasting effect on the drink driving problem. Instead, a long-term plan is 
important when using deterrence.  
Ross’ article was written in 1984, at a time before most countries had 
implemented full-scale deterrence-based enforcement programs in their jurisdiction. 
In 1990, Homel (1990b) confirmed Ross’ hypothesis through the example of 
Australia: 
In addition, however, the Australian experience suggests equally as strongly that full 
random testing is incapable of achieving long-term reductions in casualties unless it 
is rigorously enforced and extensively advertised. If visible enforcement and publicity 
are maintained, the deterrent impact is maintained. If visible enforcement is relaxed, 
the deterrent impact wanes (p74). 
Thus it has been shown that long-term deterrent effects can be achieved, if 
visible enforcement and publicity are maintained. It has also been shown that if these 
aspects of deterrence are not maintained, long-term effects will not endure. In 
supporting this contention, Benson et al (2000) cited Sherman (1997, p8): 
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 The evidence on drunk driving, in contrast [to the literature on illicit drugs], is one of 
the great success stories of world policing…[T]he sheer numbers of consistent results 
from quasi-experimental evaluations of proactive drunk driving arrest crackdowns 
suggest a clear cause and effect. The ability of the police to control drunk driving 
appears to be a direct and linear function of the amount of effort they put into it 
(p357). 
This premise has been proven further through the Victorian case—as intense 
enforcement efforts dependent upon deterrence theory (in addition to advertising) 
have been in place for over ten years in Victoria, motorists still feel threatened that 
they will be caught if they take the risk. Evidence of this threat surfaced in community 
interviews, and will be discussed below. 
The Biggest Threat 
The powerful effect of deterrence is evident in the comments made by 
Victorian community members about their main concerns regarding drink driving. 
Almost all of the interviewees mentioned loss of license as a major concern and 
reason that effected their decisions on drinking and driving. Of those interviewees, 
half noted that loss of license was the major concern. A few noted loss of license as 
the second concern behind killing someone. A few interviewees cited a combination 
of factors, including loss of license, killing someone, and the social reaction. The only 
respondents who did not mention loss of license all cited killing or hurting someone. 
It was interesting to note who cited which fears. The interviewees who have been 
involved in accidents where alcohol was a factor all mentioned killing/hurting 
someone is a main concern. The interviewee who as a passenger in a car with a drunk 
driver was left in a coma for three days with close head trauma said, 
I don’t want to kill/damage someone else. I wouldn’t want to put myself behind bars 
for life, wouldn’t want to kill someone else.  
Another interviewee crashed into a pole while he was driving, but was 
fortunate that he and his passenger were not injured. This interviewee was caught 
drink driving two and a half years later and had his license suspended for 8 months. 
He commented on his thoughts before his accident: 
Sometimes I thought about getting caught, but never thought about getting in a crash, 
thought didn’t even enter. I didn’t even think about crashing my car. Thought about 
losing my license a little bit, for work purposes, but hitting someone or getting caught 
main sort of thing. 
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 All of the interviewees with children cited killing/hurting someone as their 
primary concern. An example of these attitudes was exemplified by this father’s 
quote,  
Basically its life, obviously losing your license is a big inconvenience, but obviously 
pales in comparison to loss of life, particularly now that most of the time I have a 
family driving around with me 
 Some interviewees mentioned an important factor influencing drink driving, 
regarding the state of mind of someone when deciding whether or not to drive after 
drinking,  
What I fear most I think is getting caught. When you’re drunk, you don’t think about 
anyone else, you’re indestructible, there’s nothing but a cop to stop you. 
The belief that alcohol makes an individual feel indestructible was mentioned 
by a few interviewees. It is interesting to note however that this indestructibility was 
applicable to hurting others, but not police officers. In other words, even though they 
felt indestructible, that they could not be hurt or would not hurt others, they did think 
they could be stopped by the police. This supports the notion that sustained and 
visible random breath testing keeps the threat of being caught a threat, and therefore 
deters some motorists from driving after drinking. This is aided by planned placement 
of the RBT so a maximum number of community members are exposed to it and 
thereby deterred. 
Random Breath Testing: Deterrence theory in action 
The main method of deterrence used to combat drink driving in Victoria, 
Australia is random breath testing (RBT). Random breath testing involves the breath 
testing of motorists selected at random, where no visible signs of intoxication or 
suspicions of intoxication are necessary prior to testing. Therefore, the threat of being 
caught is significantly increased as a motorist never knows when they may be pulled 
over and tested. In Victoria, the police have the power to breathalyse any motorist 
anywhere in the state. The only requirement is that the testing is quick and does not 
hold up traffic for an extended period of time. With these small restrictions, motorists 
are guaranteed that the random breath testing will not be a time-consuming 
inconvenience, and police are able to breath test in various types of locations, posing a 
larger threat to potential offenders. 
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 Stationary RBT 
There are two types of random breath testing, stationary and mobile. 
Stationary mobile breath testing involves a pre-selected location (that is not 
announced to the community) where police set up a checkpoint and wave cars in at 
random and breathalyse them. The locations are often highly visible, and again in 
Victoria will range from a freeway to a service lane on a main street. The locations 
constantly change and the testing occurs at different times of the day/night. By 
constantly changing the location and times of the breath testing, the deterrent effects 
of sustained and high visibility are increased as more locations and therefore more 
motorists are targeted. A motorist who refuses to take a breath test is considered to 
have failed the test and penalised as such. After a motorist is waved in to be tested, 
they blow into the preliminary testing device and those returning a negative result 
drive away. In Victoria, this entire operation usually takes 20 seconds (see Appendix: 
1 B to watch breath testing process). Any motorist who records a positive test (register 
a reading of .050 or above) is taken off the road, and after 30 minutes is put on an 
evidentiary breath testing device to determine their BAC, which can then be used in 
court. If they fail this test (blow .051 or over), they are immediately charged 
according to the corresponding legislation, presented in the preceding chapter. 
Stationary breath testing in Victoria is primarily undertaken by booze buses, as was 
described in the methodology section. The exception is in rural Victoria, and this issue 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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Mobile RBT 
Mobile breath testing involves police officers in either marked or unmarked 
cars, who pull over motorists and breathalyse them on the spot. Mobile breath testing 
then operates in the same manner as stationary breath testing—the motorist is 
breathalysed, and if the result is negative they are released. If it is positive, they must 
take another test, on an evidentiary machine. Victoria implemented the ‘every car is a 
booze bus’ initiative, which dictates that every motorist that is pulled over for an 
offence is to be breathalysed. Therefore, in addition to random mobile breath testing, 
routine traffic stops result in a motorist being breathalysed. The major differences 
between stationary and mobile random breath testing therefore are two-fold. Firstly, 
mobile breath testing is much less visible—only the individual being breathalysed and 
anyone he tells of his experienced is aware that he was breathalysed. Conversely, any 
car that passes a stationary random breath testing point is aware of the random breath 
testing, as well as the motorists being breathalysed. Secondly, mobile breath testing 
returns many more positive results; the tests are often targeting motorists who have 
already committed one offence, and research shows other behaviours (such as not 
wearing a seat belt or driving erratically) are often linked to drink driving (FORS, 
1997 as cited in (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001)).  
In Victoria, stationary random breath testing as a deterrent effort is primarily 
undertaken through the use of booze buses, and supplemented with mobile breath 
testing through patrol cars. However, patrol cars are the major source in detecting 
drink drivers, exemplified through the breathalysation of 2 million cars per year in 
2003 (this includes many motorists who were pulled over for routine traffic stops such 
as speeding). In the same year, booze buses breathalysed about 1.5 million drivers. In 
total, in 2003 the Victoria Police breathalysed 3.5 million cars—with 3.5 million 
licensed drivers in Victoria, the Police were able to establish a 1:1 ratio for the year 
2003. However it took time to reach these levels, as in 1993 random breath tests were 
conducted on almost one out of every two drivers (Zaal, 1994). This shows that both 
types of random breath testing are necessary, as mobile and stationary testing exhibit 
different results. 
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 Random breath testing was successful in New South Wales well before it 
became standard procedure in Victoria. Homel (1990a) described the dramatic effect 
RBT had in NSW upon its implementation. He noted a 36% decline in alcohol-related 
deaths and injuries that occurred immediately and remained permanently. Also, there 
was an overall 22% reduction in fatalities. He cited five waves of survey data that 
suggested strongly that the decline was due in large part to RBT and not other factors. 
It is important to note, however, that simply implementing RBT does not 
guarantee success. Issues such as police organisation, local customs and community 
attitudes are relevant to each jurisdiction and need consideration. According to Homel 
(1990b), “RBT is not a ‘magic bullet’ that can be fired at the drinking and driving 
problem (p70).” This claim was originally made in reference to Victoria’s (as well as 
other Australian states’) initial attempts to implement random breath testing. These 
lacklustre attempts did not test frequently enough, lacked a high enough level of 
publicity, focused more on mobile random breath testing than stationary, and were 
easy to avoid based on predictability of location. However Victoria restructured its 
breath testing program so it more closely modelled New South Wales’ example. 
Beginning in 1990, Victoria’s random breath testing program was structured around 
points proposed by Homel as key elements of a successful random breath testing 
programme. These points are:  
• Not only do RBT operations need to be visible, but they also need to be 
‘threatening’. (Drivers should not be able to conclude that they can easily 
avoid the testing) 
• The goal (of threatening visibility) is to increase the perceived changes of 
apprehension for drinking and driving. 
• Stationary RBT should always be supplementary to mobile random breath 
testing (since it is less visible and therefore creates less of a perception of 
getting caught. Mobile breath testing’s main value is to deter those who 
think they can avoid stationary RBT) 
• Media publicity is essential in order to launch RBT with a ‘bang’. 
Publicity should focus on RBT and should not simply be educational in 
content. 
• The police should be continuously updated with goals and effectiveness of 
their RBT efforts. In addition, it must be stressed that RBT is not a 
technique for apprehending offenders but for deterring them [Homel’s 
emphasis] 
• Penalties should not be more severe than license suspensions of several 
months and fines of several hundred dollars. 
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 • RBT as a preventive policy must be paralleled by enforcement methods 
that aim to maximise the apprehension rate. 
 
Serious consideration of these recommendations made by Homel (1990a, 
1990b) for any jurisdiction planning on implementing enforcement initiatives based 
on deterrence theory could be quite beneficial, as Homel is one of the most frequently 
cited and respected researchers regarding random breath testing.  
From theory to practice: The four pillars  
The Victoria Police focus on four of these points: high visibility, strictly 
enforced, sustained, and well publicised. These four points have become the four 
pillars of Victoria’s enforcement strategy. 
Pillar 1: High visibility 
According to Inspector Ian Cairns, head of the TAS of the Victoria Police, the 
high visibility point is addressed through the design of the booze buses: 
… the highly visible part of it, when you see the booze buses, they are designed for 
people to think: drink driving. They see a police car, and they may say, ‘bloody 
coppers’, look at their speedo. to see if they’re speeding, but if they see a booze bus, 
it’s the highly visible part of it, and they are designed to be unique. We spend a lot of 
resources making one-off vehicles that the public recognises not just for the paint 
work but because of their shape, their size, all that, to really push the drink driving 
message. And in themselves, they are part of the whole TAC campaign. The TAC do 
the whole media part of it, but the booze buses themselves are very important part of 
the highly visible side of the campaign (pers comm, 2003). 
For pictures and a virtual tour of the booze buses and their highly visible 
design, see Appendix: 1 D. In addition to the visibility received from the buses’ 
design is the high visibility accrued from the constant testing which was often done in 
high-traffic (volume) areas.  
Pillar 2: Strict Enforcement 
The ‘strictly enforced’ point (certainty of punishment in preceding literature) 
is addressed in that every motorist caught by a booze bus is treated exactly the same. 
Regardless of whom the driver is, if they fail the preliminary test they are taken off 
the road and escorted to the booze bus. In the past, drivers could have been allowed to 
drive off even when failing the test, as there was no way of regulating the police 
officers. For instance, if the officer was a friend, they could conceivably let the 
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 offender keep driving. However, new technology was introduced in December 1999 
to eradicate the officer’s discretion. The Ryan Alcometer S400 is a preliminary breath 
testing device that records every screening test the police officer takes over the course 
of a shift. The information is downloadable, and the information provided includes 
each test conducted (male or female), how many tests were positive (over the legal 
limit) and this can be checked to see that each officer took the appropriate action for 
every positive test. If that action was not taken, the officer is held accountable. And 
according to Cairns (pers comm., 2003), if an officer lets someone go, they can lose 
their job. As a result of this new technology, the ‘strike rate’ immediately declined on 
the booze buses. From catching one offender per 400/450 tests, the police began 
catching one offender in every 300 tests. This occurred simply by taking away any 
discretion of the officer. This is a significant point, as it illustrates the importance of 
using smart technology, especially in an instance where human discretion is available 
yet ideally not applicable. The detriment of discretion was emphasised in few of the 
interviews when respondents made note of instances that they or people they knew 
had not been charged when they blew over the limit. 
One interviewee spoke of an incident he was involved in that included an 
officer’s discretion. This interviewee was drunk, and driving along with a BAC he 
(retrospectively) gauged to be at least .15 (three times the legal limit). He was driving 
on the road while talking on his mobile, with an equally drunk passenger also on his 
mobile. The lanes switched to make room for a turning lane, but the driver did not 
notice and continued straight ahead. The car crashed into the traffic light pole and 
knocked it over. Neither he nor the passenger were hurt, but neither wanted to stay 
and wait for the police. The interviewee said he had heard that breath tests taken a few 
hours after a crash were not able to be used as evidence, so he decided to hide. He and 
the passenger ran away from the scene of the accident and hid in the bushes. After 
approximately 45 minutes, they were found by the police. The interviewee admitted to 
the officer that he had been drinking heavily and driving. The police officer said to 
him ‘mate, here’s your car keys, go back and lock it, consider this your lucky day’, 
and then continued ‘I’ll give you a call in the next few days about the Commission’s 
accident report’. Following that the officer phoned him a couple of days later and told 
him that they wrote on the report that he’d hit some oil and crashed the car. These 
officers had been in a patrol car, and not with a booze bus. Through this experience, 
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 the two individuals involved, and any family or friends they told of this experience, 
and anyone else that heard the story, would have reason to doubt the strictly enforced 
tenet.  
Pillar 3: Sustained enforcement 
Sustained enforcement occurs through the Victoria Police conducting random 
breath tests 365 days a year, 7 days a week. Although 85% of the testing occurs 
during high alcohol hours (HAH), 15% of testing is also conducted during the day and 
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday nights. According to Harrison & Senserrick 
(2000), high alcohol hours are considered to be 6pm-6am Monday thru Thursday, 
Friday 4pm to 6am, Saturday 2pm to 8am, and Sunday 4pm to 10am. The majority of 
testing is done during HAH because that is when the majority of drink drivers are on 
the road. However, some motorists do not drive during HAH, so reinforcement for 
them that there is still a risk of being caught is conducted during low alcohol hours 
(LAH). LAH are the opposite of HAH: Monday-Thursday 6am to 6pm, Friday 6am-
4pm, Saturday 8am to 2pm, Sunday 10am to 4pm. In addition to visibility purposes, 
there are motorists who are above the limit during LAH, including those who are still 
intoxicated from the night before.  
Pillar 4: Well-publicised enforcement 
Well-publicised enforcement is a point that the Victoria Police coordinate with 
the TAC. The TAC is responsible for road safety advertising, and included among the 
emotional shock advertisements were enforcement advertisements, emphasising the 
risk of getting caught and the sustained efforts of the booze buses. Other enforcement 
advertisements exemplified the license suspension periods and fines for various illegal 
BACs. (See appendices for examples of advertisements) In addition, before known 
high-risk periods of the year (such as Christmas and New Years), or during random 
breathalysing blitzes, the TAC will put out extra publicity to reinforce the extra 
enforcement. When new breath testing technology or equipment (i.e. new booze 
buses) is going to be introduced, the TAC will usually develop an education campaign 
to create awareness about the policies increased capacity and media will also be 
alerted to secure additional media coverage.  
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 The four pillars of enforcement are exercised each time the Victoria Police 
conduct random breath testing. The following section discusses the results from the 
night of direct observation spent watching the Victorian Police operate three booze 
buses on the West Gate Freeway in Melbourne. 
Results from Booze Bus Direct Observation 
The West Gate Freeway is the largest single operation that the Victoria Police 
carry out for random breath testing. Three buses are used, and almost fifty officers are 
in attendance. In addition, there are two ‘chasers’, patrol cars that chase down any car 
that either tries to turn around and avoid the bus or that tries to speed away either 
when waved in to be tested or after they have blown .05 or over. The West Gate 
Freeway leads from downtown Melbourne out across the river towards the major city 
of Geelong, and has high traffic volume on Friday nights.  
The convoy of buses, officers, and patrol cars left the police station at 11pm 
on Friday night, and arrived at the West Gate at approximately 11:30pm. The first bus 
was placed a few hundred metres after a curve in the road, in the left-most lane, about 
200 meters from the start of the West Gate Bridge. A second bus was placed about 50 
meters further up the road, in the rightmost lane. The third bus was set up on the exit 
ramp to the service station which was parallel to the first bus, and was placed so it 
was hidden from sight from the cars until they turned on to the road. The placement of 
the third bus was strategic and important, as it caught any driver who saw the booze 
buses once they rounded the curve and thought they could avoid being breathalysed 
by going around the road via the service station. However once a car was on the 
service lane it had no place to go except past the bus, so that driver actually faced a 
higher chance of being breathalysed than if they had stayed on the highway. (A higher 
chance because as it is ‘random’ breath testing, not every vehicle that passed the buses 
was breathalysed, although the proportion tested who went down the service lane was 
a much higher percentage due to the probability they were trying to avoid the buses 
they could see).  
According to Kellehear (1993), there are seven advantages to conducting 
unobtrusive research. The first and fourth are the most pertinent to this research. First: 
…unobtrusive measures tend to assess actual behaviour as opposed to self-reported 
behaviour…the use of unobtrusive methods enables researchers to literally see for 
themselves. (p5)  
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 In the observation with the booze bus, it was possible to watch and see how 
people actually behaved when randomly placed in the situation, and look for actions 
that may not be self-reported (for example, speaking nastily towards a police officer 
or not cooperating). The fourth advantage according to Kellehear is that due to the 
non-disruptive nature of these observations, those being studied do not react to the 
researcher. This allowed for the observations to be non-involving and discreet. While 
some of the drivers who pulled up may have taken notice of the bright orange safety 
vest that was being worn during observations, it is unlikely they noticed the 
observations occurring until they were pulling away. 
According to Yin (2003), one of the benefits of direct observation is that it is 
helpful in providing supplementary information about the subject matter under study. 
It served that purpose exceptionally well in this case—while drivers and police 
officers can give a description of the process of random breath testing, it is hard to 
visualise and get an accurate feel for the environment of and the process without 
seeing it in action. One of the major advantages to directly observing the process was 
the comprehension of just how efficiently it is run, and how well accepted it is by 
Victorian metropolitan motorists. The police officers gave an account of how it took 
only 20 seconds to breathalyse a motorist, from the vehicle being waved in to them 
driving away—but by watching it while standing amongst the police officers really 
illustrated this (see Appendix: 1 B for video footage of the breath testing process). It 
was evident from watching that the officers involved knew exactly what they were 
doing, and were very efficient at their work. Everything from the wording they used 
(as they could not professionally say, ‘put your mouth on the tube and blow’) to the 
precision in which they removed an intoxicated motorist from the line and kept the 
rest of the cars moving was efficient. Perhaps more surprising however was the 
acceptance and compliance of the motorists. Time after time motorists would simply 
pull up to the officer, roll down their window, perform the test, smile and drive off 
when they were told they had passed. There was quite often a word of thanks to the 
officers, and there were no fights or refusals or confusion observed. This is not to 
imply that this never happens, as only one night and one location was observed, but 
from observations and according to the officers that were working that night, a 
reaction like that is rare. From what was observed, it seems that participating in a 
random breath test is similar to Victorian motorists as paying a toll or following a 
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 detour—not something one would volunteer to do, but an occurrence that is necessary 
for safety’s sake and simply a task of being a motorist.  
Victoria’s enforcement scheme 
The police operations regarding drink driving are different in Victoria than in 
other Australian states. There are five police regions in the state, four of which are 
country areas. These four country regions run their own booze bus operations through 
the use of four small booze buses. The fifth region is run by the Victoria Police’s 
Traffic Alcohol Section (TAS) in a 100km radius of metropolitan Melbourne which 
includes Ballarat and Bendigo. This encompasses about 80% of the Victorian 
population. The Traffic Alcohol Section’s primary responsibility is to reduce alcohol-
related road trauma, and they are provided with the resources to do it by the TAC and 
Victoria government, which then must be distributed between the five regions. In 
2002, the country buses conducted about 200,000 breath tests. The larger booze buses 
are operated by the TAS and conducted 1.3 million alcohol breath tests in 2002.  
 However deterrence theory is not used universally as the underpinning of 
enforcement initiatives. The following are examples of non-deterrence based 
enforcement efforts.  
Non deterrence-based enforcement schemes  
There are a few alternatives to random breath testing, although they are widely 
considered to be less effective in both deterring and detecting drinking drivers 
(Homel, 1990b). Two alternatives are sobriety checkpoints and/or roadblocks. With 
these methods, a police officer can stop random drivers; however they must have 
sufficient suspicion of intoxication before they can administer a breath/blood test.  
They are highly visible, and therefore do achieve this benefit of general deterrence.  In 
turn, the risk perception of drink drivers may be raised (Clayton, 1997). However 
according to Homel (1990b), the deterrent effects of roadblock programs would be 
compromised by the level of police discretion involved in determining which 
motorists would be breathalysed. According to research conducted by Homel, he 
concludes that many drivers, males in particular, play ‘breathalyser roulette’, where 
they perceive that the odds of being caught are small and that they could successfully 
hide that they had been drinking. Homel (1990b) contends: 
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 Consequently, any method of enforcement that relies on subjective judgments of 
impairment, or even on passive detection techniques is unlikely to work over the long 
term simply because the perceived probability of apprehension cannot be maintained 
at a high level. 
Sobriety checkpoints and roadblocks do not attain the majority of deterrence 
theory principles—they are not sustained or extensively publicised, every driver is not 
treated equally (as some are tested and others are not, however it is not random), and 
most importantly the changes of being apprehended are not certain or even a threat. 
To the contrary, when random breath testing is in place, motorists are aware that 
whether or not they appear to have been drinking, they may be tested. Therefore as 
Homel (1990b) concludes: 
When the threat of detection is potent and credible, fewer drivers will risk driving 
when their BAC may be over the legal limit…RBT only works if drivers believe they 
have no control whatsoever over their chances of being breath tested, and in 
particular that there is no way they can talk their way out of a test (p73) 
Methods such as sobriety checkpoints and roadblocks are used in jurisdictions 
like states in America where civil liberties arguments overshadow the implementation 
of random breath testing. Homel contends that these methods appear to be highly 
ineffective and the resources could be better spent. For jurisdictions that are choosing 
enforcement initiatives, it is important to recognise the limitations of these methods 
when considering the benefits that they achieve.  
It should be noted that the successfulness of catching impaired driving at 
sobriety checkpoints can be raised through the use of passive alcohol sensors. Passive 
alcohol sensors test the air when an individual speaks, instead of taking a full breath 
sample.  These devices are not substitutes for breath tests; they are instead used to 
establish reasonable suspicion that may be needed for an individual to give a 
breath/blood sample.  These devices are especially beneficial in improving the 
detection of drivers with BACs in the .05-.10 range, as impairment within this range is 
not expressed through easily observable behaviours (IIHS, 1993).  
Professional comments on random breath testing 
Members of the road safety field in Victoria strongly support random breath 
testing and have few doubts about its successes in helping to minimise the road toll. 
TAC communications manager De-Arnne Schmidt comments on her opinion as to 
why RBT has been so successful in Victoria: 
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 It's probably one of the simplest physiological tests that you can have and it's not 
intrusive. I think there was enough discussion and debate around the level of alcohol-
related deaths and serious injuries to set the scene before random breath testing was 
introduced. There was also enough community outrage about the issue of drink 
driving and there was finally a means to accurately test whether a driver was likely 
to injure or kill someone else. The whole issue was framed very well. (pers comm., 
2003).  
This supports the contention made in the legislation chapter that community 
support plays an important role in the overarching success of legislative initiatives.  
Ben Holgate was the Manager of Marketing and Innovation of the TAC at that 
time of the interview, and was responsible for creating new initiatives and promotions 
to minimise drink driving in Victoria. However he expressed the weight of success he 
attests to RBT, and its coordination with public education: 
By far, the most important thing [that has influenced drink driving in Victoria over 
the past 2 decades] was the introduction of random breath tests…the fact that the 
penalties include disqualification is extremely important…but clearly having RBT 
and having sufficient density to make people believe they are at a real risk of being 
caught if they do drink and drive is the most crucial thing. Clearly to be able to have 
that level of random breath testing, which is to some level an invasion to some extent 
of the civil rights they enjoy previous to that, there needed to be significant amounts 
of public education as to the dangers so there would be community support of the 
initiatives. I think that goes to the heart of why drink driving has been reduced in 
Victoria over the last twenty years, as the public education has worked hand in hand 
with fairly high levels of enforcement in terms of RBT to ensure that not only is there 
RBT there but it is reasonably accepted by a vast majority of the community (pers 
comm., 2003).  
Holgate addressed issues that were discussed in the Legislation chapter, 
regarding civil liberties and the community’s acceptance of the random breath testing 
legislation. He also highlighted the aspect of deterrence theory that Victoria appears to 
have mastered so well; consistent penalties and a high threat of being caught. 
Inspector Ian Cairns, who runs the booze bus programs in Victoria commented 
on the importance of booze buses in the state’s random breath testing program, 
If you took the booze buses out of Victoria, I’d have to say that in the long term, drink 
driving would probably go up, because the booze buses are a big part of alcohol 
enforcements and the public’s perception of being caught in this state. I would say 
they are a very important part of our road safety initiative in our state;, I would say 
MUARC research has proven that booze bus enforcement, especially in Melbourne, 
is one of the most effective tools to road trauma reduction. …I’m not saying we do it 
better, but booze buses are an important part of our road safety campaign in this 
state (pers comm., 2003). 
The importance of booze buses can be demonstrated as many other states 
within Australia have adopted their own initiatives based on the Victorian booze bus 
design. 
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 Interview comments on random breath testing 
As reported earlier in the legislation chapter, random breath testing is accepted 
in Victoria. All of the respondents in the community interview supported random 
breath testing, although a couple felt that it was done to excess.  
 The bush telegraph: random breath testing in rural vs. metropolitan Victoria 
While random breath testing through the use of booze buses has been 
demonstrated to be one of the most effective road safety tools for metropolitan 
Melbourne, it has also been demonstrated to be quite detrimental in rural Victoria. 
Through research conducted by the Monash University Accident Research Centre (M  
Cameron, Diamantopoulou, Mullan, Dyte, & Gantzer, 1997) it was uncovered that 
booze buses were actually increasing the level of deaths in alcohol-related accidents 
on minor roads in small country towns. When booze buses were implemented in these 
small towns, the ‘bush telegraph’ was put into use. The ‘bush telegraph’ is when 
people in a small community contact each other to notify them of where the breath 
testing is occurring, so they drive alternate routes. The outcome of this was that 
motorists were still drinking and driving, however they began taking back roads that 
were poorly lit, poorly maintained, and were less familiar to them. These factors, 
enhanced by the effects of alcohol, resulted in an increase in deaths along those back 
roads. Due to this, the use of large booze buses was withdrawn from small ‘one horse’ 
country towns. Police cars are now used in place of large booze buses in these towns, 
although at times the small booze buses are brought in as well. For the larger rural 
towns such as Ballarat and Geelong, the large booze buses have not demonstrated this 
detrimental effect and therefore are still used. Dr Soames Job of the RTA in New 
South Wales explained a similar situation they face: 
And part of that is because random breath testing isn’t as effective in the country as 
it is in Sydney, because it’s easy for people in a close-knit, better communicating, 
smaller society to know where and when RBT is going to occur, to know what 
alternatives are [for placement of RBT]]. So the perceived deterrence effect of RBT 
in the country isn’t as good as in the city. So I think we need to find ways to get that 
deterrence effect more powerfully in the country, then we’ll get more genuine effort 
put into changing behaviours (pers comm., 2003). 
There are other issues that need to be considered regarding drink driving in 
rural areas versus metropolitan areas. In addition to the bush telegraph, police officers 
in small towns may be reluctant to charge people they are friendly with or related to. 
When there is discretion involved in who gets charged, it becomes more difficult the 
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 tighter-knit the community. Also, distances between drinking establishments and 
motorists’ homes are larger and therefore provide more opportunity for an accident to 
occur. Country roads are also often not as well-maintained as those in metropolitan 
areas. Public transport is often minimal or non-extent in smaller country towns, which 
takes away one more option for avoiding drinking and driving. Job exemplified this 
through the New South Wales experience:  
So really our core drink driving problem is a country problem…the core problem is 
the difficulty of getting alternative transport or alternative arrangements in country 
towns. Especially if you don’t live in the country town, if you live on the farm outside, 
you don’t have many options, if you drink, for not driving. And therein really is our 
most intractable problem for drink driving at the moment. (pers comm., 2003) 
It should be noted that the enforcement measures in this chapter were 
primarily targeted at metropolitan and larger rural communities. While deterrence 
theory is a viable option for smaller country towns, tactics for implementing it need to 
be carefully considered. 
Job proposed one alternative to public transport that is currently running in a 
few locations in rural New South Wales:  
I know that a number of clubs and pubs and groups of licensed establishments run 
free shuttle bus services, I think that’s a terrific initiative. I think if we could 
encourage that more, it would be excellent…(pers comm., 2003). 
Job notes that as these locations are making large profits, it would be a very 
small portion of that they would sacrifice to run these services. In addition, he 
purports that they may in turn increase their number of patrons, and they would also 
be able to promote other aspects of their business such as their bistro services. Job 
concludes that this in turn could lead to a safer, more tight-knit community from that 
small initial expenditure.  
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Synopsis of enforcement theories and practices  
While drink driving remains a serious problem in rural Victoria, successful 
enforcement through the use of deterrence theory was achieved in metropolitan 
Melbourne and its surrounding areas. The almost universal support of random breath 
testing by the Victorian community played an important role in the initiative’s 
success, similarly to the legislation initiatives: when community members not only 
accept an initiative but expect it, they are more likely to respect it. However the 
random breath testing would not have been as successful without the support it 
received from advertising, which is to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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 5: Selling Safety: Anti-drink driving advertising 
This chapter is an examination of the advertising initiatives that were 
implemented as part of the Victorian anti-drink drive campaign. Advertising is 
defined as “any paid form of non-personal communications about an organisation, 
product, service, or idea by an identifiable sponsor”, (Alexander, 1965 as cited in 
Belch & Belch 2001). The first form of data to be examined in this chapter will be 
literature regarding road safety advertising, advertising for public health campaigns, 
mass media advertising, social marketing theory, and IMC campaigns. These were all 
integral features of the TAC campaign and therefore sufficient background 
information will be provided. The following section looks at threat/fear appeals and 
emotive vs. informational advertising, examined in reference to their use in Victoria’s 
anti-drink drive advertising, and conversely to their use in New South Wales’ 
advertising. Next, research and the ensuing debate regarding the success of the TAC 
advertisements will be discussed. Attempts to change attitudes and/or behaviours 
through advertising will be presented in the following section, as this change is an 
integral goal of many public communication campaigns. Consistent with the 
preceding two chapters and the case study methodology, all of the data pertinent to 
this section will be examined together, including literature and comments from 
interviews. These advertising issues are pertinent to the planning and implementation 
of anti-drink driving advertising and serious consideration of them when preparing a 
campaign may well be beneficial. 
It will be argued that while the TAC’s advertising initiatives had positive 
effects on the Victorian community, some aspects of the ‘bloody idiot’ campaign may 
have been over-the-top and are not necessary for a successful advertising component. 
This will be supported by comments from professional interviews, community 
interviews, and current literature.  
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Advertising as a means of supporting legislation and enforcement  
One important conclusion reached by Donovan, Henley, Jalleh, & Slater 
(1995) was that advertising can be successful when used to enhance the impact of 
other components (legislation and enforcement); however used in isolation mass 
media advertising would have a very small impact on road trauma. They concluded: 
Overall then, road safety advertising, in conjunction with visible signs of detection 
and enforcement, contributes to individual behaviour change in a number of ways, 
but primarily by maintaining the salience of the negative consequences of non-
compliance, and particularly where these negative consequences are detection and 
legally enforceable sanctions. Road safety advertising contributes to the maintenance 
of desired behaviours by maintaining, reinforcing, and providing supporting reasons 
for maintaining the desired behaviours, which in turn, reinforce positive attitudes 
towards the desired behaviour, and in some cases, independently of legal threats or 
threats of injury (pp29-30). 
This chapter will explore all of these roles that advertising plays as the third 
component of the tripartite model. 
There is an enormous amount of existing literature in the communications 
field regarding the various components of advertising and its effects [see for example 
(Vakratsas & Ambler, 1999); (Tellis, Chandy, & Thaivanich, 2000)]. It is not 
necessary to delve into all the individual topics for this thesis; instead, arguments and 
conclusions that have been relevant to the Victorian TAC advertisements and are 
specifically pertinent to anti-drink drive advertising will be examined and discussed.  
Advertising for consumer goods can have different intentions and strategies 
for communicating with its target audience then advertising related to social issues. 
The area of communicating regarding social issues is called public communication 
campaigns. Public communication campaigns were defined by Rice and Atkin (1989) 
as cited by Dozier, Grunig, & Grunig (2001) as:  
purposive attempts to inform, persuade, or motivate behavior changes in a relatively 
well-defined and large audience, generally for non-commercial benefits to the 
individual and/or society, typically within a given time period, by means of organized 
communication activities involving mass media and often complemented by 
interpersonal support (p7). 
Following from this definition, it can be asserted that road safety and 
specifically drink driving fall into the category of public communication campaigns. 
Health communication campaigns are a form of public communication campaigns, 
where the intended goal is to make sure that the public has the correct information 
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 about their health (Wallack & Dorfman, 2001). Wallack and Dorman noted a variety 
of reviews that had been conducted which concluded that a large amount of mass-
mediated health communication campaigns were failures, although some successes 
did point to the possibility of successful campaigns under certain conditions. Wallack 
and Dorman posited that there are three important factors which lead to better health 
communication campaigns: the use of behaviour change theory and mass 
communication as a foundation for campaign design, the use of formative research 
(e.g. focus groups) to develop messages and inform campaign strategy, and also the 
linkage of media strategies and community programs. 
The TAC ‘bloody idiot’ campaign addressed all of these points. Mass 
communication was a driving feature of the campaign, as was illustrated by the 70% 
use of the budget on television advertising (Grey Advertising Melbourne, 1995). This 
was aided by a large-scale IMC (integrated marketing communication) campaign that 
will be discussed later in the chapter. Multiple mass communication channels were 
used for this campaign, as is recommended by Wallack and Dorman (2001) in order to 
ensure that the message reached the audience and directed them to the behaviours they 
were supposed to undertake (in this case not drinking and driving). Deterrence theory 
was one type of behaviour change theory applied to the TAC campaign, and a number 
of the TAC advertisements reinforced this concept, in conjunction with random breath 
testing efforts. 
Wallack & Dorfman’s second point involved the use of formative research. 
The TAC employed Sweeney Research to conduct focus groups throughout the 
campaign. Usually market research was conducted before, during, and after each 
advertisement was run. These focus groups allowed for continual feedback on the 
campaign as a whole in addition to feedback regarding the varying styles of 
advertisements, and each individual advertisement. Wallack and Dorman also 
recommend the use of social marketing strategies, including market segmentation. 
The TAC accomplished this by developing advertisements that were aimed at various 
targets within the general community, including families, younger drivers, and 18-25 
year old males.  
Wallack and Dorman’s final point recommended the integration of media 
strategy and community programs, to provide local support for the desired behaviour 
changes. This third point was one the TAC did not fulfil until the later stages of the 
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 ‘bloody idiot’ campaign. Two programs were launched that involved the community 
and desirable driving behaviours. The first program was the ‘Drive Right’ program, 
which rewarded motorists who drove responsibly with prizes, including five new cars. 
Stickers were distributed to any community member who signed up, and positive 
driving behaviours were reported by designated ‘spotters’; police officers, members of 
the fire brigade, and ambulance drivers (see Appendix: 1 E for photo of Drive Right 
sticker). Over 150,000 Victorians participated in the first ‘Drive Right’ program 
(Transport Accident Commission, 2003). ‘Go Melbourne’ was the second program 
implemented, which encouraged community members to plan how they were going to 
get home before they went out drinking. A downloadable guide was developed and 
posted on a TAC website which included all of the licensed premises in metropolitan 
Melbourne and all of the train, tram, and bus locations, as well as taxi stands. The 
guide also included social information such as the venue’s atmosphere, type of food, 
and credit card policy (see Appendix: 1 F to view a frame of the Go Melbourne 
guide21).  
In addition to the abovementioned three points that are important for health 
communication campaign successes, Wallack and Dorman (2001) noted three reasons 
why health communication campaigns tend to fail. These three points include a 
primary focus on individual behavioural change, a lack of linkage between the 
campaign and broader community action, and a lack of public policy that creates an 
environment where community members can undertake the desired (recommended) 
behaviours. The Victorian government and the TAC did the opposite of these three 
points, and was in fact successful in their campaign. In addition to promoting 
individual behavioural change, the TAC advertising campaign also worked on setting 
an agenda in relation to drink driving in the community, which helped to influence the 
behaviours and attitudes of the community as a whole, not just the individual. As 
explained above, the TAC did begin to incorporate a link between community action 
and the advertising campaign through the Drive Right and Go Melbourne programs. 
Lastly, the combination of legislation, enforcement, and advertising initiatives that 
resulted in the Victorian drink drive campaign illustrate the results of public policy in 
                                                 
21 Or view the Go Melbourne guide at: http://www.tacsafety.com.au/jsp/gomelbourne/download/download.jsp?goPage=1  
Please note that the guide was not downloadable onto the DVD appendix, so only the opening frame is available for viewing 
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 the creation of an environment where drink driving was condemned and alternative 
actions (such as using public transport) were available (in metropolitan Melbourne). 
Although Wallack and Dorfman advocate media advocacy instead of public 
communication campaigns, through the examples illustrated above, it has been shown 
that the TAC drink drive campaign was a successful heath communication campaign 
(that in addition utilised media advocacy when launching new campaigns). 
Mass Media Road Safety Advertising  
Mass media campaigns are a form of public communication campaigns. 
Various studies have been undertaken which analysed a multitude of the components 
incorporated in mass media road safety advertising campaigns (M Cameron, Delaney, 
Lough, & Whelan, 2004); (Donovan, Henley, Jalleh, & Slater, 1995; Wooley, 2001). 
These reports examined aspects of advertising message content including positive and 
negative appeals and emotional and rational approaches. These components are 
directly related to the Victorian campaign as the TAC advertisements were comprised 
of both emotional and rational advertisements, and also controversial for their very 
negative focus. They will be examined below. 
Informational vs. Emotional appeals in advertising for civic compliance 
Emotional appeals focus on images and feelings, while informational/rational 
appeals emphasise deductive logic, objective informational content, and cognitive 
processing (Donovan et al., 1995). Emotional appeals try to illicit feelings and 
emotions in relation to a product or a brand, while informational appeals give the 
consumer target audience details about what is being advertised. For consumer 
products, informational appeals may give details about the benefits and qualities of 
the product (such as its great taste or its high fibre content) (Belch & Belch, 2001). In 
public health campaigns, informational advertisements could give details about new 
legislation, enforcement efforts, or options for help (e.g. a hotline to call). Emotive 
appeals for consumer products involve trying to equate emotions with the 
consumption of the product, such as happiness or feeling carefree (ibid). In public 
health campaigns, emotions such as guilt can be used to try to motivate the target 
audience to avoid undesirable behaviours. Alternatively, positive emotions can be 
linked with desirable behaviours to encourage the target audience to adopt them. 
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 Emotive and rational appeals are not mutually exclusive however; the two can be used 
together in the same ad. As consumer purchase decisions (and public health 
behaviours) are often made based on both rational and emotional motivations, 
advertisements often give attention to both (ibid).  
There is little research evidence supporting which type of appeal is more 
successful (when used on the same product) (Wooley, 2001). However according to a 
1994 report compiled by a group of scientific experts for the OECD, purely rational 
appeals are at risk of being ignored. An individual’s defence through an ‘it won’t 
happen to me’ attitude could cause them to disregard the message as not relevant to 
them. 
After a review of literature regarding fear-arousing communication in public 
health studies, the OECD study reported that a majority of the research cited found a 
positive relationship between the intensity of evoked fear and the degree of persuasion 
in public health (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1994). 
The TAC used a combination of informational and emotive advertisements. 
The informational advertisements were used to alert the Victorian community to new 
legislation, and as a reminder that random breath testing was taking place and also the 
degree of penalties being dispensed. The emotive advertising focused on the negative 
repercussions of drink driving, including guilt, shame, fear, and pain. Both types of 
advertising served different purposes, and both appear to have been successful in their 
respective tasks. More details will be given about each style of advertising below. 
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 Message Framing- Incentive appeals to influence behaviours 
The ‘framing’ of messages is when messages emphasise either potential gains 
or potential losses associated with particular health behaviours (Stephenson & Witte, 
2001). In health messages, a classic strategy for the use of incentives is to present a 
series of substantive arguments in favour of or against a certain behaviour, supported 
by credible evidence or source assertions (Atkin, 2001). Incentive appeals can be either 
positively or negatively motivated. For example, in negative appeals the audience 
should be motivated by the high probability of suffering a negative consequence if 
they perform an undesirable behaviour (Atkin, 2001). 
Donovan et al (1995) claimed positive appeals are generally considered to be 
ones eliciting or promising positive emotions as a result of the use of the advertised 
product or adoption of the recommended behaviour(s). Negative appeals are generally 
considered to be the ones eliciting or assuring negative emotions as a result of not 
adopting the recommended behaviour or not using the advertised product (ibid).  
Donovan et al (1995) concluded that the literature on framing provided limited 
practical guidance to the development of advertising messages for road safety 
behaviour. However he posited that when a choice needs to be made, the majority of 
results support a negative frame over a positive framing. The TAC emotional style 
advertisements (see Appendix: 1 G to view some of these advertisements) were 
negatively framed, depicting consequences such as physical and emotional pain, the 
loss from the death of a loved one, and/or a loss of freedom (through loss of license). 
Positive appeals as a form of influencing behaviours  
These appeals focus on the positive outcomes of performing a desired 
behaviour (Atkin, 2001). While a negative threat would be injury or death from 
drinking and driving, conversely a positive appeal would focus on the benefits of 
designating a driver. For example, the use of a designated driver could result in saving 
money from not drinking, or gaining peer acceptance for doing the socially correct 
thing, or even boast psychological benefits such as gaining self-confidence and acting 
intelligently. According to Atkin, positive appeals can take the soft sell approach to 
connect positive images with the desired behaviour. Positive appeals appear to be 
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 rarely used in the road safety field (Donovan, Jalleh, & Henley, 1999); contrarily, 
negative appeals that utilise threat appeals dominate road safety advertising.  
Negative appeals as a form of influencing behaviours 
Negative appeals can take more than one form, although the most common 
form of negative appeal is the fear appeal. Donovan et al (1995) argues that although 
negative appeals are often called fear appeals, they should be more correctly labelled 
threat appeals. As this contention has also been mentioned in other literature (Strong, 
Anderson, & Dubas, 1993), the term threat appeals will be used in relation to negative 
advertisements instead of fear appeals when discussing the TAC campaign. 
These threat appeals are those that illustrate that non-compliance with the 
desired road safety behaviour will result in or increase the chances that negatives 
consequences will occur (see Appendix: 1 G to view examples). Or, these 
advertisements show that compliance with the desired behaviour avoids or minimises 
the probability of negative consequences (Donovan et al., 1999). This type of appeal 
is necessary because providing individuals with information is not always persuasive 
enough to convince them to change long-standing attitudes and behaviours. Statt 
(1997) elaborated: 
…changing habits that have been well learned, and appear to serve us well, requires 
a great deal of effort. It will therefore take a lot of persuasion for us to overcome the 
force of inertia. So powerful is this force that even clear appeal to our self-interest, 
and indeed personal safety, may not be enough to overcome it ( p101). 
Statt (1997) explains how simply telling people they should perform desired 
behaviours because of the benefits to them is not motivation enough for behaviour 
change. Instead, it may be necessary to threaten people to encourage them to 
overcome their inertia and comfortable habits. 
According to Atkin (2001), in addition to threat appeals, negative appeals can 
focus on a myriad of other dimensions that are affected by the undesirable behaviour. 
One dimension is the social repercussions (such as looking ‘uncool’, alienating 
friends, or losing peer approval) associated with performing the undesirable 
behaviour(s). Other negative appeals can focus on psychological incentives (such as 
anxiety about getting caught, loss of control, guilt). Alternatively, negative appeals 
can focus on the economic implications of participating in the undesired behaviour, 
such as fines of loss of license. 
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 Negative threat appeals as a form of influencing behaviours  
There is a large debate (Dillard, 1994; Witte 1992a, 1998; Hale & Dillard, 
1995; Witte & Allen 2000, as cited in (Stephenson & Witte, 2001)) in regards to the 
success of threat appeals; there is a concern that an excessive amount of fear will in 
fact be counter-productive (Atkin, 2001). Donovan et al (1995) asserts that provided 
certain conditions are met, the greater the fear arousal, then the greater effect with 
respect to the recommended behaviour (p16). He continues: 
There is general agreement amongst experts of all types, that across all health 
behaviours, and particularly road safety behaviours, negative emotions are more 
relevant to most target groups than are positive motivations” (p26).  
A report produced by the Monash University Accident Research Centre in 
2004 (Cameron et al, 2004) concluded that fear appeals have been demonstrated to be 
extremely effective in the road safety arena, notwithstanding the debate surrounding 
the ideal level of fear arousal and the complications with the operationalising of such 
a concept. The report continued that optimum levels of fear will vary even further 
dependent upon target age group and behaviour. Finally, Cameron et al acknowledged 
that the literature consistently dictates that health risk messages need to contain both a 
fear appeal and a recommended action which is used to minimise the threat. As a 
majority of the TAC emotive advertisement were graphic, negatively framed threat 
appeals, these conclusions appear to support the purported success the TAC 
advertisements had on Victorian drink drive behaviour.  
The question of why to use fear in appeals was addressed by Stephenson & 
Witte (2001):  
Because increased fear arousal and perceived threat are positively associated with 
recommended attitude and behavior changes (Boster & Mongeau, 1984, Mongeau, 
1996, Sutton, 1982, Witte & Allen, 2000) (p91). 
With fear arousal being the emotional reaction to a fear appeal, and perceived 
threats the result of a cognitive reaction to a fear appeal, campaigns often rely on fear 
appeals to increase vulnerabilities and express risks regarding certain behaviours 
(ibid) 
Yet there remains a concern that threat appeals will be ineffective or backfire 
due to humans’ natural mental defence mechanism: optimism bias. 
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 Optimism Bias and people’s attitudes and behaviours  
Optimism bias, as described by Stephenson & Witte (2001) involves 
overestimating the risk of something occurring to others particularly when gauging if 
the event will happen to oneself. Optimism bias often results in underestimating the 
probability that an event will happen to oneself. Denial is a key contributor to the 
success of optimism bias, and optimism bias is often applied to beliefs about risk 
factors that one can exert control off (using condoms, frequently wearing sun screen) 
(ibid). 
Optimism bias is highly relevant to drink driving, as most motorists are 
overconfident about their capabilities as a driver and also their risks of being involved 
in a drink drive incident. Optimism bias of community members is one important 
factor that needs to be taken into consideration when preparing threat appeal 
advertisements; dependent on the goal of the advertising, levels of threat may need to 
be varied to overcome or accommodate optimism bias.  
Levels of threat in advertising: High fear vs. low fear 
Discussions with Dr Soames Job, a behavioural scientist in the road safety 
field highlighted the distinction between low-fear and high-fear threats. A high-fear 
threat would be killing oneself or another. A low-fear threat would be a fine or loss of 
license. Job’s contention is that very high threat advertisements lose their credibility 
with the target audience regardless of their believability, as a strong optimism bias 
response kicks in. This would not be the case however with a low-threat ad, at least 
not to the same degree: 
…our research shows you get a really strong optimism-bias effect as people believe 
they’re going to have a better life than their peers, that they’re going to be more 
likely to own their own home, more likely to be recognised with awards, less likely to 
fail university, less likely to get in a drink driving crash, less likely to kill someone. 
And it’s those “less likely’s” that carry the day. This optimism bias just isn’t as 
extreme for getting fined or losing some money, as it is for getting killed. People are 
very very confident that they are not going to get killed driving around. Of, if they 
are, it won’t be because of anything they did. (pers comm., 2004.) 
Therefore Job contends that low fear advertising, such as is utilised in New 
South Wales, is preferable to high-fear advertising. And in fact research conducted by 
Tay and Watson (2002) is cited in Elliott (2003) as suggesting that “the average level 
of fear could be reduced moderately without reducing message acceptance but could 
reduce message rejection, resulting in a positive change (p3).”  
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 Job continues that high-fear advertisements would result in people fearing 
getting killed by others, not doing the killing themselves—therefore their behaviours 
are not responsible and the advertisements will not result in a behaviour change. 
This was supported by a comment made by one interviewee regarding his 
thoughts on the TAC advertisements: 
 One or two that hit me more than the others…not the ones that get wrapped and 
killed, more impact ones are the ones where their quality of life changes, 
rehabilitation time, etc…what scares me more is you could be an innocent 
bystander…I suppose it hits you, but like a lot of things you try not to dwell on it, 
hope it’s someone else. 
However Job feels that low-fear advertising can be made high risk. As 
discussed in the Legislation chapter, deterrence functions to encourage a person to 
avoid performing an undesirable behaviour due to a credible fear of a negative 
consequence (Homel, 1990a). Yet promoting a severe outcome will not have a 
deterrent effect if people do not believe they will succumb to that negative 
consequence, due to optimism bias. So Job postulates that high-fear advertising will 
be ineffective while low-fear advertising will be perceived as a tangible threat: 
So I think the higher perceived probability of an event that is still deterring, is a 
better scenario for stopping a behaviour then a very very low perceived probability 
that isn’t perceived of a very bad thing happening (pers comm., 2004).  
Therefore Job claims that community members would be much more 
threatened by a loss of license than the idea of killing a child and going to jail. Hence, 
a low-fear (and therefore more believable) risk such as loss of license becomes more 
threatening than a high fear advertisement because it is more believable to the 
individual. One interviewee said: 
I think those (enforcement advertisements) are effective, that they make you think. 
The shock advertisements are not effective for me, because I go ‘oh, isn’t that awful’, 
but it isn’t personal to me at all. 
While Job does not think the TAC advertisements were good for convincing 
Victorian community members on an individual level that something bad would 
happen to them, Job does believe they served a different purpose. Job contends that 
the TAC’s high-fear advertising specifically aided in reminding the population of the 
low-fear threats, such as loss of license, fines, and reinforced why there was such a 
large amount of random breath testing on Victorian roads. Donovan et al (1999) 
supported this contention when they concluded that while individual behaviour 
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 change could be attributed to deterrent effects from low-fear advertisements (e.g. a 
perceived likelihood of getting caught), community support would have been 
enhanced by the emotive advertisements. The advertisements were good in providing 
the community with a reason to not only accept, but also to expect legislation and 
enforcement to keep the issue in abeyance. The high-fear advertisements aided in 
making drink driving a social issue, which it had not been prior to the launch of the 
‘drink, drive, bloody idiot’ campaign. One interviewee commented on the 
advertisements: 
Shock tactics don’t bother me, it’s real. I think it just reinforces my own experience; 
it’s bloody dangerous and it’s terminal. It’s a good thing to remind us that people die 
out there.  
However an individual simply liking the advertisements or remembering them 
does not necessary mean it will influence their actual behaviours, even if it does 
influence their intended behaviours.  
Good Intentions, Bad Decisions and the implications for drinking drivers  
One issue that warrants attention is that regardless of how good an individual’s 
intentions are when they are sober, once they are intoxicated things change. If a 
motorist drives to a pub with the intention of taking a cab or getting a ride home, if 
s/he drinks enough their behaviours often contradict their intentions. One of the 
interviewees, a male in his twenties who has driven after drinking on numerous 
occasions illustrated this issue. Although he stated early in the interview that he did 
not think drink driving was a good idea, he blames his actions on the ‘increase in 
bravado’ and effects to decision making that occur after a few drinks: 
 But the thing with the TAC advertisements is that they… all the stuff that is depicted 
in there, and I’ve seen a couple of things(accidents) happen as well…, everyone 
knows that that can happen, but you don’t think that’s going to happen to you. You’re 
trying to weigh it up when you’re sober, you go, ah, that was stupid the other night, 
but it’s always retrospective. I don’t think you go when you get drunk and get in your 
car, you don’t think back to those advertisements and go ‘oh, Darren look out’, or 
whatever they carry on about, and go ‘oh, I’d better not drive’, it’s more ‘oh, how 
many main roads do I go down and will I run into the cops or not. And then probably 
still drive away and hope for the best. 
This issue highlights the fact that advertising in itself is of little assistance 
once a motorist is drunk and still in a position to drive (i.e. has access to a car). While 
advertising can aim to convince community members to leave their cars at home, once 
the cars are on the road advertising can do little. Therefore, perhaps options that 
 92
 involve other aspects of road safety initiatives need to be considered. This includes 
alcohol ignition interlocks, whose detriments and attributes will be debated in the 
Discussion chapter.  
Drink, Drive, Bloody Idiot: The TAC Campaign  
In late 1989 the Transport Accident Commission hired Grey Advertising 
Melbourne to develop an advertising campaign that would bring road safety to the 
forefront of the community’s social agenda. The goal was a campaign that would 
make motorists, regardless of age or sex, reconsider their attitudes towards drink 
driving and speeding. Moreover, advertisements were needed to promote the two new 
initiatives, random breath testing ‘booze buses’ and speed cameras.  
The resulting drink driving campaign was a theme that would remain 
unchanged and in use from December 1989 through to November 2003. Under the 
banner, ‘If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot’, 25 advertisements were 
produced between 1989 and 2000. A majority of these advertisements were emotive, 
graphic, shock style threat appeal advertisements. Some of the advertisements were 
enforcement-related, utilising an informative style. One was humorous, and it was 
specifically related to the TAC’s sponsorship of a sporting team.  A majority of the 
ads remained on-air for a few years (3-5), and were rotated between enforcement and 
emotive style ads, and alternated with other road safety messages (speed, fatigue).   
Research prior to the campaign recommended that the key messages had to be 
‘acceptable’ to the target audiences, the advertising style had to be ‘attention 
grabbing’ and confronting, the ads should be localised to the communities to increase 
their salience, and the campaign should be resourced to a high degree which ensured 
that key target groups received high levels of the campaign messages (Healy and 
Forsyth, 1996).  While the attitudinal research conducted for the TAC was 
confidential and therefore inaccessible to the researcher, other studies have been 
undertaken which had access to this information.  One such study (Harrison & 
Senserrick, 2000) reported that the general attitude towards the TAC advertising was 
generally positive, despite the perception that the tactics used were emotional, tough, 
and frightening.  Figure 7 on pg 94 illustrates responses from participants from the 
abovementioned study when asked to finish the statement “TAC advertisements are 
generally…” 
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Figure 7: Audience opinions of TAC advertisements 
 
TARPs (Target Audience Ratings Points) are used to measure audience reach. 
The percentage of people in the viewing area that are estimated to be watching the 
specific television channel at the time the advertisement is played are summarised 
through Rating Points (Cameron and Newstead, 1996).  TARPS estimate only the 
number of viewers from the specific Target Audience for each advertisement.  An 
example of the TAC advertising penetration is illustrated in Figure 8 below, and 
shows the TARPS achieved for both drink drive and other road safety stream 
advertisements from January 1989-December 1992. 
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 Figure 8: TAC Road Safety Television Advertising: TARPS per month by theme22
 
In addition to the shock of the content of the advertisements, which featured 
realistic crashes, bodies, and the emotional aftermath, there was some shock around 
the slogan theme itself. In the late 1980s, the use of the word ‘bloody’ was akin to 
swearing. The use of such a word in primetime television, large billboards, and radio 
was compounded by the fact that the proponent of the slogan was a government 
agency. The TAC used the media attention to its advantage (through media 
advocacy), as described by TAC General Manager of Road Safety David Healy: 
…when ‘drink, drive, bloody idiot’ was introduced, clearly the use of the word 
bloody at that time was a bit controversial, so that raised some discussion in the 
media and to that extent that debate could be harnessed, and used to say, ‘we make 
no excuses for that, because drink driving is such a criminal activity, use of the 
bloody idiot was minor…take the moral high ground in the media, and hence provide 
debate and controversy on the issue…and that was deemed to be part of the total 
approach…(pers comm., 2003) 
This is important to the development and implementation of a drink drive 
campaign because it shows the need to get the community’s attention in whatever 
ways possible. Being shocking can be efficient if there is evidence to back up its 
claims, as the TAC was able to do with the large road toll caused by drinking drivers. 
In addition, it addresses the need for multiple styles of advertisements (emotive, 
                                                 
22 Figure from Cameron & Newstead, 1996 
 95
 informational, emotive-enforcement), which can be used to address different aspects 
of the same problem. As discussed above, emotive advertisements can attract the 
attention of community members, and bring an issue to the forefront of their social 
agenda. It can also aid in motivating some community members to change their 
attitudes and/or their behaviours, which will be addressed in detail below. For other 
community members, it is the threat of enforcement, and therefore enforcement-
related informational advertisements that will affect them. 
One stream of road safety 
The TAC ‘bloody idiot’ campaign was one stream of an overall road safety 
campaign implemented and managed by the TAC. Initially, the road safety campaign 
was launched with a focus on drink driving and speed, although the emphasis was on 
drink driving. Over the course of the ten years of this case study, the issues of 
concentration, seat belts, fatigue, motorcycles and young drivers were introduced, 
each with an accompanying advertising campaigns (see Table 7 on p89). Each theme 
had its own graphic threat appeals and its own slogan (eg ‘Concentrate or Kill, ‘A 15 
minute powernap could save your life’- see Appendix: 1 H to view examples of these 
TAC road safety advertisements). However the speed, seat belt, and drink drive 
themes were the only campaigns that had strong supporting legislation and 
enforcement initiatives. This is important to note because it should be identified that 
road safety as a general issue was brought to the forefront of the Victorian 
community’s mind, not simply drink driving. Therefore desirable road safety 
behaviours were constantly being proposed and enforced to the community. As the 
overall campaign continued, the central focus shifted from drink driving to speed, as 
occurrences and accidents related to drink driving were dramatically reducing and 
accidents related to speed were not. However it is posited by this researcher that the 
drink driving campaign could have been run independently, and would have achieved 
successful results in doing so. This is contingent upon the fact the campaign would 
have utilised the tripartite model and therefore would have been a completely 
integrated campaign. In this situation while the overall road toll may not decrease to 
the same degree as it did in Victoria, as other factors impacting drink drive accidents 
would not be addressed (eg seat belt use) in drink drive advertisements, the campaign 
is not dependent on an overall road safety strategy to succeed. This contention was 
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 supported by the General Manager of Road Safety at the TAC, the TAC’s Manager of 
Road Safety, and the Manager of Marketing and Innovation at the TAC. It should be 
noted that while an overall road safety campaign may be beneficial for reducing the 
road toll in any jurisdiction, it is not a necessity when the aim is to target a specific 
behaviour/issue (in this case drink driving).  
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Table 7: TAC advertisement themes and slogan23  
Theme Slogan 
Drink-Drivers “If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot” 
Speeding “Don’t fool yourself, speed kills” 
Fatigue “Wake up to yourself, fatigue kills” 
Seatbelts “Belt up, or suffer the pain” 
Concentration “It’s in your hands, concentrate or kill” 
Motorcycles “Look bike. Hard to see, easy to kill” 
Country People “Country people die on country roads” 
Passengers “If you don’t trust the driver, don’t get in” 
Youth “Ask yourself, are you roadworthy?” 
Older drivers “Make sure you’re right to drive” 
Speeding “10 km/h will save lives” 
Speeding “Wipe off 5 (or wipe out lives)” 
Drink Driving “Drink, Drive, Kill, Jail. If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot.” 
Learners “Ask yourself. Are you roadworthy.” 
Learners “You never stop working” 
Speeding You speed, you pay. Speed Kills” 
Drink Driving “Stop yourself here, or we’ll stop you here. If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot.” 
Speed “For every 5 ks over the limit, your risk of crashing doubles. It’s never safe to speed.” 
Fatigue A 15 minute powernap could save your life. Fatigue Kills” 
 
Outside influences  
It should be noted that the economy did play a role in the reduction of the 
overall road toll in Victoria. Due to a recession, the distances and frequency travelled 
by Victorians for commercial and recreation travel were minimised. Quantitative 
studies debate the amount of effect the economy had, and it is not within the scope of 
this research to comment on the perceived amount. However while the economy did 
impact on the road toll numbers, it is unlikely that it played a role in influencing 
community member’s attitudes and behaviours towards drinking and driving. The 
qualitative research that was conducted during this research has determined that 
                                                 
23 Source: adapted from Cameron et al, 2004
 98
 community attitudes and behaviours have changed over the course of this case study, 
and that it is these changes that are responsible for a large reduction in the drink 
driving road toll. 
In addition, other road safety initiatives were undertaken throughout the 
timeframe of this work that also may have influenced the drink driving road toll: 
initiatives such as a campaign to reduce speed, red-light cameras that are used to deter 
motorists from speeding through red lights, and Accident Blackspot programs (the 
identification of streets/intersections with abnormally high levels of accidents; than 
features such as roundabouts are introduced to try and minimise the number of 
accidents) All of these factors may have played a roll in influencing drink drive 
related accidents and should be noted. 
Variety of advertisements in public communication campaigns  
Donovan et al (1995) recommends that a pool of advertisements should be 
used with any one campaign, with a variation in message style and executional style 
of the advertisements. This recommendation is to try and minimise or avoid 
advertising wear-out. Advertising wear-out occurs when the effect of an 
advertisement lessens due to over-use of the ad, or over-exposure to the target 
audience. A report by Fry (1996) detected weak evidence that the television aspect of 
the TAC advertising campaign was suffering from wear-out at the end of 1993. Fry 
concluded that the strategy of rotating the advertisements through the use of different 
styles and the large impact of the individual advertisements made it harder to detect 
strong statistical evidence of wear-out (Cameron et al, 2004). 
One interviewee commented that the advertisements were run too frequently 
for too long and therefore began to lose their impact on him: 
I think it’s one of those things where you sometimes see the ad too often that’s part of 
a campaign, that you only see it once a week, once a fortnight…but when you see it 
repeated time after time in the middle of a movie or something like that…you just 
become a bit blasé to the message, which you shouldn’t. They should move around 
the messages a bit…[the enforcement advertisements] It’s a reminder of a fact. 
Would it make me decide to do something or not to? No, not really. 
However this interviewee was in the minority as no other mentioned that the 
advertisements had lost their effect on them. 
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 In addition to rotating the style to avoid wear-out, it is important to utilise 
different styles of advertising to target different audiences and for different messages 
(Atkin, 2001). For instance highly emotive threat appeals are beneficial for changing a 
community’s attitude, while low-fear informational campaigns may work better for 
deterring behaviours (see Appendix: 1 I to view information advertisements).  
The Manager of Marketing and Innovation of the TAC (at the time of the interview) 
illuminated the different reasons a variety of messages are needed: 
I think the fact is that you need to have a variety of different messages because 
different messages reach people in different ways. But sometimes different messages 
will affect the same person or add value in a different way to their perception of the 
issue. There’s no doubt that the confrontational, emotive advertising has an effect for 
a certain number of people…Everybody tends to be affected by the enforcement 
advertising, to some extent, and you have to make sure that people’s perception of 
the likelihood of them being caught by enforcement is quite a lot greater that it 
actually is. Victoria police have about 12 booze buses in the whole state. Well the 
reality of getting caught by one isn’t that high, but we have to give people the 
perception that that’s going to happen, that there’s a very good chance they’re going 
to get caught. So a lot of that advertising, I think a lot of what we need therefore is 
really a mixture of both. The emotive stuff is important, it affects everybody to some 
extent, it actively affects 20-30%, we actively get them to change their behaviour, but 
the enforcement advertising definitely needs to be there too, to increase people’s 
perception of the risk of their being caught. I think that…you need different 
approaches so it doesn’t’ get stale, so you press different triggers with people (pers 
comm., 2003). 
The TAC mixed their advertising strategy throughout the ‘bloody idiot’ 
campaign, incorporating highly threatening emotive appeals with informative 
enforcement appeals. This integration of ad styles was beneficial in their goals of 
changing driver attitudes and behaviours, by keeping the message reasonably fresh 
and constantly relevant to the target audience. 
Attitude and behaviour change and the objectives of the TAC Campaign 
Donovan et al (1995) contends that in regards to the issue of attitude and 
behaviour change related to advertising goals, there is sufficient evidence that 
indicates that forced behaviour change often leads to long term changes in attitude. In 
addition to attempts to change community attitudes through high-fear, threatening 
advertising, forced behaviour was simultaneously changed through booze bus 
enforcement and deterrence theory. According to cognitive dissonance theory, if a 
person holds two contradictory beliefs they will be in an uncomfortable mental state 
and will try to reduce it. Cognitive dissonance studies have shown that if a behaviour 
is changed first, then it is more likely that an attitude change will follow (Statt, 1997). 
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 Thus, behaviours were forced to change through enforcement techniques, while 
attitudes may still have been in favour of drink driving. A conflict would have 
resulted, and it is likely that attitudes would have been the resulting change (drink 
driving was no longer considered an acceptable thing to do). Once this attitude change 
occurred, the emotive advertising that was in place would have supported the new 
attitude. In fact, studies have shown that people are more receptive to positive virtues 
about the new attitude after they have made a decision (Statt, 1997). 
Although there is a debate on the use of fear and threats to try and change 
attitudes and behaviour, a majority of public health campaigns do utilise some degree 
of fear appeals. According to research by Boster & Mongeau (1984), Mongeau 
(1996), Sutton (1982), Witte & Allen (2000) as cited in Stephenson & Witte (2001), 
there are positive associations between perceived threat and increased fear arousals 
and recommended attitude and behaviour changes. 
Studies have been completed to determine which attitude and behaviour 
change theories are the most appropriate for application in various health and 
communication campaigns: (Cameron et al, 2004; (Cappella, Fishbein, Hornik, 
Ahern, & Sayeed, 2001); (Wooley, 2001) (Slater, 1999). Theories often analysed for 
health and communication campaigns are the Health Belief Model, Social Cognitive 
theory, the Theory of Reasoned Action, the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), and Roger’s Protection Motivation Theory. 
However road safety differs from many other types of heath campaigns as 
enforcement is often a component of road safety campaigns. Thus the attitude-
behaviour relationship is more complex as it must also take into account the effect the 
enforcement component when determining the efficacy of a campaign (Cameron et al, 
2004). 
To address this consideration when evaluating behavioural change theory for 
road safety, Cameron et al (2004) conducted a review of the behaviour change 
theories pertinent to road safety mass media campaigns. Cameron examined all of the 
above theories in addition to others; one specifically pertinent to road safety was 
General Deterrence Theory. Cameron contends that ‘different theories are more 
applicable to particular behaviours’ (p16), and that these theories were developed 
across a breadth of fields. After a thorough review, Cameron concluded that Roger’s 
Protection Motivation theory (see Figure 7 below) and EPPM (see Figure 8 p95) are 
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 the most suitable for road safety. He also concluded that although specific to 
enforcement aspects of behaviour change (instead of psychological aspects), General 
Deterrence theory is valuable as well.  
 
Figure 9: Rogers Protection Motivation Theory24
 
 
 
Figure 10: Extended Parallel Process Model25
 
                                                 
24 Source: (Cameron et al, 2004)
25 Source: (Cameron et al, 2004)
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 Community members views on the TAC advertising 
A goal of this research was to interview both professionals and community 
members to see if the thoughts of the professionals were an accurate reflection of the 
Victorian community. Community members did agree that their attitudes and 
behaviours had changed over the course of the 1989-2000 period, especially for those 
that were driving before that timeframe began. 
Attitudes of Victorian community members have changed over the past few 
decades according to those interviewed for this case study. Older community 
members seem to have changed their attitudes the most, while younger community 
members seem to have adopted less tolerant views of drink driving than their parents 
and grandparents would have held at their age.  
One middle-aged interviewee responded that both his friends as well as his 
own attitudes have changed: 
they have definitely changed to the extent to where my immediate peer group, they 
just don’t do it anymore. 15 years ago, yes there were some people who would openly 
do it, knowingly drive home, not all the time but on certain occasions, they would 
drive home whilst under the influence. Where as now, those same people will not do 
it, full stop. 
His comments were echoed by another middle-aged interviewee regarding 
riding with a drink driver: 
I was a passenger with a drink driver, because we all used to drink {and drive} when 
we were young. Didn’t worry us in the slightest. 
But perhaps more important than their changes in attitudes are their reported 
changes in behaviour. Many of the interviewees reported not only changes in their 
own behaviours, but also changes in those that they observed around them: their 
parents, their children, their close friends. Giving the keys to a partner and taking a 
cab were the new behaviours that were reported the most frequently. Parents most 
often noted that when their children went out they used designated drivers. A few 
interviewees noted that they tried to leave their cars at home, due to the temptation of 
driving it if it is there. Said one interviewee: 
We take cabs, for me anyway, if my car is there I’ll probably drive it, so that’s why I 
deliberately leave it at home, but if I walk out of a place drunk and my car is there, 
there’s a 99% chance I would drive. I know that about myself, so that’s why I leave 
the car at home. 
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 This desirable behaviour of leaving the car at home was modelled in 
advertisements that were produced in the latter stages of the TAC campaign (see 
Appendix: 1 J to view The Pub). 
Many of the respondents said they plan ahead now, something they would 
never have done previously. They take public transportation, or walk, designate a 
driver, or leave their car at home. One interviewee who was caught and penalised for 
drinking and driving now carries a personal breathalyser with him. His family does as 
well. It is something he says he never would have thought of before he was caught, 
but now even his friends use it if he has it with him when they are all out. Behaviours 
have also changed in individuals’ responses to others drinking and driving. This is 
evidence that the advertising worked in making drink driving a social issue. Almost 
all of those interviewees said they would try to stop someone from drink driving, or 
have in the past. Modelling of this and other alternative behaviours to drink driving 
were present in some of the TAC advertisements (see Appendix: 1 K to view Stop 
Bus); this modelling could have functioned both to make it socially acceptable for 
someone else to drive for you and also to give people examples of desirable 
behaviours. Hesitations arose both when the person driving was not someone the 
interviewee knew well, and if the passenger was drunk; interviewees mentioned that 
they did not really think about the driver in that case. People who said they had tried 
to stop others have had mixed results—that sometimes people simply would not yield. 
A story was told about a mate who actually got into a fistfight with a friend of his 
because the drunken friend did not want to give up his keys. A lot of the other 
interviewees mentioned how they never would have tried to stop someone from 
drinking driving years ago, because drink driving was not an issue. It has only been in 
the last decade that their behaviour has changed.  
In addition to asking if they would try to stop others, interviewees were 
questioned about whether or not they would be a passenger in a car with a drinking 
driver. Responses varied, again dependent on the situation. Some interviewees said 
they would never get in a car with a drinking driver. This behaviour was also 
modelled in a TAC ad—the results of getting into a car with a drinking driver showed 
it to be an undesirable behaviour as the consequence was death (see ‘Joey’ in 
Appendix: 1 L). If the interviewee was drunk, they said they would not give the issue 
any attention and would often ride with drinking drivers. Again, older interviewees 
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 cited that when they were younger it was never a concern (and thus the behaviour 
would occur), but now they would not ride with drinking drivers.  
All drink driving behaviours have not been stopped however. It appears that 
some community members have modified their actions where they have not 
completely abandoned the undesirable behaviour. One interviewee illustrated how her 
drink driving behaviours have been modified over the years: 
Many years ago I would have driven over .05, probably well over .05, and today, I 
might drive 3 blocks which I won’t excuse, tiddly [tipsy]. 
This interviewee was somewhat affected by the advertising campaign, in that 
she is more threatened now when drink driving than she used to be. As the deterrent 
effect is dependent upon advertising support in addition to the effects of the booze 
buses, it can be concluded that the enforcement advertising was effective to a degree 
in the case of this individual.  
Convincing people to change their attitudes and behaviours in regards to 
consumer goods is not easy—getting individuals to change their attitudes and 
behaviours in regards to their health seems to be an entirely different issue. However 
one type of marketing theory, social marketing, implies that the tactics used do not 
have to be mutually exclusive. 
Road Safety as a Product: Social Marketing Theory 
Social marketing was defined by Kotler & Zaltman in 1971 as:  
the design, implementation, and control of programs calculated to influence the 
acceptability of social ideas, and involving considerations of product, planning, 
pricing, communication, distribution and marketing research [ as cited in (Chapman 
Walsh, Rudd, Moeykens, & Moloney, 1993)]. 
The premise of social marketing is to identify successful aspects from 
commercial marketing theory and apply them to social issues. See Figure 9 below for 
a diagram of social marketing. 
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Figure 11: Social Marketing26
 
Social marketing is pertinent to this case study as the TAC appears to have 
utilised this theory when planning and implementing the ‘bloody idiot’ campaign. The 
following aspects addressed below, which are successful in commercial advertising 
campaigns, cited in Chapman Walsh et al (1993), are some of the facets the TAC 
appears to have adopted in their ‘bloody idiot’ campaign. 
Persistence and a long time frame are essential. The ‘If you drink, then drive, 
you’re a bloody idiot’ slogan ran unchanged from December 1989 until October 2003 
in Victoria, and was present in any aspect of advertising the TAC produced related to 
drink driving. The campaign lasted 14 years, which is a long time in advertising 
terms. Therefore, a long time frame and persistence were both achieved.  
 Segmentation of the audience is critical. The ‘bloody idiot’ campaign 
contained advertisements that were targeted at families (The Twelve Days of 
Christmas), at younger drivers (Joey) and at rural drivers (The Pub). While the ‘drink, 
drive bloody idiot’ slogan was targeted at the entire Victorian community, individual 
advertisements were themed to segments of that greater audience. As evidence 
throughout the interviews has shown, older drivers and younger drivers have different 
viewpoints on drink drivers, and thus need different advertisements targeting their 
concerns (e.g. taking care of their family vs. peer acceptance).  
Understanding target groups is a key program strategy. As mentioned above, 
the Victorian community is comprised of many segments, including but not limited to 
men, women, older drivers and younger drivers. Each of these segments may respond 
to different cues in advertisements they feel are relevant to their lives. Therefore an 
                                                 
26 (adopted from Kotler and Roberto, 1989): www.marketing.strath.ac.uk/ csm-olde/synopsis.htm via Google, accessed 08/06/04 
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 understanding of what is relevant to each group is important. The TAC commissioned 
Sweeney Research to conduct market research both before and after all of their 
advertisements were run, and therefore was able to design various advertisements 
specifically for the various segments of their target audience.  
Teaching consumers skills supports behavior change. In addition to their 
messages about the effects of drink driving (with images of death, injury, and grief), 
the advertisements also advocated alternative, desirable behaviors such as designating 
a driver or handing over keys to a mate. When these desirable behaviours were not 
followed, negative consequences often ensued. And lastly, the integration of feedback 
improves program effectiveness. With over 600 phone interviews conducted after 
every advertisement was run, a website and telephone numbers for comments, 
feedback would have been attained regarding the campaign as a whole as well as each 
individual advertisement (Grey Advertising Melbourne, 1995).  
Through the above-mentioned examples, it can be deduced that social 
marketing theory was an integral part of the TAC’s success with its ‘bloody idiot’ 
campaign. Social marketing theory guided the development, implementation, and 
development of the campaign. By adopting techniques that are successful for 
commercial advertisers, the TAC was able to make their road safety messages 
tangible to the Victorian community, and therefore was able to gain the audience’s 
attention. The use of variable message strategies kept the consumer, or in this case 
community member, interested in the product. With a 92% unaided recall rate (ibid), 
the TAC has a product that the Victorian community is extremely aware of and 
familiar with. By utilising an IMC campaign, the TAC was able to truly integrate road 
safety into the Victorian mindset 
The importance of the integration of marketing communications 
According to Rossiter & Percy (1997), an Integrated Marketing 
Communications (IMC) campaign is one that utilises multiple media to promote a 
single ‘macroposition’ for a brand, and integrates over time with regards to its 
customers. IMC campaigns are utilised when a brand wants to have all of its 
‘marketing and promotional activities project a consistent and unified image to the 
marketplace’ (Belch & Belch, 2001, p11). This is done so there is a common theme 
and positioning from all of the brand’s communications (ibid) (see Figure 10 on p101 
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 for an example of the IMC process). Therefore regardless of what medium delivers a 
message to an audience member from the brand (e.g. if they see a television 
advertisement or see a billboard), the audience receives the same message. Although 
some researchers say IMC as a theoretical concept is not robust (Cornelissen & Lock, 
2000), the TAC serves as an example that supports Rossiter and Percy’s contention 
that it is. In this case, the TAC used the following media mix at the campaign’s 
inception: television: 70%, press: 14%, radio: 7%, outdoor: 5%, Sky Channel: 2%, 
cinema advertising: 2%. Expanding from the main media, promotional products were 
distributed ranging from t-shirts to coasters, bike lights to mini footballs (see 
Appendix: 1 N for pictures of various items). These media and promotional tools were 
used to promote the TAC’s position as a road safety organisation committed to the 
Victorian community. Specifically for its ‘bloody idiot’ campaign, the TAC 
positioned drink driving as socially unacceptable, by showing the tremendous amount 
of both pain and suffering it caused the multitude of people involved (victim, the 
victim’s family, the offender).  
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Figure 12: Integrated Marketing Communication Process Model27
 
In addition to its advertising and PR aspects of its IMC campaign, the TAC 
invested in many sponsorships to further convey its ‘bloody idiot’ message to the 
Victorian community. The TAC’s sponsorship policy was to sponsor significant 
Victorian events where there was increased exposure to and increased opportunity for 
community members to drink and drive. The Spring Racing Carnival (horse racing) 
and the Wangaratta Jazz Festival were two vehicles used to promote the TAC’s 
message. This sponsorship policy was an important component of the overall IMC 
                                                 
27 Model by Tom Duncan, founder of the CU IMC program: http://www.colorado.edu/Journalism/sjmcgrad/imc/Site_Pages/more.html:accessed 
via Google 8/06/04 
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 campaign as it expanded the message and variety of media that were used to portray 
the message. 
Possibly the TAC’s most widely-known component of the ‘bloody idiot’ 
campaign was the sponsorship of the Richmond Tigers Australian Rules Football 
(AFL) team. As sports, and particularly Australian Rules Football, or ‘footy’, are 
gospel in Victoria, this integration of the organisation into Victorian’s lives proved to 
be an excellent marketing move. The TAC began their Richmond sponsorship in the 
early 1990s, when drink driving was the major road safety issue in the public eyes. At 
the time the sponsorship began, the new booze buses had just been introduced and the 
‘bloody idiot’ advertising campaign had just been launched. Richmond was chosen 
due to the fact that it contained a significant amount of one of the larger target 
audience segments (working males between 18-25). As the team’s major sponsor, the 
TAC was able to put their logo and the ‘drink, drive, bloody idiot’ slogan on the front 
and back of the players’ jumpers (see Appendix: 1 O for photos of the jumper). In 
addition, the TAC received press backdrops and extensive signage both at 
Richmond’s home training ground and the two major sporting grounds in Melbourne 
at televised matches. Also, a certain amount of corporate hospitality, use of the 
players/coach for appearances (eg in hospitals), and assorted media rights (eg the web 
site) were exchanged for the sponsorship. 
Ben Holgate, Manager of Marketing and Innovation (at the time of the 
interview) described the importance and benefits of this aspect of the ‘bloody idiot’ 
IMC campaign: 
…in order to get very widespread, vernacular acceptance of the bloody idiot message 
among our core target audience market, sponsoring Richmond footy club seemed like 
a very good thing to do. And certainly it has assisted in getting almost iconic status 
for the drink drive bloody idiot message (pers comm., 2003). 
One major benefit of targeting sports fans is that in the Australian culture there 
is a strong emphasis on the mixing of alcohol and sport (Pettigrew, 2003); (Munro, 
1998). Therefore, a large target audience of drinkers (and potential drivers) can be 
reached by targeting sports fans. There were multiple benefits reaped by the TAC 
from the influence a footy sponsorship had on the TAC’s identity, in addition to the 
increased exposure to the target audience. Holgate explained: 
Football in Victoria… only once you live here do you understand how absolutely 
ingrained football is in this society. Being connected to football almost seems to give 
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 you by association almost a certain amount of credibility, and we would have 
credibility as a government organisation anyway, but it gives us a certain kind of 
realism, and a connection to the grassroots of how society works here. What I think 
makes us more believable here, people see the TAC as one of them, rather than an 
ivy-tower organisation that nags them about road safety issues. I think we are seen as 
much more connected with the man on the street, because of our football connection 
(pers comm., 2003). 
In addition to the regular shock advertisements and enforcement 
advertisements, the TAC created a humour ad specifically related to their footy 
sponsorship. That was the only positively framed ad the TAC produced for the 
‘bloody idiot’ campaign. As the Richmond footy club’s mascot is a tiger, and this 
image is automatically associated with the club, the tiger was incorporated in the ad. 
The ad involved two inebriated fans walking to their car in the sporting ground’s 
parking lot with the intention of driving home. As one tries to put the key in the door, 
they hear a tiger roar. They look around confused, not sure where the noise is coming 
from. After a few more attempts at unlocking the door they realise the tiger that is 
roaring is on a Richmond ‘drink drive bloody idiot’ sticker on the car. They walk 
away, deciding to find other transport home (see Appendix: 1 P to view Angry Tiger). 
This ad was successful because in addition to using a different tactic then the other 
TAC advertisements (which helps to keep the message fresh), it also resonated with 
some of the younger community members, who are not often targeted by the other 
advertisements. According to one father: 
Certainly makes me more aware of the consequences, but the one with the roaring 
tiger, the Richmond footy one, that’s good with kids, when the lion roars and doesn’t 
let him in he asks questions, why’s he doing that dad? So I explain to him, when you 
drink beer or wine, you can get so sick you’re not allowed to drive home, and as he 
grows older, that message will stick, hopefully. 
However it was not just the tiger advertisements that the parents thought were 
relevant to children. It is interesting to note that half of the parents interviewed 
specifically mentioned that the TAC advertisements were good for kids, or should be 
targeted more at children to get the message across. One parent, whose children were 
teenagers throughout the timeframe of the advertisements said: “I think it’s necessary 
for the young ones. It doesn’t affect me too much, but when the kids see it, they get up 
and they walk.” This illustrates that different types of appeals are beneficial for 
different target audiences, as described by Donovan et al (1995) earlier in the section. 
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 Dollars and sense and effective public communication  
One of the major contentions about the TAC advertising campaign was its 
cost. The TAC spent millions of dollars annually (approximately $16 million28) both 
on creating the television advertisements and on media spend to place them, in 
addition to the creation and placement of for radio advertisements, billboards, and the 
other aspects of their IMC campaign. Critics of the TAC’s advertising campaigns 
argue that the massive advertising spend and highly dramatic tactics may not have 
been necessary to secure similar results, if the amount of enforcement and media 
spend were equal to that of Victoria. Donovan et al (1999) concluded that although 
the TAC advertising was successful in the reduction of casualty crashes, the use of 
less costly and perhaps less dramatic advertisements could be more cost beneficial. 
Donovan et al. conducted research comparing high-cost, graphic TAC advertisements 
to other Australian states’ and New Zealand’s low emotion or talking heads 
advertisements. In addition, the TAC advertisements are often 60 or 90 second spots 
compared to 30 or 45 second spots, so the media spend can be much higher. When 
taking this factor into account, Donovan et al contests that ‘big budgets are clearly not 
a prerequisite for effectiveness’ (p250).  
 Thus, while the TAC advertisements did serve their purpose in Victoria, it 
may not be necessary for other jurisdictions to spend the same amount of money on 
their advertisements. For example a similar style of advertisements produced on a 
smaller budget may be able to produce comparable results, provided the advertising is 
supported by legislation and enforcement. 
The TAC defends its high advertising budget through cost-effectiveness it says 
is achieved by saving money on having to pay claims for accidents and deaths. This 
defence is echoed by Salmon & Murray-Johnson (2001): 
…the cost-effectiveness of a health intervention can be calculated to include savings 
in health care resources, diminished opportunity costs, and prolonged life, all of 
which most campaign evaluations do not address (p175) 
Thus while high costs can be justified, the question of whether or not the costs 
need to be as high as the TAC’s is an important distinction to be made for other 
jurisdictions contemplating a similar drink drive campaign. 
                                                 
28 Information from TAC Marketing Department (pers comm. 2004) 
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 TAC General Manager of Road Safety David Healy, while responding to a 
question about what, if anything, he would change about the TAC’s path addressed 
this issue of the organisation’s high media spend: 
I suspect that probably there was maybe an overkill in terms of advertising 
expenditure…I would probably, early on, redirect the balance away more from the 
emotive advertising and have much more of a balance between enforcement, 
educative, and emotive. The educating being like, modelling leaving the keys at 
home, which started later rather than earlier…but also options for you to avoid the 
drink driving, rather than just the pain of you drink and drive and you crash. Or, you 
drink and drive and you’re caught. Rather than saying, how do we get around that, 
what options do we have…how do we feel empowered, what options do we have to 
avoid that. And also giving permission for people to say no, in early settings…public 
education can play that role in a social context, to say no (pers comm., 2003). 
From the literature presented above, and the support of Healy’s comments, it 
has been concluded in this research that while the TAC’s advertising spend may have 
been justified by their return investment and the reduction in road toll, in hindsight 
this large budget may not have been necessary. Thus other jurisdictions that are 
looking to create a drink driving campaign may want to utilise the TAC’s tactics on a 
smaller, less expensive scale. It may be that an initial burst of spending similar to the 
TAC’s may be beneficial when launching the issue into a community, which would 
immediately be followed by a reduction in spending once the message has been 
received. It is noteworthy that the TAC now addresses a larger range of road safety 
issues on a budget slightly reduced from that of the early 1990s. 
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Synopsis of advertising in the social marketing context  
The combination of theoretical and research-based literature, practical 
experience in Victoria and the success of alternative methods in New South Wales 
that was presented in this chapter demonstrate that these highly graphic, highly 
emotional, high expense advertisements are not a requirement for successful road 
safety advertising. This type of advertising does serve its purpose, as is evident from 
this research to a degree. However these advertisements do not necessarily need to be 
the major focus of a campaign, and instead could be used more in the earlier stages of 
the campaign than in the later. They appear to be highly successful in getting 
community member’s attention, and making drink driving a social issue, both which 
are important factors in the early steps of an integrated drink drive campaign. 
However evidence demonstrated through the experience of New South Wales 
illustrates that low fear advertising is more effective in changing behaviours and 
attitudes providing the enforcement that is advertised is in place and threatening. 
Therefore, a combination of low fear, enforcement based advertising mixed with some 
high fear, emotional advertising may be the most successful. 
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 6: Advertising, policies and the pillars of enforcement:            
A discussion  
This case study has reviewed the anti-drink driving initiatives implemented 
and run in the state of Victoria, Australia from 1989-2000. This research involved 
literature, direct and participant observation, and interviews with both professionals in 
the road safety field and Victorian community members, in an effort to gain a wider 
perspective of the successes, shortcomings, and issues raised from these initiatives 
than was previously unavailable through quantitative data.  
This case study identified changes in Victorian attitudes and behaviours over 
the course of the initiatives and identified some factors that led to the occurrence of 
these changes. Furthermore, the research supports the importance of resources 
necessary to undertake a large-scale anti-drink driving campaign. In the Victorian 
case this is exemplified through a unique model that which is applied by the Transport 
Accident Commission. Moreover, this research has illustrated the importance of and 
advocates the use of a tripartite model for behavioural compliance for drink driving 
campaigns.  
Furthermore, while not falling under one of the main objectives of this 
research, this work uncovered a major issue facing the anti-drink driving cause, which 
to this point has remained largely absent from the drink driving literature. This issue 
involves a motorist’s ability to determine their blood alcohol concentration (BAC) 
while they are in the process of, or after drinking, and therefore gauge whether or not 
they should be driving. Various options were put to the community members 
interviewed to get their insight on these ideas, including a .00 BAC, coin-operated 
breathalysers, and alcohol ignition interlocks. Their comments will be discussed 
below. 
There is also be a brief discussion of other factors that played a role in the 
reduction in road toll in Victoria, such as the economy and other road safety programs 
such as Accident Blackspot areas. 
The following research questions underpinned this research, and a discussion 
of the resulting answers will be presented below: 
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• How has the attitude toward drink driving changed among Victorians since 
1989? 
• What has changed in drink driving behaviours since 1989? 
• What factors may have led to a reduction in incidences of drink driving in 
Victoria? 
• What types of advertising tactics are effective in changing people’s 
attitudes/behaviours regarding drink driving? 
• What direction could future anti-drink driving campaigns take to continue 
forward from the success of their predecessors? 
 
Attitude changes in Victoria in relation to drink driving  
Successful changes in attitudes as a result of initiatives  
It has been documented through a decline in the road toll and quantitative 
studies that Victorian attitudes regarding drink driving have changed over the past 
decade and a half. This researched aimed to do more in-depth work, to find out not 
only how attitudes have changed, but why. The response to the former question was 
more easily answered: 15 years ago drivers did not think about ‘drink driving’, 
because it was not an issue. If you went out and drank, you drove home. If the police 
stopped you, they would generally give you a warning and let you go. No one 
condemned the behaviour, so no one gave it much thought. Drinking and drinking was 
simply something that happened. Now, attitudes have shifted on two different levels. 
Drinking and driving is considered a socially unacceptable thing to do—those who do 
drink and drive are often condemned by their family and peers. Many community 
members will not drink and drive because they believe the behaviour is wrong. When 
asked, a majority of the interviewees said they would condemn a family member or 
friend if they were caught drink driving. This demonstrates that it is not socially 
acceptable to drink and drive. The other new attitude that has developed is one that 
the consequences of the behaviour are not worth the risk. For some community 
members the consequence would be death or injury of another, caused by their doing. 
For others, a more plausible consequence would be a loss of license and a fine when 
caught by the police.  
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 The latter question, as to why these attitudes shifts have occurred, is a more 
difficult one to answer. The literature and the interviews point to a variety of possible 
reasons; this research concludes that it is one of a few. A major reason for a shift in 
attitude would have been cognitive dissonance, as was explained in the 
communications chapter—when behaviour changes were forced due to enforcement, 
attitudes had to be changed to avoid a mental state of discomfort. The advertising at 
the time would have reinforced and sealed these newly acquired attitudes. Another 
reason for change would have been the advertising itself—for some community 
members, drink driving becoming a socially immoral issue with the potential for 
irrevocable and painful consequences would have been enough to change their 
attitudes of the behaviour. Alternatively, individuals who have had intimate 
knowledge of someone involved in a serious drink drive accident would have been 
scared into changing their attitudes, based on the consequences relating to someone 
very close to them.  
It is important to note however that while a majority of attitudes have changed 
in the Victorian community, there is still a minority of the population that believes 
drinking and driving is not wrong under any circumstances, and also that there are 
those that believe that drink driving is okay under certain conditions. Some 
interviewees said they would be more likely to chastise others for being stupid enough 
to get caught, which illustrates that there are some community members who believe 
that driving a bit over the limit is not a serious offence. This is important because it 
indicates not only that social pressure can act in a beneficial way when trying to 
change a community’s attitudes and behaviours, but also that a new problem has 
evolved: the community needs to be reminded and convinced that drinking even a bit 
over the limit is dangerous and an undesirable behaviour. 
Where the TAC campaign was unsuccessful 
There is little doubt following this research that Victoria was a highly 
successful jurisdiction in minimising drink driving through many of the avenues that 
it could control (aspects such as community member attitudes and behaviours, 
legislation, and enforcement). It is also noted that other avenues that influenced the 
road toll were outside the control of Victorian policy makers and road safety 
professionals, such as the economy. However in addition to all of the successes, there 
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 are some shortcomings that are important to note. These failings are noted so that 
Victoria can improve upon them, and so that other jurisdictions are watchful of them 
when they are preparing and executing their own campaigns. These weaknesses are 
mostly attitudinal, and thus will be discussed in this section.  
The attitudinal shortcomings stem from a distinction the Victorian community 
makes between ‘drink driving’ and ‘drunk driving’. Although the grey area between 
the two varies by community member, a strong distinction is drawn. Drink driving 
seems to occur after someone has had an amount of alcohol that does not necessarily 
seem to impair them—they are not slurring their words, or falling over, however they 
do have alcohol in their system. Some community members would identify drink 
driving as driving after drinking any amount of alcohol over the legal limit of .05; 
others believe they can drink more than .05 and not be impaired at all. Conversely all 
community members identify drunk driving as driving when an in individual is 
critically affected by alcohol—through visible behaviours such as the slurring of 
words or stumbling when trying to walk. This distinction between drink driving and 
drunk driving has led to the growth of a few undesirable attitudes: that driving a little 
bit over the legal limit is not a problem, that driving short distances is an acceptable 
behaviour, and that there is no any harm driving at BAC levels below the legal limit.  
Problems arise when behaviours are matched to these attitudes. Individuals 
think that driving ‘a little bit over’ the limit is not dangerous, so if they think they can 
drive without being caught they will drink past the .05 limit and drive. This puts 
drinking drivers on the road. Other individuals think that driving short distances is 
acceptable, both because they will not get caught over such a short distance and also 
because there is a small likelihood of getting in an accident. Again, drink drivers are 
on the road. Lastly, community members do not believe that driving with amounts of 
alcohol under the legal limit is a concern. This is in fact not the case. As was 
examined in-depth in the legislation section, some skills utilised when driving are 
affected at BAC levels of .02, even if they are not visibly apparent. Thus there are 
drivers on the road who may not be performing at their best levels and are unaware of 
their skill deficiencies.  
 All of the abovementioned attitudes can be dangerous, as they result in more 
drink drivers on the road, as well as drivers unaware that they are not performing at 
their full capacity. In Victoria, the first of these attitudinal shortcomings is currently 
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 being addressed, as a new campaign entitled ‘little bit over? You bloody idiot’ was 
launched in November 2003. However the other two issues still remain largely 
unaddressed, and it may be beneficial if both advertising campaigns (and enforcement 
were applicable) are developed to speak to and ultimately change these undesirable 
attitudes and resulting behaviours. 
When developing a long-term campaign strategy in other jurisdictions, these 
issues needs to be considered. While targeting these discretions needs not be the 
primary concern, they will need to be addressed once drink driving has been made a 
social behaviour and the major behaviours of drink driving have been minimised.  
Behaviour changes in Victoria as a result of initiatives  
Similarly to the change noted in regards to attitudes in question one, 
behaviours have distinctly changed over the past 15 years in Victoria as well. Where 
15 years ago community members would drink and drive, regardless of the distance 
that had to travel, who was in the car with them, or how close they were to the legal 
limit, these behaviours have all but been abandoned by the greater Victorian 
community. Instead, the different age groups have adopted more desirable behaviours. 
The younger community members leave their car at home, take taxis sometimes, and 
generally try to plan their transportation ahead of time. The older respondents take 
taxis a majority of the time, and walk and take public transport at other times. 
Alternately, they will drink and have their partners drive home. The older respondents 
also noted that their observations of younger community members included them 
often designating a driver. The use of personal breathalysers and BAC calculations 
based on body weight and number of drinks are new behaviours that have been 
adopted.  
In addition to adjusting their personal behaviour, community members have 
also changed their behaviours in relation to others drinking and driving. Hesitations 
over trying to stop a family member or close friend from drinking and driving seems 
non-existent, whereas 15 years ago stopping someone from drink driving was not 
even a thought. In addition to discouraging others from drink driving, there is a 
general sense of reluctance (when they are sober) to get into a car with a drink driver. 
15 years ago, riding with drink drivers was simply the way to get home, and it was not 
given a second thought.  
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 As was the case with community attitudes, there are some undesirable 
behaviours that have not yet been eradicated. There are still some drivers who have 
minimised their drink driving but will drive when they feel they are only slightly over 
the limit, or when they are driving short distances. There are of course also those who 
drink drive intentionally when they are well over the legal limit, however these 
recidivists (repeat offenders) are a very small percent of the community and often 
pose different issues, including but not limited to alcoholism. Additionally, when an 
individual is drunk their judgement is impaired and they will often be a passenger 
with a drink driver. Lastly, some passengers will get into a car with a driver they are 
comfortable with that person and if they feel that the person is not impaired (which 
often is assessed by visual cues). As was discussed in regards to the previous 
question, a lack of visual impairment does not mean the driver is operating at their full 
capacity and therefore could be a danger on the road. 
In Victoria, the issue of driving slightly over the limit again is currently being 
addressed by the ‘little bit over? You bloody idiot campaign’. However driving short 
distances and allowing people to drive or riding with drivers who may be over the 
limit but do not appear intoxicated are all issues that could be addressed with 
advertising (and enforcement where applicable) campaigns to try and change 
behaviours. 
These issues are also those that public policy makers and road safety 
professionals in other jurisdictions need to be wary of. Although not a primary 
concern with launching a campaign, they are issues that need to be addressed in due 
course once the larger problems are contained.  
 
Factors contributing to the Campaign’s success  
The tripartite model of effective social marketing campaigns  
The tripartite model for behavioural compliance for drink driving campaigns is 
comprised of a legislative element, an enforcement element, and an advertising 
element. 
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Figure 13: the tripartite model of behavioural compliance for effective  
social marketing campaigns 
 
It has been illustrated throughout this thesis that none of these components are 
strong enough on their own to change behaviours. It is only through the support of the 
other elements that change can be achieved and maintained. Although .05 legislation 
was in place in Victoria as early as 1966, this legislation was not strictly enforced 
until 1990, and therefore was relatively ineffective until this time. The random breath 
testing by itself would not have been accepted as quickly and easily as it was had it 
not been for the advertising that positioned drink driving as a social threat and socially 
immoral act, therefore triggering a community expectation of protection against this 
threat. The advertising itself, while bringing the issue to the forefront of community 
concern and even affecting the attitudes of some, was not strong enough to motivate a 
large number of community members to alter their behaviour. It was only when the 
legislation was enforced and the issue was made a concern and the threat made a 
viable one that behaviours, and therefore attitudes, were changed.  
Conversely, the lack of this tripartite model can be seen in the United States. 
The United States lacks strong legislative, enforcement, and advertising components. 
Moreover, none of the weak components support one another—the legislation is 
rarely enforced, and the advertising is minimal and does not support either the 
legislation or the enforcement. As a result, the US drink driving situation is not one 
that is improving a great deal. For example, in 2000, 17,380 people were killed in 
alcohol-related crashes in the US. These deaths constituted approximately 42 percent 
of America’s 41,945 total traffic fatalities (Tyson, 2001); (National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis, 2001).  
However in the case of Victoria, all three aspects were present and integrated. 
Legislation was implemented, enforced, and advertised. Enforcement was advertised. 
Advertising turned drink driving into a socially immoral act. Accordingly, the number 
of deaths on Victorian roads related to alcohol dropped from over one hundred to 
approximately 50 (Transport Accident Commission, 2004) (see Figure 12 below).  
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Figure 14: Victorian road fatalities due to illegal BACs from 1987-200229
 
While other factors such as the economy are noted as having an effect on the 
road toll, this work has clearly demonstrated the tripartite model played an integral 
role in the reduction of drink driving in Victoria. 
Importance of resource allocation to social marketing campaigns 
Having an organisation like the Transport Accident Commission was one of 
the major factors that aided Victoria’s success in minimising road toll numbers. As 
explained in Chapter 1: Background to the Study, the TAC is a monopolistic third-
party government organisation that is responsible for both compensating Victorian 
motorists involved in accidents and trying to minimise the road toll. Due to this 
unique situation, the TAC is willing to spend millions of dollars to try and minimise 
deaths and serious casualties on the road, to save money on the pay-out of those 
accidents. According to Inspector Cairns of the Victoria Police, each road death costs 
the Victorian community approximately one million dollars, in terms of lost earning 
production, family and community losses, vehicle damage, and insurance 
administration. Each serious injury costs the community about $700,000, and lesser 
injuries costs the community in terms of tying up medical resources, doctors, and 
hospitals.  
                                                 
29http://www.tacsafety.com.au/jsp/content/NavigationController.do?areaID=12&tierID=1&navID=A9348A54&navLink=null&pageID=164
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 Applying numbers like these, the TAC justifies the amount they spend on road 
safety mass media advertising per year (approximately $16 million, according to the 
TAC marketing department) based on the amount they are saving per year with fewer 
lives lost and fewer serious injuries. In other words, the TAC has a vested interest in 
lowering the road toll: money they put into lowering the road toll through initiatives is 
multiplied in returns by the amount of money they do not have to spend on death and 
injury compensation payouts. 
As the TAC has millions of dollars to spend on road safety initiatives, it was 
able to finance assist initiatives such as random breath testing. In 1989 and 1990 the 
TAC providing the Victoria Police with 13 custom-designed booze buses. The new, 
larger booze buses each cost half a million dollars, and are unique to Victoria.  
Another instrumental factor in Victoria’s success is the working partnership 
between all the road safety organisations in the jurisdiction. The TAC does not handle 
road safety alone; it is in a 3-organisation cluster with VicRoads and the Victoria 
Police. The TAC focus on road user attitudes and road safety behaviours, the Victoria 
Police concentrate on enforcement, investigation, and crash reporting, and VicRoads 
focus on the roads themselves, vehicles, traffic management, driver licenses, and 
regulation. In addition to their individual goals, the three organisations share 
responsibility for the areas of research and evaluation, information, and traffic safety 
education. Through the structure of this coordinated attack on road safety, suitable 
forums and processes for focusing on the priority issues, accomplishing tasks, and 
monitoring progress in meeting the goals of the strategy is achieved (Ungers, 1997).  
The structure of coordination and support described above is an important 
element that could be beneficial if it was seriously considered by jurisdictions looking 
to undertake a full-scale anti-drink driving campaign. The vested interest of an 
organisation like the TAC guarantees that it will make efforts to minimise the road 
toll instead of simply talking about potential solutions. In addition, an organisation 
with a vested interest would look for cost-effective and well-researched measures so 
as not to waste its own resources. This type of organisation also provides for itself 
financially, which is important as road safety measures such as random breath testing 
and advertising campaigns are expensive initiatives.  
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 Successful advertising tactics used in the TAC campaign  
Three types of successful advertising tactics were identified through this 
research. They are: the use of high-fear threat appeals which were successful in 
changing community members’ attitudes by making drink driving a socially moral 
issue, low-fear threat appeals which accomplished the task of changing community 
members’ behaviours, and informational appeals which also helped to change 
behaviours by promoting and informing the community about legislation and 
enforcement initiatives. As discussed in the Advertising chapter, each type of 
advertising was able to fulfil a different role as part of the overarching advertising 
component. 
It was also noted that the high costs the TAC paid in regards to some of its 
advertising campaigns are not necessary for a successful campaign. This is important 
to note for jurisdictions that do not have the same amount of financial support as 
Victoria. While the intensity of the TAC campaign appears beneficial for the 
beginning of other campaigns, it is not necessary for that intensity to be continued 
throughout the duration of the campaign. However a continual promotion is important 
to keep the message top-of-mind for community members. In addition, more low-fear 
and informational advertisements could be integrated into the campaign at an earlier 
stage than they were in the TAC campaign.  
 This chapter addressed the Victorian drink drive campaign from 1989-2000, 
based on results from the data collected throughout this research. In addition to issues 
related to this timeframe, information also emerged from the data regarding problems 
that may need to be addressed in the future. These issues will be attended to in the 
following chapter: A perspective on drink driving campaigns in the future.  
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 7: A perspective on drink driving campaigns in the future 
As noted in the previous chapter, one issue was uncovered that was not 
affiliated with the objectives of this work. However this issue of determining one’s 
BAC is considered to be important for the future of drink driving campaigns and 
therefore it will be addressed below. This chapter will explore the problem of 
determining one’s BAC and explore both potential technological and educational 
solutions. It concludes with future suggestions and a conclusion of the case study.  
Determining BAC: a continuing issue for compliance campaigns 
One issue stood out amongst the others in this research as an issue that needs 
to be addressed by the road safety community. Community members said that they 
have no accurate way of gauging their BAC, and they feel this is a serious concern, 
since they are expected to abide by a specific BAC or face legal ramifications. Some 
community members feel comfortable that they can estimate how much they can 
drink, while a majority do not.  
While there has been some research conducted on ways to aid motorists in 
determining their BAC (such as coin-operated breathalysers) and inhibiting drinking 
drivers (such as alcohol ignition interlocks), there is an absence of literature on the 
actual problem of motorists determining their BACs. Coin-operated breathalysers are 
generally viewed as unreliable by community members, and alcohol ignition 
interlocks are currently only used for recidivist (repeat) drink drivers. Attention is 
being focused on a solution before there is a satisfactory understanding of the 
problem, and how the community would be most receptive to dealing with it. 
This research was able to discern some of the issues facing community 
members; however more large-scale research could be undertaken both on the 
problem itself and potential solutions, to see if the ideas presented here are 
representative of the general Victorian community.  
One problem interviewees mentioned was the confusion caused by a lack of 
standardised drinks. While a community member may try to follow the ATSB guide 
(see Appendix: 1 Q for pictures of the guide), many do not realise that one glass of 
wine or one glass of beer is usually more than one standard drink. And unless one sees 
the bottle, there is no way of knowing how many standard drinks have been 
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 consumed. Thus while someone may presume they consumed four drinks, in reality 
they may have consumed the equivalent of five standard drinks of alcohol. This would 
be a very difficult and very expensive problem to rectify, as wineries, breweries, and 
mixed drink companies all produce different strength products, in different size 
bottles, and pubs across the country use different size glasses. Even if the problem 
was rectified, it would still leave unanswered the question as to how many drinks an 
individual should consume to stay under .05. 
Another problem involves the simple act of guessing as to what an 
individual’s BAC is after they have commenced drinking. Taking the un-standardised 
drinks into the equation, and then trying to figure out over what time period one has 
been drinking, on top of issues of metabolism with fluctuating factors (less sleep, big 
meal beforehand) it can be very hard to gain an accurate and confident reading of 
one’s BAC. Community members voiced that they feel they need better guides or 
better aides in helping them determine where their BAC is, to avoid driving when they 
are a little bit over the legal limit.  
The question that remains is which is the smarter option, to try and better 
educate the community members on ways to gauge their BAC, or to create 
technological options to gauge their BAC for them? Or, to create situations which 
stop individuals from driving once they have drank themselves over the limit? Or 
ultimately, to reduce the BAC to a limit where there is no uncertainty involved at all? 
While this research cannot answer this question, it can provide suggestions for 
measures that could be implemented and tested as possible solutions. 
Technology and BAC  
There are two technologies present at the moment that deal with gauging an 
individual’s BAC—breathalysers and alcohol ignition interlocks. Various types of 
breathalysers (coin-operated, disposable, police operated) are used to measure an 
individual’s BAC at this time; however they are either unreliable or unavailable to the 
public.  
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 Coin-operated breathalysers 
Coin-operated breathalysers (see Appendix: 1 T for photos) are machines 
placed in licensed venues such as casinos and pubs for a consumer’s use to gauge his 
BAC. A coin is deposited in the machine, and the user places a straw in a designated 
area and blows into it until the machine acknowledges the individual can stop. Then a 
BAC reading is given by the machine. Currently, a majority of coin-operated 
breathalysers are not constantly calibrated (so they are not accurate), and thus the 
community does not have high levels of confidence in them. Moreover, the machines 
give readings up to very high level BACs (.20, .30), which encourages drunk patrons 
to use the machine as a game, to see who is the drunkest by who records the highest 
BAC reading. A further limitation of the machines is that they are not widely 
available, so a majority of drinking community members do not have access to them. 
Discussions with Inspector Cairns of the Victoria Police included possible 
future amendments to and improvements of the machines that could make them more 
user-friendly and widely-used. Results of this discussion were then put to the 
community members, and their feedback was integrated into the following 
recommendations for machines community members said they would utilise: new 
machines need to be constantly calibrated, of a technological level even with the 
machines the Police use, and the government should subsidise the cost to help place 
them in licensed venues30. The highest reading the machine should produce (in 
Australia) is .08—therefore an individual would have a clear idea of how close to the 
limit they were while knowing if they can legally drive, or not.31 Additionally, a 
maximum reading of .08 would eliminate the use of the machines for drunken games.  
Community members were mixed on their beliefs of whether or not they 
would use it—younger drivers (under 30) said they would, especially if they thought 
they were close to the limit, with the exception being if they were very drunk, then 
they claimed they would not. Older drivers gave mixed responses, highlighted by the 
                                                 
30 Two hotel managers were interviewed who worked at a small neighbourhood pub. Both supported the idea of coin-operated breathalysers, but 
said for small venues such as theirs the cost would need to be subsidised. 
31 While a maximum reading of .05 was the original recommendation, it was noted that if someone received a reading of .05 they would not know 
how close to the limit they were and therefore may risk driving under the assumption that their level would soon drop below .05. At .08, an 
individual would know that they were significantly above the limit. 
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 fact that many do not frequent pubs (although some replied they would use it in a 
restaurant) and many feel they are confident with how much they can drink to stay 
under .05.  
There are potential problems with the use of coin-operated breathalysers as 
well, as noted by one of the road safety professionals interviewed. The major concern 
would be the liability aspect of such a machine. While a reading given could be 
accurate at the time of testing BAC levels can fluctuate due to factors such as if the 
individual had consumed a large meal and the alcohol had taken extra time to get into 
the blood. If a motorist was pulled over 15 minutes after using a coin-operated 
breathalyser and was given a different reading, they may have cause for complaint. A 
second issue is that some professionals believe that individuals tend to overestimate 
their BAC, and therefore would often drive when they were significantly under .05, 
instead of when they were .048. He believes that these machines may cause people to 
drink more then they normally would. These issues are important ones to be taken 
under consideration, and potential solutions could be discussed before a large-scale 
implementation of coin-operated breathalysers was undertaken. 
The qualitative data illustrates that this is an issue that needs further study. 
While studies have been done on coin-operated breathalysers, they did not include 
research on the type of model conceived here: a constantly calibrated, subsided 
machine that gave readings up to .08. It could be researched whether this type of 
machine could be created, and whether large numbers of community members would 
utilise them. The money for subsidising these machines could be supplied by fines for 
offenders caught drink driving.  
Personal breathalysers  
A personal breathalyser is a handheld device that measures an individual’s 
BAC level (see Appendix: 1 R for photos of two breathalysers). The distribution of 
personal reusable breathalysers to each motorist in Victoria is another potential 
solution to the BAC problem. Either a mandatory or optional program could be 
implemented. Through a mandatory program, an additional fee could be added to 
license registration costs of all new drivers, and all renewed licenses for the next ten 
years (the length of a license in Victoria). Therefore when a motorist paid their 
registration fees, they would receive a personal breathalyser. Alternatively, there an 
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 optional fee could be added to license registration that would make breathalysers 
available for motorists if they wanted to purchase one. Taking into consideration the 
massive bulk buying power the government would have, they would most likely be 
able to offer the breathalysers at a much cheaper rate than if an individual bought one 
themselves. For this program to be implemented the breathalysers would have to be 
highly accurate, and would also be faced with similar issues as the coin-operated 
breathalysers—the chance of increasing drinking for people who miscalculate, and 
litigious issues if the machines are faulty or not accurate. This is also a project that 
could be subsidised by fines from drink driving offenders. This idea was not put to the 
community members interviewed, so it is suggested research be undertaken both on 
the community’s viewpoint and on the possibility of creating technology that is 
accurate enough to be used.  
Alcohol Ignition Interlocks 
Breathalysers can inform individuals of their BAC and if they are above or 
below the legal limit, however they do nothing to actually stop someone from driving 
once they have decided to do so. This is especially relevant to alcoholics and 
recidivist drink drivers, who would not use a breathalyser. Therefore, technology was 
developed to inhibit these individuals from driving when they should not be—alcohol 
ignition interlocks (see Appendix: 1 S for photos of an interlock). Alcohol ignition 
interlocks are devices that are installed in a car and require a breath test before a car is 
started—if the reading is above the legal limit, the car will not start. Many of these 
machines also require the driver to blow into it at constant (or sporadic) intervals 
while driving; if the test is not performed of the result is positive, the car will shut 
itself off. Alcohol ignition interlocks are expensive to install and can be a hassle for 
the driver—therefore, they are currently only used by recidivists, who can chose to 
install one at their own expense in exchange for not serving time in jail.  
The potential use of alcohol interlocks in all vehicles was also discussed with 
Inspector Cairns. While identified as an initiative that would be not be ready for 
implementation in the near future (due to insufficient current technology), once 
interlocks were installed in a majority of vehicles these devices would immediately 
and drastically reduce the number of drink drivers, as people simply would not be able 
to drive if they were above the legal limit. 
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 Community members interviewed overall seemed to accept the idea, provided 
the interlocks were easy to use and only took a few seconds to work.  
Perhaps the largest issues facing this initiative are those of technology and 
cost. At the present time this technology is not in use, if it even exists. Thus time and 
resources would need to be spent developing a quick, easy, reliable interlock. In 
addition, the motor vehicle industry would most likely quote a very high figure as an 
add-on for each car these interlocks were placed in, and this would be a cost the 
community might not be willing to bear. Research needs to be done to find an 
accurate cost for the mass production and installation of these interlocks into cars. 
Research also needs to be conducted to determine if the community would support an 
initiative such as this, which could be seen as penalising the majority for offences 
committed by the minority. While comparable to random breath testing, RBT occurs 
to the average motorist a couple of times a year, where this would be an action 
necessary every time a motorist used their car. Therefore, as was the case with the 
introduction of RBT, a new advertising campaign would be required to prepare the 
community for this initiative and gain their support.  
One alternative that is being investigated by the TAC is an ‘alcohol sniffer’ 
device. This device would determine if there was an alcohol in the air inside the car. If 
not, the alcohol ignition interlock would be bypassed and the car could be started 
immediately. If there was any alcohol detected, than the driver would have to use the 
interlock.  
Educational options for self evaluating BAC 
Both breathalysers and interlocks are engineering solutions for behavioural 
problems, and some professionals and community members do not think this is the 
correct way to attack the problem. They are proponents of educational tactics; prepare 
community members with information before they start to drink, so they can make 
better decisions during the drinking process and immediately after. Unfortunately 
there are no set educational options available that the researcher is aware of, besides 
informing people about alternative actions to drink driving (for example: taking a taxi 
or using public transport, and designating a driver).  
One idea that could be explored would involve helping people gauge their 
approximate limit as to how many drinks they could consume and remain under .05. 
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 This would be used as a guide only, but would give individuals at least some idea of 
their limitation. The initiative would be geared towards younger people, at 18, the age 
when they legally start to drink in Australia. The scenario would involve a volunteer 
lock-down situation run at individual schools. All year-12 students over the age of 18 
would be invited to participate in a lock-down sleep-over where the purpose was to 
test their BAC level. The program would be designed like so: on a weekend evening 
all the students involved would come into the gym area, where they will remain for 
the rest of the night. They would all be feed dinner (pizza, for instance) and 
encouraged to eat an amount they would normally eat before a night out. Then each 
student would consume a drink, and half an hour later, would have their BAC tested. 
If they were under the .05 limit, they would consume another drink. The process 
would go on, with testing after every drink, and one drink an hour after the first hour. 
As soon as a student recording a reading of .050 or above, they would be cut off for 
the night and not be given any more alcohol. While this process was being run, there 
would be other activities to keep the students entertained, such as a mock casino 
night, or a movie night; and as it is a lock-down situation, all the students are required 
to spend the night as a precautionary measure. The goal would be to give the students 
a guide as to how many drinks they could safely drink while staying under the limit, 
based upon having a meal and drinking over a period of time. The incentive would be 
that the kids would have an idea of their limit, and the parents would have peace of 
mind knowing their children were being informed and educated while in a structured 
environment.  
Research would have to be undertaken to see if there would be community 
support for the program (from the students, parents, and school administrators) and 
police support (in providing officers and the breathalysers to test the students). It may 
be beneficial to consider programs that would be available to help those who are 
concerned determine their BAC limits, as this is an issue the community feels strongly 
about and does not feel confident in any of their current options.  
.00 BAC 
The only other option this research discussed in regards to the BAC issue was 
that of lowering the legal BAC to .00. This argument was presented in the Legislation 
chapter, as one that the Victorian community currently would not support. It was 
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 claimed by community members that this legislation would sharply contrast with the 
Australian social culture and would be more damaging than beneficial. Community 
members, while agreeing that the legislation may help the problem, professed that it 
was not a solution they would currently support. Conversely, a majority of the 
professionals were strong proponents of the idea, although they also had reservations 
about community support.  
It is the opinion of this researcher, based on qualitative data gathered 
throughout this research that reducing the BAC to .00 would not be the most 
beneficial initiative to undertake at this time. Instead, educational and technological 
tactics discussed above appear as though they would be the most accepted courses of 
action (and would result in a less likely chance of community backlash and a 
boomerang effect). However it is not advisable to forget the initiative of reducing the 
BAC to .00, especially if the road toll were to drastically increase again. It would 
most likely require carefully consideration and research if it were to be implemented, 
and a very strong advertising campaign would have to precede it to try and win 
community support. 
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 Conclusion 
Road safety is an issue of international importance: it affects millions of lives 
and costs billions of dollars every year worldwide. Of this global burden, alcohol-
related accidents make up a significant component of the overall road accident toll. 
The research presented in this thesis examined the drink driving initiatives of one 
jurisdiction that played a large role in reducing its alcohol-related road toll. In this 
case, a social marketing campaign proved effective in altering the attitudes and 
behaviours of the general Victorian community in relation to drink driving. One of the 
major reasons for this campaign’s success can be attributed to the tripartite model 
utilised that integrated legislation, enforcement and advertising initiatives. These 
initiatives resulted in drink driving becoming a socially unacceptable act in Victoria, 
and aided in the reduction of drink driving behaviours by some community members. 
In this case, deterrence theory proved a suitable and successful theoretical framework 
that supported enforcement initiatives. The use of both high and low fear threat 
appeals in addition to informational appeals appears to have been a successful mix in 
influencing the target audience. In Victoria, the implementation of an agency with 
vested interests in the road toll in addition to the cooperation of a number of road 
safety organisations appears to have played a role in the success of the initiatives. 
Despite the limitations of this study, the research has contributed to the knowledge 
regarding successful drink driving initiatives in Victoria, and potential successes for 
other jurisdictions. 
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Limitations 
While this study provided insight into one jurisdiction’s initiatives that aided 
in reducing drink driving related attitudes and behaviours, there are limitations that 
need to be addressed. The number of community members interviewed was small, and 
therefore generalisations are not possible to the whole Victorian community. 
Additionally, Victoria is only one jurisdiction and therefore its successes cannot be 
generalised to every nation with drink driving problems. 
The nature of a single case study is such that only one stream of Victoria’s 
overall road safety campaign was able to be evaluated: drink driving. The other 
streams (such as speeding) would have also impacted the overall road safety road toll 
reduction, and most likely also impacted Victorian’s attitudes and behaviours in 
relation to road safety. 
Recommendations for future research 
As a case study aims to provide a broad overview of the context rather than 
any specific detail, any future research could address the following areas:  
• Future research could focus on initiatives that address the issue of 
helping individuals determine their BAC.  
o Alcohol ignition interlocks are another initiative that could be 
researched. These interlocks are wired to the engine to prevent 
motorists with a BAC above the legal limit to operate the 
vehicle. Research could examine if community members would 
support the interlocks in their cars.  
o Coin operated breathalysers, which could be placed in pubs and 
restaurants for patrons to use after they have consumed alcohol 
when they are unsure if they are above the legal limit are one 
initiative to study.  Research could ascertain if patrons would 
utilise the machines if they were available, how much they 
would be willing to pay to use them, and if licensed premises 
would install them. 
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 o Educations programs could try to inform individuals of their 
average BAC levels per number of drinks. Research could 
develop different strategies for testing individual’s alcohol 
levels, such as the year 12 program presented earlier in this 
chapter. In addition, work could be done to examine the amount 
of support such a program would receive from the students, the 
parents, and the police (who would be conducting the breath 
testing). 
• Research could also be conducted to determine if it is possible to 
reverse the attitudes held by community members that driving a little 
bit over the limit is acceptable, and also that driving short distances is 
not problematic. The objective of the research would be to determine if 
advertising campaigns or enforcement initiatives are more likely to 
have an effect. 
• Tactics could be developed through research to educate the community 
that there are dangers when driving with any alcohol in the system, so 
that drinking right up to the .05 BAC limit is not a desirable behaviour. 
The question of what type of initiative (legislative, enforcement, or 
advertising) would be most effective could be examined. 
All of these suggestions for future research, if undertaken, could potentially 
help inform policy makers about possibilities for the minimisation of the alcohol 
related road toll in the future for jurisdictions around the world.  If this was to occur, it 
would aid in circumventing the World Health Organisation’s prediction that road 
traffic injuries will become the third leading contributor to the world’s disease and 
injury burden. 
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Guide to the Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: DVD  
Appendix 2: A guide to Appendix 1  
Appendix 3: Transcript for viewing of Appendix 1 C 
Appendix 4: Transcript for viewing of Appendix 1D 
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Appendix 1 
 
DVD with multimedia Appendices 
 
 
 
The DVD is located on the inside-back cover of this thesis 
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Appendix 2: A guide to the contents of Appendix 1, the DVD 
 
Appendix A:  Picture of a Victorian booze bus 
Appendix B: Video of random breath tested process in Victoria 
Appendix C: Video from direct observation of the Booze Buses on the West  
 Gate Freeway (19 minutes)  
Appendix D: Virtual tour on a 2003 Victorian Booze Bus 
Appendix E: Drive Right Sticker 
Appendix F: Go Melbourne guide 
Appendix G: TAC emotional and threat advertisements 
Appendix G1: Girlfriend (1st advertisement of the campaign) 
Appendix G2: Glasses 
Appendix G3: Bush Telegraph 
Appendix G4: Never 
Appendix H: Other streams of TAC advertisements 
Appendix H1: 6’o clock news - speed 
Appendix H2: Consequences (informational) 
Appendix H3: Bones (seatbelt) 
Appendix H4: Pinball (seatbelt) 
Appendix H5: Country Kids (concentrate) 
Appendix H6: Motherless Child (concentrate) 
Appendix H7: Nightshift (fatigue) 
Appendix H8: Powernap (informational) 
Appendix H9: Country People Die (country drivers) 
Appendix H10: Crash Cause (younger drivers) 
Appendix I:  Informational advertisements 
Appendix I1: On the buses 
Appendix I2: Every car a booze bus 
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Appendix I3: Back Streets  
Appendix I4: See the light 
Appendix I5: Blue Squares 
Appendix J: The Pub 
Appendix K: Stop Bus 
Appendix L: Joey 
Appendix M: 12 Days of Christmas 
Appendix N: TAC Promotional items 
Appendix N1: Bloody Idiot bumper sticker 
Appendix N2: Bike light 
Appendix N3: T-shirt 
Appendix N4: Plastic carry bag 
Appendix N5: Tiger coaster 
Appendix N6: Paper carry bag 
Appendix N7: Tigerhead stick 
Appendix O: A photo of a Richmond Tigers footy jumper  
Appendix P: ‘Angry Tiger’  
Appendix Q ATSB wallet-size BAC guide card  
Appendix R1: Personal breathalyser model 1 photo 
Appendix R2: Personal breathalyser model 2 photo 
Appendix S1: Alcohol ignition interlock exterior photo  
Appendix S2: Alcohol ignition interlock interior photo 
Appendix T1: Coin-operated breathalyser photo 
Appendix T2: Coin-operated breathalyser close-up photo 
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Appendix 3: Transcript for direct observation of the Booze Buses 
on the West Gate Freeway  
(Duration 19 minutes) 
• Buses arriving on the West Gate Freeway 
• Watch the unloading of equipment from the bus: 
• See the generator  
• A chase car 
• The set-up of the testing area 
• Walk through a fully-fitted bus 
• Note the forms, evidentiary machine, where they offenders and officers sit. 
• An officer explains four forms are printed and a receipt: 1 for offender, 1 
for informant. 1 for operator, one for Traffic Alcohol office 
• Watch the randomness of the practice, as some cars get waved in and some 
keep going 
• Line of officers 
• First cars pulled in—count, takes 16 seconds from when pull in front of 
officer until they drive away 
• Observe the process in action 
• Officer waving cars in, see the strip where they park cars of people being 
tested 
• Observations from the strip with the officers 
• Bucket where they place used mouthpieces 
• Next officer in line puts out hand with breathalyser to signal motorist 
where to stop 
• Second bus on the other side of the road, two working at once 
• Close-up of breathalyser  
• More observations from the strip 
• Drive in a car up freeway towards RBT stop 
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• Start to notice ‘slow down’ signs as you see flashing lights up ahead, as 
coming around the bend 
• See a car cut across 3 lanes from the right to get off at the exit ramp when 
realises random breath testing is ahead 
• Note that the car is greeted by a hidden booze bus 
• View from the booze bus on the exit ramp 
• Note road work from VicRoads, a Victorian organisation. Note that 
partnership between the organisation is important for the RBT process to 
run safely and smoothly  
• Driving up to booze buses 
• See the HSV car 
• Pan the whole operation 
• See license plate BBus 1 
• Shot of cars parked off the road who failed first test 
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Appendix 4: Tour of Victorian booze buses given by Inspector Ian 
Cairns, Head of the Traffic Alcohol Section, Victoria Police. 
 (Duration 5 minutes)  
 
• See the exterior of the booze bus; it’s unique size, shape and paint job. 
• Watch the light generator set up 
• Open the back and step inside for an intimate tour of the bus’s facilities 
• A ‘police station on wheels’ – storage for safety vests, forms, etc… 
• Offenders sits at one side of table, officer at other. 
• Across from evidentiary breath testing machine 
• Through to second station with similar set-up 
• Technology: GPS equipment, police scanners and radios, mobile 
phones 
• Driver’s compartment 
• Push-button automatic shifting, video camera for backing up truck, 
coffee, tea, microwave, seating for 8 
• Look up and see the generator through sky light 
• Leave booze bus 
• A view of new bus from outside, generator, pan bus 
• Pan of older buses 
• Back to new bus 
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